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==History==
==History==
On July 1st, 1997, U.S. President Bill Clinton directed the Secretary of Commerce to privatize the management of the [[DNS]], which had heretofore been managed by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency ([[DARPA]]), the National Science Foundation ([[NSF]]) and other U.S. research agencies.<ref>[http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/022098fedreg.htm NTIA Green Paper]</ref> The goal was to open the Internet to greater international participation, and to bolster it as a new medium of commercial competition and exchange.<ref>[http://www.icann.org/en/general/icann-mou-25nov98.htm ICANN DOC MoU]</ref>
On July 1st, 1997, U.S. President Bill Clinton directed the Secretary of Commerce to privatize the management of the [[DNS]], which had heretofore been managed by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency ([[DARPA]]), the National Science Foundation ([[NSF]]) and other U.S. research agencies.<ref>[http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/022098fedreg.htm NTIA Green Paper]</ref> The goal was to open the Internet to greater international participation, and to bolster it as a new medium of commercial competition and exchange.<ref>[http://www.icann.org/en/general/icann-mou-25nov98.htm ICANN DOC MoU]</ref>
In January, 1998, an agency of the [[DOC|Department of Commerce]] ([[NTIA]]) issued what has become known as the "[[Green Paper]]." The document was a proposal which made clear that the agency intended to empower a non-profit entity to take control of the Internet and its [[DNS]] system.<ref>[http://www.icann.org/en/general/white-paper-05jun98.htm ICANN White Paper]</ref> The proposal drew criticism from some American lawmakers and other concerned individuals who saw the American-fostered Internet about to be handed over to a Swiss entity.<ref>[http://www.icann.org/en/comments-mail/icann-current/msg00800.html ICANN Green Paper v. White Paper correspondence]</ref> The revised "[[White Paper]]" addressed some of those concerns but still posited the need for an Internet organization which could respect and foster stability, competition, bottom-up coordination, and international representation, while also establishing appropriate protocol and administrative mechanisms.<ref>[http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rcs/principles.html Harvard Law Document]</ref> The "[[White Paper]]" did not clarify all of the divisive issues but instead called for the proposed entity to utilize its self-governance to decide on the issues at hand itself.<ref>[http://www.icann.org/en/comments-mail/icann-current/msg00800.html ICANN Greev v. White Paper correspondence]</ref> The White Paper spurned the creation of the [[International Forum on the White Paper]], which involved the creation and meeting of four globally regional forums, and brought together some 1,000 Internet stakeholders. The IFWP did not create any specific proposal in response to NTIA's White Paper, but it did create a valuable body of thought and laid the foundations for future Internet governance and multi-stakeholder conferences and organizations.<ref>[http://www.ntia.doc.gov/legacy/ntiahome/domainname/proposals/bosgrp/submission-letter.html Letter from Boston Working Group to Ira Magaziner, ntia.doc.gov]</ref>
In January, 1998, an agency of the [[DOC|Department of Commerce]] ([[NTIA]]) issued what has become known as the "[[Green Paper]]." The document was a proposal which made clear that the agency intended to empower a non-profit entity to take control of the Internet and its [[DNS]] system.<ref>[http://www.icann.org/en/general/white-paper-05jun98.htm ICANN White Paper]</ref> The proposal drew criticism from some American lawmakers and other concerned individuals who saw the American-fostered Internet about to be handed over to a Swiss entity.<ref>[http://www.icann.org/en/comments-mail/icann-current/msg00800.html ICANN Green Paper v. White Paper correspondence]</ref> The revised "[[White Paper]]" addressed some of those concerns but still posited the need for an Internet organization which could respect and foster stability, competition, bottom-up coordination, and international representation, while also establishing appropriate protocol and administrative mechanisms.<ref>[http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rcs/principles.html Harvard Law Document]</ref> The "[[White Paper]]" did not clarify all of the divisive issues but instead called for the proposed entity to utilize its self-governance to decide on the issues at hand itself.<ref>[http://www.icann.org/en/comments-mail/icann-current/msg00800.html ICANN Greev v. White Paper correspondence]</ref> The White Paper spurned the creation of the [[International Forum on the White Paper]], which involved the creation and meeting of four globally regional forums, and brought together some 1,000 Internet stakeholders. The IFWP did not create any specific proposal in response to NTIA's White Paper, but it did create a valuable body of thought and laid the foundations for future Internet governance and multi-stakeholder conferences and organizations.<ref>[http://www.ntia.doc.gov/legacy/ntiahome/domainname/proposals/bosgrp/submission-letter.html Letter from Boston Working Group to Ira Magaziner, ntia.doc.gov]</ref>
===The Memorandum of Understanding===
On November 25th, 1998, The U.S. [[DOC|Department of Commerce]] and ICANN entered into a Memorandum of Understanding ([[MoU]]),<ref>[http://www.icann.org/en/general/icann-mou-25nov98.htm ICANN MoU]</ref> which officially recognized ICANN as the entity that would:
On November 25th, 1998, The U.S. [[DOC|Department of Commerce]] and ICANN entered into a Memorandum of Understanding ([[MoU]]),<ref>[http://www.icann.org/en/general/icann-mou-25nov98.htm ICANN MoU]</ref> which officially recognized ICANN as the entity that would:
Once again, these responsibilities would be undertaken and guided by the principles of stability, competition, private bottom-up coordination, and representation.<ref>[http://www.icann.org/en/general/icann-mou-25nov98.htm ICANN DOC MoU]</ref> The agreement established ICANN as an entity that would encourage transparency in its dealings and would create ample room for appeals for any binding decisions it would make. The Department of Commerce later noted that it was comfortable ceding its control to ICANN, as it seemed like the best step towards true privatization while still binding the authority of the institution to the American policies found within the [[MoU]].<ref>[http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju63594.000/hju63594_0f.htm Congressional Hearing]</ref> The original agreement was set with an expiration of September 30th, 2000.<ref>[http://www.icann.org/en/general/icann-mou-25nov98.htm ICANN DOC MoU]</ref> The [[MoU]] has been amended several times.
Once again, these responsibilities would be undertaken and guided by the principles of stability, competition, private bottom-up coordination, and representation.<ref>[http://www.icann.org/en/general/icann-mou-25nov98.htm ICANN DOC MoU]</ref> The agreement established ICANN as an entity that would encourage transparency in its dealings and would create ample room for appeals for any binding decisions it would make. The Department of Commerce later noted that it was comfortable ceding its control to ICANN, as it seemed like the best step towards true privatization while still binding the authority of the institution to the American policies found within the [[MoU]].<ref>[http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju63594.000/hju63594_0f.htm Congressional Hearing]</ref> The original agreement was set with an expiration of September 30th, 2000.<ref>[http://www.icann.org/en/general/icann-mou-25nov98.htm ICANN DOC MoU]</ref> The [[MoU]] has been amended several times.
===Initial Issues===
ICANN was immediately faced with two pressing, opposing issues: the task of reigning in [[cybersquatting]] by creating policies necessary to protect recognized trademarks, and conversely the need to expand the number of entities accredited to function as [[registrar]]s. Following the release of the [[White Paper]], [[WIPO]] began its own research into how to protect trademarks and intellectual property within the changing [[DNS]]. A congressional hearing some 7 months after the empowerment of ICANN recognized the steps that the new entity had already taken to protect intellectual property, recognized the headway WIPO had made in creating further proposals, and called on intellectual property owners to become involved in ICANN.<ref>[http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju63594.000/hju63594_0f.htm Congressional Hearing, July 1999]</ref>
ICANN was immediately faced with two pressing, opposing issues: the task of reigning in [[cybersquatting]] by creating policies necessary to protect recognized trademarks, and conversely the need to expand the number of entities accredited to function as [[registrar]]s. Following the release of the [[White Paper]], [[WIPO]] began its own research into how to protect trademarks and intellectual property within the changing [[DNS]]. A congressional hearing some 7 months after the empowerment of ICANN recognized the steps that the new entity had already taken to protect intellectual property, recognized the headway WIPO had made in creating further proposals, and called on intellectual property owners to become involved in ICANN.<ref>[http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju63594.000/hju63594_0f.htm Congressional Hearing, July 1999]</ref>
The report also made recommendations regarding the process of accrediting new registrars, called for the creation of a concrete dispute resolution process for intellectual property issues within the [[DNS]], and also recommended that the creation of any new [[gTLD]]s should proceed slowly and with caution. These recommendations precipitated ICANN's [[Accreditation Guidelines]], the creation of the [[UDRP]], and the continued debate over how and when to increase the number of [[gTLD]]s.<ref>[http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju63594.000/hju63594_0f.htm Congressional Hearing, July 1999]</ref>
The report also made recommendations regarding the process of accrediting new registrars, called for the creation of a concrete dispute resolution process for intellectual property issues within the [[DNS]], and also recommended that the creation of any new [[gTLD]]s should proceed slowly and with caution. These recommendations precipitated ICANN's [[Accreditation Guidelines]], the creation of the [[UDRP]], and the continued debate over how and when to increase the number of [[gTLD]]s.<ref>[http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju63594.000/hju63594_0f.htm Congressional Hearing, July 1999]</ref>
===Registrar Accreditation===
A month before the [[MoU]] officially recognized ICANN, the [[DOC|Department of Commerce]] and [[NSI]] amended their cooperative agreement. The agreement had previously maintained the [[NSI]] as the only registrar for the [[.com]], [[.org]], and [[.net]] domains.<ref>[http://www.icann.org/en/registrars/accreditation-history.htm accreditation history]</ref> The three amendments to the agreement removed the exclusive rights of NSI; amendment 11 called for the creation of a [[SRS|Shared Registry System]], whereby an unlimited number of competitive registrars would have access to one system managed by NSI.<ref>[http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/proposals/docnsi100698.htm NTIA Amendment 11]</ref> Amendment 12 gave more time to NSI to complete important milestones in the liberalization of registry services; the final phase, which called for equal access to the [[SRS]] by all accredited [[Registrar|registrars]], was now given a deadline of about one year, October 25th, 1999.<ref>[http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/amend12.htm NTIA Amendment 12]</ref> Amendment 13 attached a $9 fee for each [[SLD|second level domain]] name registered, payable as $18 for new registrations and $9 per year on the anniversary of the original registration.<ref>[http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/amendment13.htm NTIA Amendment 13]</ref>
A month before the [[MoU]] officially recognized ICANN, the [[DOC|Department of Commerce]] and [[NSI]] amended their cooperative agreement. The agreement had previously maintained the [[NSI]] as the only registrar for the [[.com]], [[.org]], and [[.net]] domains.<ref>[http://www.icann.org/en/registrars/accreditation-history.htm accreditation history]</ref> The three amendments to the agreement removed the exclusive rights of NSI; amendment 11 called for the creation of a [[SRS|Shared Registry System]], whereby an unlimited number of competitive registrars would have access to one system managed by NSI.<ref>[http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/proposals/docnsi100698.htm NTIA Amendment 11]</ref> Amendment 12 gave more time to NSI to complete important milestones in the liberalization of registry services; the final phase, which called for equal access to the [[SRS]] by all accredited [[Registrar|registrars]], was now given a deadline of about one year, October 25th, 1999.<ref>[http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/amend12.htm NTIA Amendment 12]</ref> Amendment 13 attached a $9 fee for each [[SLD|second level domain]] name registered, payable as $18 for new registrations and $9 per year on the anniversary of the original registration.<ref>[http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/amendment13.htm NTIA Amendment 13]</ref>
The [[Registration Accreditation Agreement]] was unanimously amended by the ICANN board in May, 2009.<ref>[http://www.icann.org/en/registrars/accreditation-history.htm ICANN Accrediation History]</ref>
The [[Registration Accreditation Agreement]] was unanimously amended by the ICANN board in May, 2009.<ref>[http://www.icann.org/en/registrars/accreditation-history.htm ICANN Accrediation History]</ref>
===The Testbed Period===
Numerous technical problems plagued the testbed period of the [[SRS]].<ref>[http://www.icann.org/en/registrars/update-14jun99.htm Andrew McLaughlin Memorandum]</ref> The aforementioned Amendment 12 established the testbed period as Phase 1 of the deployment of the SRS, and set a start date of April 26th, 1999, and an end date of June 25th, 1999.<ref>[http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/amend12.htm Amendment 12]</ref> [[Register.com]] finally became the first of the 5 competitive [[Testbed Registrars|testbed registrars]] to successfully implement its interface with the SRS, which happened 6 weeks into the 2 month testbed period. The technical difficulties also extended to the deployment of the required [[Whois]] system.<ref>[http://www.icann.org/en/registrars/update-14jun99.htm Andrew McLaughlin Memorandum]</ref> Throughout the testbed period general applications for the later phases were being accepted.<ref>[http://www.icann.org/en/registrars/accreditation-history.htm ICANN Accreditation History]</ref> The [[DOC|Department of Commerce]] and the [[NSI]] extended the testbed period about 4 times,<ref>[http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/icann/pressingissues2000/briefingbook/milestones.html</ref> the final extension finally expired on November 5th, 1999.<ref>[http://www.icann.org/en/nsi/factsheet.htm Fact Sheet on Tentative Agreements among ICANN, the U.S. Department of Commerce, and Network Solutions, Inc.]</ref>
Numerous technical problems plagued the testbed period of the [[SRS]].<ref>[http://www.icann.org/en/registrars/update-14jun99.htm Andrew McLaughlin Memorandum]</ref> The aforementioned Amendment 12 established the testbed period as Phase 1 of the deployment of the SRS, and set a start date of April 26th, 1999, and an end date of June 25th, 1999.<ref>[http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/amend12.htm Amendment 12]</ref> [[Register.com]] finally became the first of the 5 competitive [[Testbed Registrars|testbed registrars]] to successfully implement its interface with the SRS, which happened 6 weeks into the 2 month testbed period. The technical difficulties also extended to the deployment of the required [[Whois]] system.<ref>[http://www.icann.org/en/registrars/update-14jun99.htm Andrew McLaughlin Memorandum]</ref> Throughout the testbed period general applications for the later phases were being accepted.<ref>[http://www.icann.org/en/registrars/accreditation-history.htm ICANN Accreditation History]</ref> The [[DOC|Department of Commerce]] and the [[NSI]] extended the testbed period about 4 times,<ref>[http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/icann/pressingissues2000/briefingbook/milestones.html</ref> the final extension finally expired on November 5th, 1999.<ref>[http://www.icann.org/en/nsi/factsheet.htm Fact Sheet on Tentative Agreements among ICANN, the U.S. Department of Commerce, and Network Solutions, Inc.]</ref>
===UDRP===
On September 29th, 1999, ICANN posted the [[UDRP|Uniform Domain Name Resolution Policy]] for public comments. The process aimed to address problems arising from [[cybersquatting]] and protect intellectual property rights. This process was not solely a concern or product of ICANN,given [[WIPO]]'s earlier, and continued, effort on the [[UDRP]]. The policy asserts that it will transfer, delete, or asses other changes to any domain name held by a [[Domainer|domainer]] which:
On September 29th, 1999, ICANN posted the [[UDRP|Uniform Domain Name Resolution Policy]] for public comments. The process aimed to address problems arising from [[cybersquatting]] and protect intellectual property rights. This process was not solely a concern or product of ICANN,given [[WIPO]]'s earlier, and continued, effort on the [[UDRP]]. The policy asserts that it will transfer, delete, or asses other changes to any domain name held by a [[Domainer|domainer]] which: