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==NIC.lv & Spamhaus== | ==NIC.lv & Spamhaus== | ||
In June 2010, the anti-spam organization [[Spamhaus]] added a chunk of Latvian IP addresses to its anti-spam list. In line with their common practices, Spamhaus contacted the abuser -- which, in this case, most notably included a small [[ISP]] called Microlines -- to ask them to take down the relevant servers. When they received no response, Spamhaus added Microlines' IP range to their blocklist. Escalation procedures followed, including the use of [[RIPE]] data to discover the source of the spam. It was discovered that a larger ISP called [[Latnet Serviss]] was routing Microlines' traffic, and Spamhaus then added Latnet's IP range to the blocklist, not knowing that Latnet had outsourced the management of its abuse department to the University of Latvia's Institute of Mathematics and Computer Science. This resulted in an IP block of many significant websites, and subsequent | In June 2010, the anti-spam organization [[Spamhaus]] added a chunk of Latvian IP addresses to its anti-spam list. In line with their common practices, Spamhaus contacted the abuser -- which, in this case, most notably included a small [[ISP]] called Microlines -- to ask them to take down the relevant servers. When they received no response, Spamhaus added Microlines' IP range to their blocklist. Escalation procedures followed, including the use of [[RIPE]] data to discover the source of the spam. It was discovered that a larger ISP called [[Latnet Serviss]] was routing Microlines' traffic, and Spamhaus then added Latnet's IP range to the blocklist, not knowing that Latnet had outsourced the management of its abuse department to the University of Latvia's Institute of Mathematics and Computer Science. This resulted in an IP block of many significant websites, and subsequent outrage from NIC.lv, who shared that "thousands of Internet users -- academic users, state and municipal institutions, non-profit organizations, companies, and individuals" were cut off. Spamhaus, on the other hand, said it was merely following normal procedures after seeing an increase in spam and [[DDoS]] traffic. Spamhaus founder, Steve Linford, issued a statement saying that NIC.lv and Latnet were negligent in their handling of the situation, while NIC.lv called for an independent adjudicator to mediate the situation.<ref name="botnet">[http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/08/13/spamhaus_latvia/ Rise in Latvian botnets prompts Spamhaus row]. The Register. Published 2010 August 13. Retrieved 2012 November 15.</ref> | ||
==NIC.lv & dotMobi== | ==NIC.lv & dotMobi== | ||
Revision as of 02:02, 16 November 2012
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| Country: | Latvia |
| Website: | nic.lv |
| Key People | |
| Katrina Sataki, CEO | |
NIC.lvis the organization which manages and operates Latvia's .lv ccTLD.
NIC.lv & Spamhaus[edit | edit source]
In June 2010, the anti-spam organization Spamhaus added a chunk of Latvian IP addresses to its anti-spam list. In line with their common practices, Spamhaus contacted the abuser -- which, in this case, most notably included a small ISP called Microlines -- to ask them to take down the relevant servers. When they received no response, Spamhaus added Microlines' IP range to their blocklist. Escalation procedures followed, including the use of RIPE data to discover the source of the spam. It was discovered that a larger ISP called Latnet Serviss was routing Microlines' traffic, and Spamhaus then added Latnet's IP range to the blocklist, not knowing that Latnet had outsourced the management of its abuse department to the University of Latvia's Institute of Mathematics and Computer Science. This resulted in an IP block of many significant websites, and subsequent outrage from NIC.lv, who shared that "thousands of Internet users -- academic users, state and municipal institutions, non-profit organizations, companies, and individuals" were cut off. Spamhaus, on the other hand, said it was merely following normal procedures after seeing an increase in spam and DDoS traffic. Spamhaus founder, Steve Linford, issued a statement saying that NIC.lv and Latnet were negligent in their handling of the situation, while NIC.lv called for an independent adjudicator to mediate the situation.[1]
NIC.lv & dotMobi[edit | edit source]
Latvia introduced the .mobi extension to its offerings in late 2011, allowing every holder of an .lv domain name to potentially active an .lv.mobi domain name free of charge. This move was designed to allow mobile phone users to find websites successfully on their handsets, considering 20% of all Latvian mobile phone users access the Internet daily via their phones.
Trey Harvin, CEO of dotMobi, the registry for the .mobi top-level domain, said, "Most websites are not suitable for viewing on a mobile phone, even an iPhone or Android. They are too large for a a smaller mobile screen and too slow to load. Working with NIC.lv will help Latvian companies of all sizes develop strategies to exploit the mobile Web and increase their business." [2]
References[edit | edit source]
- ↑ Rise in Latvian botnets prompts Spamhaus row. The Register. Published 2010 August 13. Retrieved 2012 November 15.
- ↑ NIC.LV and dotMobi's special working arrangement, every .lv registrant can activate an lv.mobi domain at no extra cost. Published 2011 November 5. Retrieved 2012 November 15.