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'''Congolese Network Information Centre, or CDNIC''' was the registry operator that managed and administered the .cd [[ccTLD]] for the Democratic Republic of the Congo.<ref name="dotafrica">[http://dotafrica.blogspot.com/p/african-cctlds.html African ccTLDs], DotAfrica. Retrieved 2015 September 9.</ref> The Office Congolais des Postes et Télécommunications (OCPT) is now listed by the [[ccNSO]] as the registry manager.<ref>[https://ccnso.icann.org/en/about/member-profiles/cd.htm ccNSO Member Profile - .cd]</ref> The OCPT is now the Société Congolaise des Postes et Télécommunications (SCPT).<ref name="niccd">[http://www.nic.cd/nic.cd/ Nic.cd - Notice]</ref>

'''Congolese Network Information Centre, or CDNIC''' was the registry operator that managed and administered the .cd [[ccTLD]] for the Democratic Republic of the Congo.<ref name="dotafrica">[http://dotafrica.blogspot.com/p/african-cctlds.html African ccTLDs], DotAfrica. Retrieved 2015 September 9.</ref> The Office Congolais des Postes et Télécommunications (OCPT) is listed by the [[ccNSO]] as the registry manager.<ref>[https://ccnso.icann.org/en/about/member-profiles/cd.htm ccNSO Member Profile - .cd]</ref> The OCPT is now the Société Congolaise des Postes et Télécommunications (SCPT).<ref name="niccd">[http://www.nic.cd/nic.cd/ Nic.cd - Notice]</ref>

==History==

==History==

* Providing quality services and management of the .CD domain name.<ref name="cdnic">[https://web.archive.org/web/20170920032957/http://www.nic.cd/vision.php Vision and Mission], nic.cd. Retrieved 2015 September 9.</ref>

* Providing quality services and management of the .CD domain name.<ref name="cdnic">[https://web.archive.org/web/20170920032957/http://www.nic.cd/vision.php Vision and Mission], nic.cd. Retrieved 2015 September 9.</ref>

On or around August 10, 2017, a notice was posted on nic.cd that the trio of companies who had been in charge of the registry, CONIC, Webnet Africa, and Mikuba, had been removed "due to irregularities in the managment of the Registry."<ref name="niccd" /> The English translation of the notice emphasized that the three businesses named were "all the same team."<ref name="niccd" /> The three companies listed appear to still exist, but it is unclear whether they are operating. It is noteworthy that CONIC and Webnet Africa both still offer .cd domains,<ref>As listed in the notice on Nic.cd: Conic's website: [http://conic.africa Conic.Africa]<br>Webnet Africa's website: [http://www.webnetafrica.net/ WebnetAfrica.net]</ref> while mikuba.cd appears to allege that it is still the TLD registry provider.<ref>[http://mikuba.cd Mikuba.cd]</ref>

On or around August 10, 2017, a notice was posted on nic.cd that the trio of companies who had been in charge of the registry, CONIC, Webnet Africa, and Mikuba, had been removed "due to irregularities in the managment of the Registry."<ref name="niccd" /> The English translation of the notice emphasized that the three businesses named were "all the same team."<ref name="niccd" /> The three companies listed appear to still exist, but it is unclear whether they are operating. It is noteworthy that CONIC and Webnet Africa both still offer .cd domains,<ref>As listed in the notice on Nic.cd:<br> Conic's website: [http://conic.africa Conic.Africa]<br>Webnet Africa's website: [http://www.webnetafrica.net/ WebnetAfrica.net]</ref> while mikuba.cd appears to allege that it is still the TLD registry provider.<ref>[http://mikuba.cd Mikuba.cd]</ref>

Instability in operation of the domain was evident prior to the summer of 2017. Open source server automation company goCD was utilizing the .cd domain as a [[Domain hack|domain hack]]. Their operations were substantially disrupted when their domain "expired," despite being registered through 2021; they eventually abandoned their use of the go.cd domain.<ref>[https://www.gocd.org/2017/01/05/why-we-moved-from-go-cd-to-gocd-io.html GoCD.org - Why we moved form go.cd to gocd.io]</ref>

Instability in operation of the domain was evident prior to the summer of 2017. Open source server automation company goCD was utilizing the .cd domain as a [[Domain hack|domain hack]]. Their operations were substantially disrupted when their domain "expired," despite being registered through 2021; they eventually abandoned their use of the go.cd domain.<ref>[https://www.gocd.org/2017/01/05/why-we-moved-from-go-cd-to-gocd-io.html GoCD.org - Why we moved form go.cd to gocd.io]</ref>

In October 2020, security consultant Fredrik Almroth noticed that the domain name registration of one of the [[nameserver]]s for the .cd ccTLD was set to expire in December.<ref name="tc">[https://techcrunch.com/2021/01/15/congo-comandeered/ TechCrunch - A security researcher commandeered a country’s expired top-level domain to save it from hackers] After watching the registration for the domain expire, Almroth quickly registered the name, then attempted to transfer ownership back the Democratic Republic of Congo.<ref name="tc" /> Control of a nameserver of a [[TLD]] would allow a hacker to employ a broad range of middle-man attacks, phishing schemes, and SSL hacks.<ref name="tc" />

In October 2020, security consultant Fredrik Almroth noticed that the domain name registration of one of the [[nameserver|nameservers]] for the .cd ccTLD was set to expire in December.<ref name="tc">[https://techcrunch.com/2021/01/15/congo-comandeered/ TechCrunch - A security researcher commandeered a country’s expired top-level domain to save it from hackers]</ref> After watching the registration for the domain expire, Almroth quickly registered the name, then attempted to transfer ownership back the Democratic Republic of Congo.<ref name="tc" /> Control of a nameserver of a [[TLD]] would allow a hacker to employ a broad range of middle-man attacks, phishing schemes, and SSL hacks.<ref name="tc" />

 

==References==

==References==

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