ICANN: Difference between revisions
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On July 1st, 1997, U.S. President Bill Clinton directed the Secretary of Commerce to privatize the management of the [[DNS]], which had heretofore been managed by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency ([[DARPA]]), the National Science Foundation ([[NSF]]) and other U.S. research agencies.<ref>[http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/022098fedreg.htm NTIA Green Paper]</ref> The goal was to open the Internet to greater international participation, and to bolster it as a new medium of commercial competition and exchange.<ref>[http://www.icann.org/en/general/icann-mou-25nov98.htm ICANN DOC MoU]</ref> | On July 1st, 1997, U.S. President Bill Clinton directed the Secretary of Commerce to privatize the management of the [[DNS]], which had heretofore been managed by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency ([[DARPA]]), the National Science Foundation ([[NSF]]) and other U.S. research agencies.<ref>[http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/022098fedreg.htm NTIA Green Paper]</ref> The goal was to open the Internet to greater international participation, and to bolster it as a new medium of commercial competition and exchange.<ref>[http://www.icann.org/en/general/icann-mou-25nov98.htm ICANN DOC MoU]</ref> | ||
On July 2nd, the [[Department of Commerce]] requested public input regarding [[DNS]] administration and structure, policy input regarding new registrars and the creation of new [[TLD]]s, and concerns regarding trademarks. More than 1,500 pages of comments were received.<ref>[http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/6_5_98dns.htm NTIA]</ref> | On July 2nd, the [[DOC|Department of Commerce]] requested public input regarding [[DNS]] administration and structure, policy input regarding new registrars and the creation of new [[TLD]]s, and concerns regarding trademarks. More than 1,500 pages of comments were received.<ref>[http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/6_5_98dns.htm NTIA]</ref> | ||
In January, 1998, an agency of the [[Department of Commerce]] ([[NTIA]]) issued what has become known as the "[[Green Paper]]." The document was a proposal which made clear that the agency intended to empower a non-profit entity to take control of the Internet and its [[DNS]] system.<ref>[http://www.icann.org/en/general/white-paper-05jun98.htm ICANN White Paper]</ref> The proposal drew criticism from some American lawmakers and other concerned individuals who saw the American-fostered Internet about to be handed over to a Swiss entity.<ref>[http://www.icann.org/en/comments-mail/icann-current/msg00800.html ICANN Green Paper v. White Paper correspondence]</ref> The revised "[[White Paper]]" addressed some of those concerns but still posited the need for an Internet organization which could respect and foster stability, competition, bottom-up coordination, and international representation, while also establishing appropriate protocol and administrative mechanisms.<ref>[http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rcs/principles.html Harvard Law Document]</ref> The "[[White Paper]]" did not clarify all of the divisive issues but instead called for the proposed entity to utilize its self-governance to decide on the issues at hand itself.<ref>[http://www.icann.org/en/comments-mail/icann-current/msg00800.html ICANN Greev v. White Paper correspondence]</ref> | In January, 1998, an agency of the [[DOC|Department of Commerce]] ([[NTIA]]) issued what has become known as the "[[Green Paper]]." The document was a proposal which made clear that the agency intended to empower a non-profit entity to take control of the Internet and its [[DNS]] system.<ref>[http://www.icann.org/en/general/white-paper-05jun98.htm ICANN White Paper]</ref> The proposal drew criticism from some American lawmakers and other concerned individuals who saw the American-fostered Internet about to be handed over to a Swiss entity.<ref>[http://www.icann.org/en/comments-mail/icann-current/msg00800.html ICANN Green Paper v. White Paper correspondence]</ref> The revised "[[White Paper]]" addressed some of those concerns but still posited the need for an Internet organization which could respect and foster stability, competition, bottom-up coordination, and international representation, while also establishing appropriate protocol and administrative mechanisms.<ref>[http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rcs/principles.html Harvard Law Document]</ref> The "[[White Paper]]" did not clarify all of the divisive issues but instead called for the proposed entity to utilize its self-governance to decide on the issues at hand itself.<ref>[http://www.icann.org/en/comments-mail/icann-current/msg00800.html ICANN Greev v. White Paper correspondence]</ref> | ||
==The Memorandum of Understanding== | ==The Memorandum of Understanding== | ||
On November 25th, 1998, The U.S. [[Department of Commerce]] and ICANN entered into a Memorandum of Understanding ([[MoU]]),<ref>[http://www.icann.org/en/general/icann-mou-25nov98.htm ICANN MoU]</ref> which officially recognized ICANN as the entity that would: | On November 25th, 1998, The U.S. [[DOC|Department of Commerce]] and ICANN entered into a Memorandum of Understanding ([[MoU]]),<ref>[http://www.icann.org/en/general/icann-mou-25nov98.htm ICANN MoU]</ref> which officially recognized ICANN as the entity that would: | ||
a. Establish policy for and direct the allocation of IP number blocks; | a. Establish policy for and direct the allocation of IP number blocks; | ||
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d. Coordinate the assignment of other Internet technical parameters as needed to maintain universal connectivity on the Internet; and | d. Coordinate the assignment of other Internet technical parameters as needed to maintain universal connectivity on the Internet; and | ||
e. Oversee other activities necessary to coordinate the specified [[DNS]] management functions, as agreed by the | e. Oversee other activities necessary to coordinate the specified [[DNS]] management functions, as agreed by the Department of Commerce and ICANN. | ||
Once again, these responsibilities would be undertaken and guided by the principles of stability, competition, private bottom-up coordination, and representation.<ref>[http://www.icann.org/en/general/icann-mou-25nov98.htm ICANN DOC MoU]</ref> The agreement established ICANN as an entity that would encourage transparency in its dealings and would create ample room for appeals for any binding decisions it would make. The Department of Commerce later noted that it was comfortable ceding its control to ICANN, as it seemed like the best step towards true privatization while still binding the authority of the institution to the American policies found within the [[MoU]].<ref>[http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju63594.000/hju63594_0f.htm Congressional Hearing]</ref> The original agreement was set with an expiration of September 30th, 2000.<ref>[http://www.icann.org/en/general/icann-mou-25nov98.htm ICANN DOC MoU]</ref> The [[MoU]] has been amended several times. | Once again, these responsibilities would be undertaken and guided by the principles of stability, competition, private bottom-up coordination, and representation.<ref>[http://www.icann.org/en/general/icann-mou-25nov98.htm ICANN DOC MoU]</ref> The agreement established ICANN as an entity that would encourage transparency in its dealings and would create ample room for appeals for any binding decisions it would make. The Department of Commerce later noted that it was comfortable ceding its control to ICANN, as it seemed like the best step towards true privatization while still binding the authority of the institution to the American policies found within the [[MoU]].<ref>[http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju63594.000/hju63594_0f.htm Congressional Hearing]</ref> The original agreement was set with an expiration of September 30th, 2000.<ref>[http://www.icann.org/en/general/icann-mou-25nov98.htm ICANN DOC MoU]</ref> The [[MoU]] has been amended several times. | ||
==Initial Issues== | ==Initial Issues== | ||
ICANN was immediately faced with two pressing, opposing issues: the task of reigning in [[CyberSquatting]] by creating policies necessary to protect recognized trademarks, and conversely the need to expand the number of entities accredited to function as [[registrars]]. Following the release of the [[White Paper]], [[WIPO]] began its own research into how to protect trademarks and intellectual property within the changing [[DNS]]. A congressional hearing some 7 months after the empowerment of ICANN recognized the steps that the new entity had already taken to protect intellectual property, recognized the headway WIPO had made in creating further proposals, and called on intellectual property owners to become involved in ICANN. <ref>[http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju63594.000/hju63594_0f.htm Congressional Hearing, July 1999]</ref> | ICANN was immediately faced with two pressing, opposing issues: the task of reigning in [[CyberSquatting]] by creating policies necessary to protect recognized trademarks, and conversely the need to expand the number of entities accredited to function as [[registrars]]. Following the release of the [[White Paper]], [[WIPO]] began its own research into how to protect trademarks and intellectual property within the changing [[DNS]]. A congressional hearing some 7 months after the empowerment of ICANN recognized the steps that the new entity had already taken to protect intellectual property, recognized the headway WIPO had made in creating further proposals, and called on intellectual property owners to become involved in ICANN.<ref>[http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju63594.000/hju63594_0f.htm Congressional Hearing, July 1999]</ref> | ||
WIPO's report, submitted to ICANN at their 1999 meeting in Berlin, supported the [[Whois]] system, but also recommended that, should the [[Whois]] system fail to provide adequate contact information for the trademark holder to contact the domain name holder, the [[registrar]] should be obliged to rectify the situation by canceling the domain name holder's rights to the name. ICANN immediately took steps to develop the nascent [[Whois]] system. | WIPO's report, submitted to ICANN at their 1999 meeting in Berlin, supported the [[Whois]] system, but also recommended that, should the [[Whois]] system fail to provide adequate contact information for the trademark holder to contact the domain name holder, the [[registrar]] should be obliged to rectify the situation by canceling the domain name holder's rights to the name. ICANN immediately took steps to develop the nascent [[Whois]] system. |