Changes

The papers themselves largely propose subordinating ICANN as an entitled policy-making body. Many see the publication of the papers as a response to the aforementioned dismissal of [[GAC]] recommendations by the ICANN board at [[ICANN 41]].<ref>[http://www.circleid.com/posts/who_wrote_those_icann_papers_anyway_european_commission/ Whore Wrote these ICANN Papers Anyway European Commission, circleid.com]</ref> The papers take issue with a range of ICANN decisions and policies; from how they staff the organization, to the new [[gTLD]] program, to their handling of [[ccTLD]]s; as a whole they have been taken as a full assault on the organization's independent legitimacy, and its multi-stakeholder model.<ref>[http://blog.internetgovernance.org/blog/_archives/2011/9/2/4891821.html Blog.InternetGovernance.org]</ref>

The papers themselves largely propose subordinating ICANN as an entitled policy-making body. Many see the publication of the papers as a response to the aforementioned dismissal of [[GAC]] recommendations by the ICANN board at [[ICANN 41]].<ref>[http://www.circleid.com/posts/who_wrote_those_icann_papers_anyway_european_commission/ Whore Wrote these ICANN Papers Anyway European Commission, circleid.com]</ref> The papers take issue with a range of ICANN decisions and policies; from how they staff the organization, to the new [[gTLD]] program, to their handling of [[ccTLD]]s; as a whole they have been taken as a full assault on the organization's independent legitimacy, and its multi-stakeholder model.<ref>[http://blog.internetgovernance.org/blog/_archives/2011/9/2/4891821.html Blog.InternetGovernance.org]</ref>

====Paper 1====

====Paper 1: Anti-Trust Laws and Registrar/Registry Integration ====

The first paper deals with the board's 2011 decision in [[ICANN 41|Singapore]] to move from a vertically separated [[registrar]]/[[registry]] model to one that allows competition in the new [[gTLD]] space through integration of the previously separated spheres. The EC does not seem to agree, or is not convinced, that competition will continue to be fostered to the highest degree possible; thus, they see the move as possibly in violation with a number of their own laws, and are generally dissatisfied with the board's decision to move ahead despite opposition from them and the [[GAC]]. The EC believes that businesses will now be in violation of certain anti-trust and other applicable laws, and consequently accuses ICANN of disregarding these laws. However, industry insiders have pointed to the fact that any company in a given jurisdiction traditionally must answer to that jurisdiction's law, regardless of the way ICANN decides to allow its regulations with international businesses to develop. The EC is further seen as misunderstanding the situation when it calls for review mechanisms to review all board decisions. In fact, ICANN does have an [[Independent Review Panel]].

The first paper deals with the board's 2011 decision in [[ICANN 41|Singapore]] to move from a vertically separated [[registrar]]/[[registry]] model to one that allows competition in the new [[gTLD]] space through integration of the previously separated spheres. The EC does not seem to agree, or is not convinced, that competition will continue to be fostered to the highest degree possible; thus, they see the move as possibly in violation with a number of their own laws, and are generally dissatisfied with the board's decision to move ahead despite opposition from them and the [[GAC]]. The EC believes that businesses will now be in violation of certain anti-trust and other applicable laws, and consequently accuses ICANN of disregarding these laws. However, industry insiders have pointed to the fact that any company in a given jurisdiction traditionally must answer to that jurisdiction's law, regardless of the way ICANN decides to allow its regulations with international businesses to develop. The EC is further seen as misunderstanding the situation when it calls for review mechanisms to review all board decisions. In fact, ICANN does have an [[Independent Review Panel]].

The first paper can be read [http://blog.internetgovernance.org/pdf/Paper1-AppLaw.pdf here].

The first paper can be read [http://blog.internetgovernance.org/pdf/Paper1-AppLaw.pdf here].

====Paper 2====

====Paper 2: New gTLDs, Censorship, and the IANA Contract====

The second paper deals with the U.S. Government's recommendations regarding new [[gTLD]]s, the renewal of the [[IANA]] contract between the USG and ICANN, and the future role of the GAC in determining whether or not a proposed [[TLD]] has legitimate community support, and also that body's role in creating a block-list for names at the [[Second Level Domain|second-level]].<ref>[http://blog.internetgovernance.org/blog/_archives/2011/9/4/4893009.html InternetGovernance.org/blog]</ref> Basically, the EC seems to agree with a provision suggested by the U.S. Government, that would require all applicants to substantially prove that they have the backing of the community they claim to be serving through the proposed new extension, and they would like to see this clause added by the USG into the [[IANA]] contract. The EC further adds that an application should, ideally,  not even be seen by them if it does not have verifiable backing from the outset. Essentially, they claim that it should be quickly verifiable if the extension is a legitimate addition to the root, and if it has a legitimate sponsoring community behind it, though they also seem to reserve the right to amend any initial ruling. Further protections sought by the EC in this paper include a type of universal blocked-list for names at the [[Second Level Domain|second level]]; this was preempted when [[ICM Registry]] asked the GAC for a list of names that it would like to reserve in the [[.xxx]] name space as culturally sensitive or otherwise improper for that name space. The EC sees it as time consuming to produce this list for every new domain, and instead would like the [[IANA]] contract to be amended to allow the GAC to create an authoritative master list of all second-level names that should not be allowed to be registered in any new [[TLD]].<ref>[http://blog.internetgovernance.org/pdf/EC-TLD-censorship.pdf InternetGovernance.org/blog pdf Paper 2]</ref>

The second paper deals with the U.S. Government's recommendations regarding new [[gTLD]]s, the renewal of the [[IANA]] contract between the USG and ICANN, and the future role of the GAC in determining whether or not a proposed [[TLD]] has legitimate community support, and also that body's role in creating a block-list for names at the [[Second Level Domain|second-level]].<ref>[http://blog.internetgovernance.org/blog/_archives/2011/9/4/4893009.html InternetGovernance.org/blog]</ref> Basically, the EC seems to agree with a provision suggested by the U.S. Government, that would require all applicants to substantially prove that they have the backing of the community they claim to be serving through the proposed new extension, and they would like to see this clause added by the USG into the [[IANA]] contract. The EC further adds that an application should, ideally,  not even be seen by them if it does not have verifiable backing from the outset. Essentially, they claim that it should be quickly verifiable if the extension is a legitimate addition to the root, and if it has a legitimate sponsoring community behind it, though they also seem to reserve the right to amend any initial ruling. Further protections sought by the EC in this paper include a type of universal blocked-list for names at the [[Second Level Domain|second level]]; this was preempted when [[ICM Registry]] asked the GAC for a list of names that it would like to reserve in the [[.xxx]] name space as culturally sensitive or otherwise improper for that name space. The EC sees it as time consuming to produce this list for every new domain, and instead would like the [[IANA]] contract to be amended to allow the GAC to create an authoritative master list of all second-level names that should not be allowed to be registered in any new [[TLD]].<ref>[http://blog.internetgovernance.org/pdf/EC-TLD-censorship.pdf InternetGovernance.org/blog pdf Paper 2]</ref>