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In the case where multiple entities apply for a single ICANN [[new gTLD]], two main models -- '''ICANN Auctions''' and '''Private Auctions''' -- will be used to determine the winner of each contention set. Exceptions are made in the case of geographic and community-based applicants, who receive preferential treatment over other applicants.
In the case where multiple entities apply for a single ICANN [[new gTLD]], two main models -- '''ICANN Auctions''' and '''Private Auctions''' -- will be used to determine the winner of each contention set. Exceptions are made in the case of geographic and community-based applicants, who receive preferential treatment over other applicants.
In August 2008, ICANN published a document stating the economic case for using auctions in new gTLDs. They cite allocative efficiency, via the following ways in particular:<ref name="economic">[http://archive.icann.org/en/topics/economic-case-auctions-08aug08-en.pdf Economic Case for Auctions in New gTLDs], ICANN.org. Published 8 August 2008. Retrieved 6 December 2012.</ref>
#Applicants whose true intentions or abilities are to serve many users would be able to justify higher bids than applicants who will serve few users;
# Applicants capable of providing high-quality service at low cost would be able to justify higher bids than low-quality, high-cost applicants;
# Applicants who intend to develop the gTLD immediately would be able to justify higher bids than applicants whose purpose is to hold the gTLD, unused, for speculative purposes.
ICANN notes in the document that though "auctions are not perfectly aligned with ICANN's objectives, alternative allocation mechanisms such as comparative evaluations and lotteries inherently have much more severe limitations and defects".<ref name="economic"></ref>
==ICANN Auctions==
==ICANN Auctions==