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Line 135: − + + + + − + − ''Getting better'':+ − The February 2021 [[DAAR]] report indicates the majority (64.8%) of security issues are occurring in legacy [[TLDs]], which comprise 88.8% of resolving gTLD domains in zone files.<ref>[https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/daar-monthly-report-28feb21-en.pdf DAAR monthly report Feb 2021]</ref>+ − + − + − # The overall health of [[TLD]]s:+ − #* nTLDs, 6.6% of the market, are the most abused group of TLDs in relative terms. In 2021, 20.5% of all abused domain names were registered in new gTLDs. Specifically, the two most abused nTLDs together account for 41% of all nTLD abuse.+ − #* Legacy TLD domains, 53% of the market, comprise almost 49% of DNS abuse. Domains in [[.com]] and [[.net]] TLDs are the most abused. + − #* EU ccTLDs are the least abused; only 0.8% of all abuse ([[Compromised Domain]]s and [[Malicious Domain]]s) were registered under EU ccTLDs. [[.eu]], [[.de]], [[.nl]], [[.fr]], [[.pl]], [[.it]], [[.es]], and [[.be]] account for 76% of all abuse among EU ccTLDs. Abused [[.ru]] and [[.su]] second-level domain names account for 75% of all abused domains among non-EU ccTLDs.+ − # [[Malicious Domain]]s and [[Compromised Domain]]s:+ − #* Most [[spam]] and [[Botnet Attacks|botnet]] control and command [[domain name]]s are maliciously registered.+ − #* Almost 25% of [[phishing]] domain names and 41% of [[malware]] are registered by legitimate users. They are compromised at the hosting level and thus cannot be addressed at the [[DNS]] level without collateral damage.+ − #* 42% of hacked websites occur among more frequently used TLDs. In less-used new gTLDs, hackers directly register domains for malicious activities.+ − #* [[Registries]] and [[registrars]] can act at the DNS level but not on the hosting infrastructure unless they also offer hosting services. + − #* The top five most abused registrars account for 48% of all maliciously registered domain names.+ − #* Phishers use free subdomain and hosting providers, which do not work well for spammers and botnet C&C activity. For phishing abuse, half of the 10 most abused TLDs ([[.ml]], [[.tk]], [[.ga]], [[.cf]], and [[.gq]]) are operated by [[Freenom]].+ − # Adoption of [[DNSSEC]] and mail protection protocols:+ − #* DNSSEC adoption remains low. Of 227 million domain names, only 9.4 million meet all required resource records; however, 98% of them are correctly signed and validated.+ − #* In Europe, [[.cz]] (59%), [[.se]] (55%), [[.nl]] (51%), and [[.sk]] (48%) have the highest adoption of DNSSEC and offer price incentives and technical support. + − #* Around the world, 2.5 million open DNS resolvers can be used as amplifiers in [[DDoS Attack]]s. + − #* 60% of 247 million domain names do not use SPF and 97% do not use DMARC records to prevent [[Cybercrime|Email Spoofing and Business Email Compromise]] scams.+ + + +
→Open Questions
* [[Protocol Attack]]s,
* [[Protocol Attack]]s,
* the exploitation of implementation vulnerabilities, <ref>[https://www.verisign.com/en_US/company-information/dns-abuse/index.xhtml DNS Abuse, Verisign]</ref>
* the exploitation of implementation vulnerabilities, <ref>[https://www.verisign.com/en_US/company-information/dns-abuse/index.xhtml DNS Abuse, Verisign]</ref>
* [[Registrar Hopping]], aka TLD Hopping<ref>[https://annualreport2020.iwf.org.uk/trends/international/other/toplevel TLD Hopping, IWF 2020 Annual Report]</ref><ref>[https://www.zdnet.com/article/the-pirate-bays-domain-hopping-tour-takes-it-to-perus-pe/ The Pirate Bay's Domain Hopping Tour Takes It to Peru]</ref>
* [[Hopping]] can refer to registrar or registry hopping<ref>[https://annualreport2020.iwf.org.uk/trends/international/other/toplevel TLD Hopping, IWF 2020 Annual Report]</ref><ref>[https://www.zdnet.com/article/the-pirate-bays-domain-hopping-tour-takes-it-to-perus-pe/ The Pirate Bay's Domain Hopping Tour Takes It to Peru]</ref>
===DNS abuse adjacent issues===
===DNS abuse adjacent issues===
==Open Questions==
==Open Questions==
===Defining and Measuring the Problem===
===Defining and Measuring the Problem===
''Should we worry about defining it completely?''
* [[Graeme Bunton]]: no, let's stop focusing on the edges and focus on the areas of core consensus.<ref>[https://74.schedule.icann.org/meeting At-Large Policy: An End User's Perspective on the Role of At-Large in DNS Abuse, ICANN 74]</ref>
''Is there a hard and fast difference between technical abuse and content abuse?''
''Is there a hard and fast difference between technical abuse and content abuse?''
*The [[BC]] and [[GAC]] want more enforcement from [[ICANN]] in terms of gray areas, for instance, when technical and content abuse overlap<ref>[https://www.circleid.com/posts/20200723-the-state-of-dns-abuse-moving-backward-not-forward/ Cole, Mason. "The State of DNS Abuse Moving Backward," CircleID. July 23, 2020.]</ref>
*The [[BC]] and [[GAC]] want more enforcement from [[ICANN]] in terms of gray areas, for instance, when technical and content abuse overlap<ref>[https://www.circleid.com/posts/20200723-the-state-of-dns-abuse-moving-backward-not-forward/ Cole, Mason. "The State of DNS Abuse Moving Backward," CircleID. July 23, 2020.]</ref>
*The [[ICANN Board]] does not want to deliberate over content issues
*The [[ICANN Board]] does not deliberate over content issues
''How should DNS abuse be measured?''
''How should DNS abuse be measured?''
# [https://www.phishtank.com/index.php PhishTank]
# [https://www.phishtank.com/index.php PhishTank]
# [https://thenew.org/org-people/about-pir/resources/anti-abuse-metrics/ .ORG Anti-Abuse Metrics]
# [https://thenew.org/org-people/about-pir/resources/anti-abuse-metrics/ .ORG Anti-Abuse Metrics]
''What are the best tools and techniques for measuring DNS abuse?''<br/>
In April 2022, [[Adiel Akplogan]], vice president for technical engagement at ICANN, furthered the conversation around DNS Abuse measurement, opening the [https://community.icann.org/display/SIFT/DNS+Abuse+Measurement+Technology Special Interest Forum on DNS Abuse Measurement Technology] and seeking in particular:
# Techniques for detecting DNS abuse (including machine learning techniques)
# Techniques to categorize types of DNS abuse
# Industry tools (commercial or open-source) and matters of commercial or practical interest regarding DNS abuse measurements
# New standards/tools to measure and share DNS abuse information
# Analysis of open source threat intelligence datasets related to DNS abuse
# Description of real-world examples of emerging/existing DNS abuse
===Responsibility===
===Responsibility===
===Progress===
===Progress===
''Is it getting better or worse''?
''Is it getting better or worse?''
''Getting worse''<br/>
In March 2021, the FBI’s [[Internet Crime Complaint Center]] (IC3) released its 2020 Internet Crime Report. There were 791,790 complaints of suspected internet crime, which indicated an increase of more than 300,000 from 2019, involving losses in excess of US$4.2 billion. Phishing, non-payment/non-delivery scams, and extortion were the top three types of crime reported.<ref>[https://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/fbi-releases-the-internet-crime-complaint-center-2020-internet-crime-report-including-covid-19-scam-statistics FBI releases 2020 Internet Crime Report]</ref> <br/>
''Getting worse'': In March 2021, the FBI’s [[Internet Crime Complaint Center]] (IC3) released its 2020 Internet Crime Report. There were 791,790 complaints of suspected internet crime, which indicated an increase of more than 300,000 from 2019, involving losses in excess of US$4.2 billion. Phishing, non-payment/non-delivery scams, and extortion were the top three types of crime reported.<ref>[https://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/fbi-releases-the-internet-crime-complaint-center-2020-internet-crime-report-including-covid-19-scam-statistics FBI releases 2020 Internet Crime Report]</ref> <br/>
''Getting better''<br/>
In March 2022, [[ICANN]] released a report of DNS Abuse from the last 4 years and indicated the practice was trending down.<ref>[https://www.icann.org/en/blogs/details/icann-publishes-dns-abuse-trends-22-03-2022-en ICANN DNS Abuse Trends, March 2022, ICANN Blogs]</ref><ref>[https://domainnamewire.com/2022/03/22/icann-dns-abuse-is-going-down/ DNS Abuse is going down? Domain Name Wire]</ref><br/>
''Are new or Legacy gTLDs experiencing more problems?''
''Are new or Legacy gTLDs experiencing more problems?''
*On January 31, 2022, the [[European Commission]] published a [https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/d9804355-7f22-11ec-8c40-01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF/source-search Study on DNS Abuse], conducted by Fasano Paulovics Società tra Avvocati and Institut Polytechnique de Grenoble. Its key findings included:<ref>[https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/d9804355-7f22-11ec-8c40-01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF/source-search Study on DNS Abuse Technical Report Appendix 1, Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology (European Commission), Fasano Paulovics Società tra Avvocati, Grenoble INP-UGA Institute of Engineering 2022-01-31]</ref><br/>
''Legacy''<br/>
On January 31, 2022, the [[European Commission]] published a [https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/d9804355-7f22-11ec-8c40-01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF/source-search Study on DNS Abuse], conducted by Fasano Paulovics Società tra Avvocati and Institut Polytechnique de Grenoble. Its key findings included:<ref>[https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/d9804355-7f22-11ec-8c40-01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF/source-search Study on DNS Abuse Technical Report Appendix 1, Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology (European Commission), Fasano Paulovics Società tra Avvocati, Grenoble INP-UGA Institute of Engineering 2022-01-31]</ref>
* The February 2021 [[DAAR]] report indicates the majority (64.8%) of security issues are occurring in legacy [[TLDs]], which comprise 88.8% of resolving gTLD domains in zone files.<ref>[https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/daar-monthly-report-28feb21-en.pdf DAAR monthly report Feb 2021]</ref>
* Legacy TLD domains, 53% of the market, comprise almost 49% of DNS abuse. Domains in [[.com]] and [[.net]] TLDs are the most abused. <br/>
''nTLDs'' <br/>
* nTLDs, 6.6% of the market, are the most abused group of TLDs in relative terms. In 2021, 20.5% of all abused domain names were registered in new gTLDs. Specifically, the two most abused nTLDs together account for 41% of all nTLD abuse.<br/>
''among ccTLDs?''<br/>
* EU ccTLDs are the least abused; only 0.8% of all abuse ([[Compromised Domain]]s and [[Malicious Domain]]s) were registered under EU ccTLDs. [[.eu]], [[.de]], [[.nl]], [[.fr]], [[.pl]], [[.it]], [[.es]], and [[.be]] account for 76% of all abuse among EU ccTLDs. Abused [[.ru]] and [[.su]] second-level domain names account for 75% of all abused domains among non-EU ccTLDs.
''Which is more prevalent? Malicious or Compromised Domains?''<br/>
''[[Malicious Domain]]s''<br/>
* Most [[spam]] and [[Botnet Attacks|botnet]] control and command [[domain name]]s are maliciously registered.
* 42% of hacked websites occur among more frequently used TLDs. In less-used new gTLDs, hackers directly register domains for malicious activities.
* [[Registries]] and [[registrars]] can act at the DNS level but not on the hosting infrastructure unless they also offer hosting services.
* The top five most abused registrars account for 48% of all maliciously registered domain names.
''[[Compromised Domain]]s''<br/>
* Almost 25% of [[phishing]] domain names and 41% of [[malware]] are registered by legitimate users. They are compromised at the hosting level and thus cannot be addressed at the [[DNS]] level without collateral damage.
* Phishers use free subdomain and hosting providers, which do not work well for spammers and botnet C&C activity. For phishing abuse, half of the 10 most abused TLDs ([[.ml]], [[.tk]], [[.ga]], [[.cf]], and [[.gq]]) are operated by [[Freenom]].
''Adoption of preventative measures?''<br/>
* DNSSEC adoption remains low. Of 227 million domain names, only 9.4 million meet all required resource records; however, 98% of them are correctly signed and validated.
* In Europe, [[.cz]] (59%), [[.se]] (55%), [[.nl]] (51%), and [[.sk]] (48%) have the highest adoption of DNSSEC and offer price incentives and technical support.
* Around the world, 2.5 million open DNS resolvers can be used as amplifiers in [[DDoS Attack]]s.
* 60% of 247 million domain names do not use SPF and 97% do not use DMARC records to prevent [[Cybercrime|Email Spoofing and Business Email Compromise]] scams.
==References==
==References==
[[Category:Practices]]
[[Category:Practices]]