Changes

'''ICANN Accountability''' refers to ICANN's commitment to maintain and improve mechanisms for public input, responsibility, and transparency so that ICANN’s decision-making reflect the public interest and are accountable to the Internet community. Toward this aim, ICANN relies on a quantitative report of accountability indicators to demonstrate progress toward [[ICANN Governance]] objectives, as outlined in the organization's strategic and operating plans. [[ICANN Bylaws]] have also established four mechanisms for reviewing and reconsidering ICANN actions and decisions: [[Empowered Community]], [[Reconsideration]], [[IRP|Independent Review]], and an [[Ombudsman]].

'''ICANN Accountability''' refers to ICANN's commitment to maintain and improve mechanisms for public input, responsibility, and transparency so that ICANN’s decision-making reflect the public interest and are accountable to the Internet community. Toward this aim, ICANN relies on a quantitative report of accountability indicators to demonstrate progress toward [[ICANN Governance]] objectives, as outlined in the organization's strategic and operating plans. [[ICANN Bylaws]] have also established four mechanisms for reviewing and reconsidering ICANN actions and decisions: [[ICANN Empowered Community]], [[Reconsideration]], [[IRP|Independent Review]], and an [[Ombudsman]].

==History==

==History==

Accountability, along with transparency, became a primary focal point of the [[ICANN]] community shortly after the [[NTIA]] announced its intent to transition the stewardship of the [[IANA]] functions to the global multistakeholder community. ICANN, already bestowed with the IANA functions contract and coordination of the [[DNS]], was asked to kick-start a multistakeholder process aimed at developing a proposal for the transition. During the early stages of this process, the community raised concern over the outlook of ICANN’s accountability following the transition. <ref>[https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/process-next-steps-2014-10-10-en Enhancing ICANN Accountability: Process and Next Steps]</ref>

Accountability, along with transparency, became a primary focal point of the [[ICANN]] community shortly after the [[NTIA]] announced its intent to transition the stewardship of the [[IANA]] functions to the global multistakeholder community. ICANN, already bestowed with the IANA functions contract and coordination of the [[DNS]], was asked to kick-start a multistakeholder process aimed at developing a proposal for the transition. During the early stages of this process, the community raised concern over the outlook of ICANN’s accountability following the transition. <ref>[https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/process-next-steps-2014-10-10-en Enhancing ICANN Accountability: Process and Next Steps]</ref>

From the days of ICANN’s infancy, a high degree of accountability was set in place by a contractual relationship between ICANN and the United States government. The renewal process of the IANA functions contract has historically served as a backstop to ICANN accountability. The impending relinquishment of this role by the US government, created the opportunity and the necessity to examine the efficacy of existing accountability mechanisms. <ref>[https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/process-next-steps-2014-10-10-en Enhancing ICANN Accountability: Process and Next Steps]</ref>

From the days of ICANN’s infancy, a high degree of accountability was set in place by a contractual relationship between ICANN and the United States government. The renewal process of the IANA functions contract has historically served as a backstop to ICANN accountability. The impending relinquishment of this role by the US government created the opportunity and the necessity to examine the efficacy of existing accountability mechanisms. <ref>[https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/process-next-steps-2014-10-10-en Enhancing ICANN Accountability: Process and Next Steps]</ref>

In late 2014 the need for an Accountability evaluation gave way to the creation of the CCWG-Accountability (CCWG), a cross-community working group created by [[SO]]s and [[AC]]s to determine how the current mechanisms in place could be strengthened to compensate for the absence of the US Government.  The CCWG immediately began working on the developing proposed reforms to the accountability mechanisms currently in place, publishing its First Draft Proposal in May 2015. <ref>[https://internetnz.nz/sites/default/files/2015-10-09-ICANN-accty-chrono.pdf Chronology of Recent ICANN Accountability milestones]</ref>

In late 2014 the need for an Accountability evaluation gave way to the creation of the CCWG-Accountability (CCWG), a cross-community working group created by [[SO]]s and [[AC]]s to determine how the current mechanisms in place could be strengthened to compensate for the absence of the US Government.  The CCWG immediately began working on developing proposed reforms to the accountability mechanisms currently in place, publishing its First Draft Proposal in May 2015. <ref>[https://internetnz.nz/sites/default/files/2015-10-09-ICANN-accty-chrono.pdf Chronology of Recent ICANN Accountability milestones]</ref>

Enhancing ICANN Accountability is inherently intertwined with the IANA Stewardship Transition. In fact, there may not be any specific topic surrounding the transition that carries more weight than the outcome of the process for Enhancing ICANN Accountability.  

Enhancing ICANN Accountability is inherently intertwined with the IANA Stewardship Transition. In fact, there may not be any specific topic surrounding the transition that carries more weight than the outcome of the process for Enhancing ICANN Accountability.  

==CCWG-Accountability==

==CCWG-Accountability==

The CCWG-Accountability was developed in response to a community that did not believe that ICANN’s Board’s proposal adequately met the needs of the global multistakeholder community. The accountability process that was originally designed by ICANN received unfavorable public comments, resulting a revised proposal. After the revised version, suggesting a two-tier working group, once again received a negative response during the public comment period, ICANN stakeholders submitted a joint rejection letter to the ICANN Board demanding a community-driven approach. <ref>[http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-enhancing-accountability-06sep14/pdfggcThDbfOp.pdf Stakeholders Joint Letter]</ref>

The CCWG-Accountability was developed in response to a community that did not believe that ICANN’s Board’s proposal adequately met the needs of the global multistakeholder community. The accountability process that was originally designed by ICANN received unfavorable public comments, resulting in a revised proposal. After the revised version, suggesting a two-tier working group once again received a negative response during the public comment period, ICANN stakeholders submitted a joint rejection letter to the ICANN Board demanding a community-driven approach. <ref>[http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-enhancing-accountability-06sep14/pdfggcThDbfOp.pdf Stakeholders Joint Letter]</ref>

The joint letter combined with reiterated demands for accountability improvements at an ICANN Town Hall Session at the United Nations Ninth Internet Governance Forum (IGF) and favorable comments coming from the NTIA, led the board to concede at ICANN 51 in Los Angeles that accountability and the IANA Transition are ultimately intertwined.  

The joint letter combined with reiterated demands for accountability improvements at an ICANN Town Hall Session at the United Nations Ninth Internet Governance Forum (IGF) and favorable comments coming from the NTIA, led the board to concede at ICANN 51 in Los Angeles that accountability and the IANA Transition are ultimately intertwined.  

Based on strong community sentiment, the structure originally proposed by ICANN, the CCG/Coordination Group, was adapted into the CCWG-Accountability, which became the vehicle for creating proposed improvement to the mechanisms already in place.  

Based on strong community sentiment, the structure originally proposed by ICANN, the CCG/Coordination Group, was adapted into the CCWG-Accountability, which became the vehicle for creating a proposed improvement to the mechanisms already in place.  

In May 2015, the CCWG submitted their First Draft Proposal, which proposed SO/ACs as Members of ICANN, giving them the ability to exercise certain accountability powers. This comments on this initial proposal expressed concerns with the individual SO/AC roles and legal personality required under this model.  

In May 2015, the CCWG submitted their First Draft Proposal, which proposed SO/ACs as Members of ICANN, giving them the ability to exercise certain accountability powers. These comments on this initial proposal expressed concerns with the individual SO/AC roles and legal personality required under this model.  

<ref>[https://internetnz.nz/sites/default/files/2015-10-09-ICANN-accty-chrono.pdf Chronology of Recent ICANN Accountability milestones]</ref>

<ref>[https://internetnz.nz/sites/default/files/2015-10-09-ICANN-accty-chrono.pdf Chronology of Recent ICANN Accountability milestones]</ref>

In responding the raised concerns, the CCWG met in Paris for a Face-to-face meeting and united around the Sole Member Model, which presented SOs and ACs as a single member of ICANN. This model was then developed into the CCWG’s Second Draft Proposal, which introduced the Community Mechanism as a Sole Member (CMSM) model.  

In responding to the raised concerns, the CCWG met in Paris for a Face-to-face meeting and united around the Sole Member Model, which presented SOs and ACs as a single member of ICANN. This model was then developed into the CCWG’s Second Draft Proposal, which introduced the Community Mechanism as a Sole Member (CMSM) model.  

The second proposal was met with significant resistance by ICANN’s board, which provided an alternative proposal in the form of the Multistakeholder Enforcement Mechanism (MEM) model. This led to the CCWG to call for a Face-to-Face meeting in Los Angeles. At this meeting, the board drew a “red line,” communicating that it could not accept a model involving Membership. Accordingly, CCWG participants began exploring alternative options, including considering a “designator” model. However, the Board asserted that like the Membership model, a designator model was unacceptable.  

The second proposal was met with significant resistance by ICANN’s board, which provided an alternative proposal in the form of the Multistakeholder Enforcement Mechanism (MEM) model. This led the CCWG to call for a Face-to-Face meeting in Los Angeles. At this meeting, the board drew a “red line,” communicating that it could not accept a model involving Membership. Accordingly, CCWG participants began exploring alternative options, including considering a “designator” model. However, the Board asserted that like the Membership model, a designator model was unacceptable.  

There will be no final proposal available for review at ICANN 54 in Dublin.

There will be no final proposal available for review at ICANN 54 in Dublin.