Changes

'''ICANN Accountability''' became a primary focal point of the [[ICANN]] community. Shortly after the [[NTIA]] announced its intent to transition stewardship of the [[IANA]] functions to the global multistakeholder community. ICANN , already bestowed with the IANA functions contract and coordination of the [[DNS]], was asked to kick-start a mutistakeholder process aimed at developing a proposal for the transition. During the early stages of this process, the community raised concern over the outlook of ICANN’s accountability following the transition. <ref>[https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/process-next-steps-2014-10-10-en Enhancing ICANN Accountability: Process and Next Steps]</ref>

'''ICANN Accountability''' became a primary focal point of the [[ICANN]] community shortly after the [[NTIA]] announced its intent to transition the stewardship of the [[IANA]] functions to the global multistakeholder community. ICANN, already bestowed with the IANA functions contract and coordination of the [[DNS]], was asked to kick-start a mutistakeholder process aimed at developing a proposal for the transition. During the early stages of this process, the community raised concern over the outlook of ICANN’s accountability following the transition. <ref>[https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/process-next-steps-2014-10-10-en Enhancing ICANN Accountability: Process and Next Steps]</ref>

From the days of ICANN’s infancy, a high degree of accountability was set in place by contractual relationship between ICANN and the United States government. The renewal process of the IANA functions contract has historically served as a backstop to ICANN accountability. The impending relinquishment of this role by the US government, created the opportunity and the necessity to examine the efficacy of existing accountability mechanisms. <ref>[https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/process-next-steps-2014-10-10-en Enhancing ICANN Accountability: Process and Next Steps]</ref>

From the days of ICANN’s infancy, a high degree of accountability was set in place by contractual relationship between ICANN and the United States government. The renewal process of the IANA functions contract has historically served as a backstop to ICANN accountability. The impending relinquishment of this role by the US government, created the opportunity and the necessity to examine the efficacy of existing accountability mechanisms. <ref>[https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/process-next-steps-2014-10-10-en Enhancing ICANN Accountability: Process and Next Steps]</ref>

In responding the raised concerns, the CCWG met in Paris for a Face-to-face meeting and united around the Sole Member Model, which presented SOs and ACs as a single member of ICANN. This model was then developed into the CCWG’s Second Draft Proposal, which introduced the Community Mechanism as a Sole Member (CMSM) model.  

In responding the raised concerns, the CCWG met in Paris for a Face-to-face meeting and united around the Sole Member Model, which presented SOs and ACs as a single member of ICANN. This model was then developed into the CCWG’s Second Draft Proposal, which introduced the Community Mechanism as a Sole Member (CMSM) model.  

The second proposal was met with significant resistance by ICANN’s board, which provided an alternative proposal in the form of the Multistakeholder Enforcement Mechanism (MEM) model. This led to the CCWG to call for a Face-to-Face meeting in Los Angeles. At this meeting the board drew a “red line,” communicating that it could not accept a model involving Membership. Accordingly, CCWG participants began exploring alternative options, including considering a “designator” model. However, the Board asserted that like the Membership model, a designator model was unacceptable.  

The second proposal was met with significant resistance by ICANN’s board, which provided an alternative proposal in the form of the Multistakeholder Enforcement Mechanism (MEM) model. This led to the CCWG to call for a Face-to-Face meeting in Los Angeles. At this meeting, the board drew a “red line,” communicating that it could not accept a model involving Membership. Accordingly, CCWG participants began exploring alternative options, including considering a “designator” model. However, the Board asserted that like the Membership model, a designator model was unacceptable.  

There will be no final proposal available for review at ICANN 54 in Dublin.

There will be no final proposal available for review at ICANN 54 in Dublin.

An enhanced Independent Review Process and redress process with a broader scope and the power to ensure ICANN stays within its revised Mission

An enhanced Independent Review Process and redress process with a broader scope and the power to ensure ICANN stays within its revised Mission

New specific powers for the ICANN community that can be enforced when the usual methods of discussion and dialogue have not effectively built consensus including the powers to:

New specific powers for the ICANN community that can be enforced when the usual methods of discussion and dialogue have not effectively built consensus including the powers to:

* Reject ICANN Budgets, Operating Plans or Strategic Plans

* Reject ICANN Budgets, Operating Plans, or Strategic Plans

* Reject changes to ICANN's Bylaws

* Reject changes to ICANN's Bylaws

* Approve changes to new Fundamental Bylaws (see below)

* Approve changes to new Fundamental Bylaws (see below)

* Additions to the ICANN Bylaws to create an Empowered Community that is based on a simple legal vehicle that will act on the instructions of ICANN stakeholder groups to exercise the Community Powers. The Empowered Community is granted the status of a Designator (a recognized role in law) and has the standing to enforce the Community Powers if needed.

* Additions to the ICANN Bylaws to create an Empowered Community that is based on a simple legal vehicle that will act on the instructions of ICANN stakeholder groups to exercise the Community Powers. The Empowered Community is granted the status of a Designator (a recognized role in law) and has the standing to enforce the Community Powers if needed.

* Core elements of ICANN's governing documents (the Articles and Bylaws) being categorized as Fundamental Bylaws that can only be changed with agreement between the ICANN community and the ICANN Board.

* Core elements of ICANN's governing documents (the Articles and Bylaws) being categorized as Fundamental Bylaws that can only be changed with an agreement between the ICANN community and the ICANN Board.

In addition, further proposed changes include:

In addition, further proposed changes include:

*Incorporation of ICANN's commitments under the 2009 Affirmation of Commitments with the United States Department of Commerce into the Bylaws, where appropriate

*Incorporation of ICANN's commitments under the 2009 Affirmation of Commitments with the United States Department of Commerce into the Bylaws, where appropriate

Improved accountability and diversity for ICANN's Supporting Organizations and Advisory Committees

Improved accountability and diversity for ICANN's Supporting Organizations and Advisory Committees

* A commitment to discuss additional accountability improvements and broader accountability enhancements in 2016, following implementation of this core set of accountability improvements

* A commitment to discuss additional accountability improvements and broader accountability enhancements in 2016, following the implementation of this core set of accountability improvements

To develop these recommendations to improve ICANN's accountability, the Working Group:

To develop these recommendations to improve ICANN's accountability, the Working Group: