View source for ICANNWiki:Interview with Philip Sheppard on the origins of the business community in Internet governance (2024)

{{AtheneumInterview
| Title = Interview with Philip Sheppard on the origins of the business community in Internet governance
| Format = Text interview
| Date = September 11, 2024
| Interviewer = [[Mark W. Datysgeld]] ([[User:MarkWD]])
| Interviewee = [[Philip Sheppard]]
}}

'''(Mark W. D.)'''
How did the idea of establishing a permanent business users group within ICANN originate and which companies were the key players?

'''(Philip Sheppard)'''
Once business users found that the Internet was becoming commercially interesting, governments realised that coordination and regulations were required. They naturally looked to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), a treaty organisation that co-ordinated international telephony. That body had evolved with members (often public sector PTT organisations) and a growing users body of the newer private sector  telephony suppliers.  

Internet users and suppliers with experience of the ITU realised its decision-making process was too slow for the fast-evolving Internet and lobbied for something else. As ICANN started the ITU model of suppliers and users was adopted.

The founders of the Business Constituency (BC) were phone companies such as BT, AT&T, and Telefonica who had a foot in two camps (Internet service providers and users). By 1999 brands found they were suffering online from counterfeits and impersonation and looked to their intellectual property lawyers to help. The first members of the intellectual property constituency were all US lawyers.  The members of my organisation – the European Brands Association – faced the same intellectual property issues and having discovered the existence of ICANN decided in 1999 to join the BC which had a broader user focus. Seeking influence, I became a member of the Names Council at the end of 1999, and then Chairman from 2001 – 2002.

'''(Mark W. D.)'''
What role did the business users community expect to play in Internet governance starting in the 1990s?

'''(Philip Sheppard)'''
The Internet had evolved technically in a haphazard way with functionality not consumer protection being the priority. The business users community wanted to establish trust by addressing consumer harm caused by Internet actors and realised that it was not going to happen anywhere else but ICANN. 

'''(Mark W. D.)'''
From the business users community's perspective, how would you describe the first few years of ICANN policymaking? What were the business users community’s goals and to what extent were they achieved?

'''(Philip Sheppard)'''
For us the goals were trust and consumer protection. That meant we needed to know who the bad guys were. We were horrified to discover that finding out who owned a domain name was no easy task. Hence improving WHOIS to be a function that could fight crime was key. We were alarmed to discover that another group of users thought this a bad idea. They wanted to protect anonymous free speech, a real if minority issue, especially in countries where speaking the truth could get you killed. Striking a middle way was difficult. This division was exploited by the suppliers (registries and registrars) who realised technical or operational change to fight crime would impose direct costs on them. Their actions at the time suggest they chose cost minimisation over consumer protection. Alas WHOIS was then, and remains, an inadequate means to fight online crime.

'''(Mark W. D.)'''
During the early years of ICANN, was there discussion about the varying sizes and influences of companies and their approach to Internet governance?

'''(Philip Sheppard)'''
As the BC grew, we encompassed multi-nationals, trade associations, and certain small companies. Those small companies typically had a special business interest relevant to domain names. However, they saw the merit of consumer protection, and even if it might impact a specific business ambition, they would agree with BC policy. Policy was created by discussion and the adoption of a paper, where necessary by a weighted majority vote.

'''(Mark W. D.)'''
In the early years, how much access to policy-related information did the business users community have?

'''(Philip Sheppard)'''
Information from the ICANN secretariat was poor and typically provided by ICANN’s legal expert. The expert did his best to help but was also new to the game. Information from the suppliers’ side was filtered. We were obliged to become familiar with the DNS and other systems to be able to propose technical solutions to trust and consumer issues.

'''(Mark W. D.)'''
Can you identify the business users’ key policy topics during ICANN's first five years?

'''(Philip Sheppard)'''
{| class="wikitable"
|-
! Year !! Policy !! Objective
|-
| 2000 || New TLDs || Follow 7 principles: certainty, honesty, differentiation, competition, diversity, meaning, simplicity
|-
| 2001 || At-Large || Maintain a representative stakeholder model and avoid capture by narrow interests
|-
| 2001 || .org || Increase competition by re-delegating away from Verisign
|-
| 2002 || UDRP || Make the UDRP efficient and quick
|-
| 2004 || .net || Increase competition by re-delegating away from Verisign
|-
| 2004 || New TLDs || Make all new TLDs restricted or sponsored
|-
| 2005 || WHOIS || Make WHOIS effective in addressing crime
|-
| 2005 || Law || Ensure conflict between ICANN policy and national law is not a barrier to making policy
|}

'''(Mark W. D.)'''
Do you recall early ICANN interactions between stakeholders being characterized by polarization or was there a sense of shared purpose?

'''(Philip Sheppard)'''
The Names Council was always polarised due to the conflict of objectives. Users wanted to introduce operations to make the Internet a place for trusted business. Suppliers actions at the time suggest they chose cost minimisation over trust-enhancements.

'''(Mark W. D.)'''
How has the business users community's participation in Internet governance evolved from its early days to the present?

'''(Philip Sheppard)'''
Policy making when I chaired the Names Council was quick and effective. Discussion was tempered by a sense of urgency that there was harm being done and we were the only global body that could address it. We created and implemented policy in months. 

Following the creation of the GNSO, policy development became sluggish. Objections (I want to think about it more) or laziness (I haven’t consulted my constituency within the deadline) were indulged at the expense of moving forward to addressing ongoing harm. Worse the GNSO Council trashed its delegated role to make policy as the representatives of their constituencies and instead became an overseer of a cumbersome policy process. This resulted in a system where irrelevance was given undue weight. Policy now takes years. 

This loss of urgency, to create trust by fighting crime enabled by the Domain Name System, continues today. It is ICANN’s most significant failure.

[[Category:Internet Governance Atheneum]]
[[Category:Interviews]]