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Line 30: − + − + − + − − ===The Memorandum of Understanding=== − On November 25th, 1998, The U.S. [[DOC|Department of Commerce]] and ICANN entered into a Memorandum of Understanding ([[MoU]]),<ref name="icann-mou"></ref> which officially recognized ICANN as the entity that would: − − # Establish policy for and direct the allocation of IP number blocks; − # Oversee the operation of the authoritative root server system; − # Oversee the policy for determining the circumstances under which new [[TLD]]s would be added to the root system; − # Coordinate the assignment of other Internet technical parameters as needed to maintain universal connectivity on the Internet; and − # Oversee other activities necessary to coordinate the specified [[DNS]] management functions, as agreed by the Department of Commerce and ICANN. − − Once again, these responsibilities would be undertaken and guided by the principles of stability, competition, private bottom-up coordination, and representation.<ref name="icann-mou"></ref> The agreement established ICANN as an entity that would encourage transparency in its dealings and would create ample room for appeals for any binding decisions it would make. The Department of Commerce later noted that it was comfortable ceding its control to ICANN, as it seemed like the best step towards true privatization while still binding the authority of the institution to the American policies found within the [[MoU]].<ref name="congress">[http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju63594.000/hju63594_0f.htm Congressional Hearing].Published 1999 July.</ref> The original agreement was set with an expiration of September 30th, 2000.<ref name="icann-mou"></ref> The [[MoU]] has been amended several times. − − ===The First Three Supporting Organizations=== − The three original supporting organizations include: <ref name="caslon">[http://www.caslon.com.au/icannprofile2.htm#dnso ICANN Profile, Structure and Personnel Review]. Caslon Analytics.</ref> − * '''[[DNSO|Domain Names Supporting Organization]] (DNSO)''' provides policy advice to the [[ICANN Board]] on issues related to the [[DNS|Domain Name System]] (DNS) and IP addresses. The ICANN Board established the Bylaw provisions for the basic structure of the DNSO on March 31, 1999.<ref>[http://archive.icann.org/en/dnso/dnso1.htm DNSO Background]. ICANN.</ref> The DNSO was composed of the Names Council, General Assembly and Constituencies including ccTLD registries, gTLD registries, commercial and business entities, [[ISP]]s and connectivity providers, registrars and intellectual property.<ref>[http://archive.icann.org/en/meetings/berlin/berlin-resolutions.html#1 Resolution on DNSO Constituencies]. ICANN.</ref> On July 9, 2003 the DNSO was restructured and its responsibilities were transferred to the [[GNSO|Generic Names Supporting Organization]] (GNSO).<ref>[http://www.dnso.org/ DNSO Website]</ref> The organization ceased operation after the ICANN Board adopted Article XX: Transition Article of the New Bylaws on December 15, 2002.<ref>[http://www.icann.org/en/groups/board/documents/minutes-appb-15dec02-en.htm Appendix B to Minutes of Board Meeting]. ICANN. Published 2002 December 12.</ref> − * '''[[ASO|Address Supporting Organization]] (ASO)''' is responsible for providing advice to the [[ICANN Board]] on issues related to the operation, assignment and management of Internet addresses. It is composed of an Address Council and representatives from the [[RIR|Regional Internet Registries]] (RIRs), including the [[APNIC|Asia Pacific Network Information Centre]] (APNIC), [[ARIN|American Registry for Internet Numbers]] (ARIN) and [[RIPE|Reseaux IP Europeens]] (RIPE).<ref name="bylawsamended">[http://www.icann.org/en/about/governance/bylaws/bylaws-29oct99-en.htm#V ICANN Bylaws As Amended and Restated]. ICANN. Published 1999 October 29.</ref><ref name="caslon"></ref> − * '''[[PSO|Protocol Supporting Organization]] (PSO)''' advised the ICANN Board on issues related to the assignment of parameters for Internet protocols through the PSO Council, which was composed of the [[IETF|Internet Engineering Task Force]] (IETF), [[W3C|World Wide Web Consortium]] (W3C), the [[ITU|International Telecommunications Union]] (ITU) and the [[ETSI|European Telecommunications Standards Institute]] (ETSI).<ref name="bylawsamended"></ref> − − ===Initial Issues=== − ICANN was immediately faced with two pressing, opposing issues: the task of reigning in [[cybersquatting]] by creating policies necessary to protect recognized trademarks, and conversely the need to expand the number of entities accredited to function as [[registrar]]s. Following the release of the [[White Paper]], [[WIPO]] began its own research into how to protect trademarks and intellectual property within the changing [[DNS]]. A congressional hearing some 7 months after the empowerment of ICANN recognized the steps that the new entity had already taken to protect intellectual property, recognized the headway WIPO had made in creating further proposals, and called on intellectual property owners to become involved in ICANN.<ref name="congress"></ref> − − WIPO's report, submitted to ICANN at their 1999 meeting in Berlin, supported the [[Whois]] system, but also recommended that, should the [[Whois]] system fail to provide adequate contact information for the trademark holder to contact the domain name holder, the [[registrar]] should be obliged to rectify the situation by canceling the domain name holder's rights to the name. ICANN immediately took steps to develop the nascent [[Whois]] system. − − The report also made recommendations regarding the process of accrediting new registrars, called for the creation of a concrete dispute resolution process for intellectual property issues within the [[DNS]], and also recommended that the creation of any new [[gTLD]]s should proceed slowly and with caution. These recommendations precipitated ICANN's [[Accreditation Guidelines]], the creation of the [[UDRP]], and the continued debate over how and when to increase the number of [[gTLD]]s.<ref name="congress"></ref> − − ===Registrar Accreditation=== − A month before the [[MoU]] officially recognized ICANN, the [[DOC|Department of Commerce]] and [[NSI]] amended their cooperative agreement. The agreement had previously maintained the [[NSI]] as the only registrar for the [[.com]], [[.org]], and [[.net]] domains.<ref name="accreditation">[http://www.icann.org/en/registrars/accreditation-history.htm Registrar Accreditation: History of the Shared Registry System]. ICANN.</ref> The three amendments to the agreement removed the exclusive rights of NSI; amendment 11 called for the creation of a [[SRS|Shared Registry System]], whereby an unlimited number of competitive registrars would have access to one system managed by NSI.<ref>[http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/proposals/docnsi100698.htm Amendment 11]. National Telecommunications & Information Administration. Published 1998 October 7.</ref> Amendment 12 gave more time to NSI to complete important milestones in the liberalization of registry services; the final phase, which called for equal access to the [[SRS]] by all accredited [[Registrar|registrars]], was now given a deadline of about one year, October 25th, 1999.<ref name="amend12">[http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/amend12.htm Amendment 12]. National Telecommunications & Information Administration.</ref> Amendment 13 attached a $9 fee for each [[SLD|second level domain]] name registered, payable as $18 for new registrations and $9 per year on the anniversary of the original registration.<ref>[http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/amendment13.htm Amendment 13]. National Telecommunications & Information Administration.</ref> − − On February 8th, 1999, ICANN posted its Draft Guidelines for [[Registrar]] Accreditation for public commentary.<ref name="accreditation"></ref> The guidelines were formed through consultation with the [[DOC]] and [[NSI]], and further tailored after the session of public commentary.<ref>[http://www.mail-archive.com/list@ifwp.org/msg01253.html Press Release: ICANN Releases Draft Accreditation Guidelines]. Mail Archive. Published 1999 February 8.</ref> Some issues raised during the period of public commentary include: concerns regarding the inherent bureaucracy, inadequate protections for intellectual property, and the reasoning behind accrediting registrars before the [[DNSO]] was constituted.<ref>[http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/icann/singapore-0399/archive/scribe.html ICANN Public Meeting Details]. Harvard Law.</ref> The ICANN board accepted the revised [[Registrar Accreditation Agreement|Statement of Registrar Accreditation Policy]] at their March, 1999 meeting in Singapore.<ref name="accreditation"></ref> − − The initial policy called for [[Registrar|registrars]] to provide secure access to the [[Registry|registry]], be operationally capable of handling significant registration volume, maintain electronic transaction records, handle and provide prompt service to [[SLD]] requests, provide security, handle seamless transfers of customers who desire to switch registrars, employ an adequately sized staff, and have measures in place to protect the interests of their customers should the registrar fail. The registrar would also have to demonstrate that it had a sufficient liability insurance policy and store of liquid assets. A concern over creating and maintaining a valid registry service is evidenced in the requirement that information regarding each registrant of a [[SLD]] would have to be submitted by the registrar to [[NSI]] for inclusion in its registry. Providing a searchable [[Whois]] service was also required. Application fees for those applying to be included in the Phase 1 testbed cost $2,500, the general application fee was $1,000. Annual accreditation fees, amounting to $5,000, would also be assessed.<ref>[http://www.icann.org/en/registrars/policy_statement.html Statement of Registrar Accreditation Policy]</ref> − − The [[Registration Accreditation Agreement]] was unanimously amended by the ICANN board in May, 2009.<ref name="accreditation"></ref> − − ===The Testbed Period=== − Numerous technical problems plagued the testbed period of the [[SRS]].<ref name="andrewmclaughlin">[http://www.icann.org/en/registrars/update-14jun99.htm Registrar Competition Testbed and Accreditation Update #2]. ICANN. Published 1999 June 14.</ref> The aforementioned Amendment 12 established the testbed period as Phase 1 of the deployment of the SRS, and set a start date of April 26th, 1999, and an end date of June 25th, 1999.<ref name="amend12"></ref> [[Register.com]] finally became the first of the 5 competitive [[Testbed Registrars|testbed registrars]] to successfully implement its interface with the SRS, which happened 6 weeks into the 2 month testbed period. The technical difficulties also extended to the deployment of the required [[Whois]] system.<ref name="andrewmclaughlin"></ref> Throughout the testbed period general applications for the later phases were being accepted.<ref name="accreditation"></ref> The [[DOC|Department of Commerce]] and the [[NSI]] extended the testbed period about 4 times,<ref>[http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/icann/pressingissues2000/briefingbook/milestones.html http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/icann/pressingissues2000/briefingbook/milestones.html]. Harvard Law.</ref> the final extension finally expired on November 5th, 1999.<ref>[http://www.icann.org/en/nsi/factsheet.htm Fact Sheet on Tentative Agreements among ICANN, the U.S. Department of Commerce, and Network Solutions, Inc.] ICANN.</ref> − − ===UDRP=== − ''Main article: [[UDRP]]'' − − On September 29th, 1999, ICANN posted the [[UDRP|Uniform Domain Name Resolution Policy]] for public comments. The process aimed to address problems arising from [[cybersquatting]] and protect intellectual property rights. This process was not solely a concern or product of ICANN, given [[WIPO]]'s earlier, and continued, effort on the [[UDRP]]. The policy asserts that it will transfer, delete, or asses other changes to any domain name held by a [[Domainer|domainer]] which: − − # Is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights; and − # The domainer no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and − # The domain name in question has been registered and is being used in bad faith.<ref>[http://www.icann.org/en/udrp/udrp-policy-29sept99.htm Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy]. ICANN. Published 1999 September 29.</ref> − − The same day, ICANN also issued the [http://www.icann.org/en/udrp/udrp-rules-29sept99.htm Rules for the UDRP], which set forth the procedure for filing and responding to complaints. This was also open for a period of public commentary.<ref>[http://www.icann.org/en/udrp/udrp-rules-29sept99.htm Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy]]. ICANN. Published 1999 September 29.</ref> Some of the public comments can be found [http://www.icann.org/en/comments-mail/comment-udrp/current/maillist.html here]. − − ICANN adopted the [[UDRP]] at its November, 1999, meeting in Los Angeles.<ref>[http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/udrp/overview.html Overview of Domain Name Policy Development]. Harvard Law.</ref>
→History: The Beginning
==History: The Beginning==
==History: The Beginning==
On July 1st, 1997, U.S. President Bill Clinton directed the Secretary of Commerce to privatize the management of the [[DNS]], which had heretofore been managed by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency ([[DARPA]]), the National Science Foundation ([[NSF]]) and other U.S. research agencies.<ref>[http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/022098fedreg.htm Improvement of Technical Management of Internet Names and Addresses; Proposed Rule]. National Telecommunications & Information Administration. Published 1998 February 20.</ref> The goal was to open the Internet to greater international participation, and to bolster it as a new medium of commercial competition and exchange.<ref name="icann-mou"></ref>
On July 1st, 1997, U.S. President Bill Clinton directed the Secretary of Commerce to privatize the management of the [[DNS]], which had been managed by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency ([[DARPA]]), the National Science Foundation ([[NSF]]) and other U.S. research agencies.<ref>[http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/022098fedreg.htm Improvement of Technical Management of Internet Names and Addresses; Proposed Rule]. National Telecommunications & Information Administration. Published 1998 February 20.</ref> The goal was to open the Internet to greater international participation, and to bolster it as a new medium of commercial competition and exchange.<ref name="icann-mou"></ref>
On July 2nd, the [[DOC|Department of Commerce]] requested public input regarding [[DNS]] administration and structure, policy input regarding new registrars and the creation of new [[TLD]]s, and concerns regarding trademarks. More than 1,500 pages of comments were received.<ref>[http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/6_5_98dns.htm Statement of Policy on the Management of Internet Names and Addresses]. National Telecommunications & Information Administration. Published 1998 June 5.</ref>
On July 2nd, the [[DOC|Department of Commerce]] requested public input regarding [[DNS]] administration and structure, policy input regarding new registrars, the creation of new [[TLD]]s, and concerns regarding trademarks. More than 1,500 pages of comments were received.<ref>[http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/6_5_98dns.htm Statement of Policy on the Management of Internet Names and Addresses]. National Telecommunications & Information Administration. Published 1998 June 5.</ref>
In January 1998, an agency of the [[DOC|Department of Commerce]] ([[NTIA]]) issued what has become known as the "[[Green Paper]]." The document was a proposal which made clear that the agency intended to empower a non-profit entity to take control of the Internet and its [[DNS]] system.<ref>[http://www.icann.org/en/general/white-paper-05jun98.htm ICANN White Paper]. ICANN.</ref> The proposal drew criticism from some American lawmakers and other concerned individuals who saw the American-fostered Internet about to be handed over to a Swiss entity.<ref name="greenwhite">[http://www.icann.org/en/comments-mail/icann-current/msg00800.html The Green Paper vs. The White Paper]. ICANN. Published 1999 October 18.</ref> The revised "[[White Paper]]" addressed some of those concerns but still posited the need for an Internet organization which could respect and foster stability, competition, bottom-up coordination, and international representation, while also establishing appropriate protocol and administrative mechanisms.<ref>[http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rcs/principles.html How do the NTIA White Paper and the ICANN By-Laws Impact Membership?]. Harvard Law. Published 1999 January 19.</ref> The "[[White Paper]]" did not clarify all of the divisive issues but instead called for the proposed entity to utilize its self-governance to decide on the issues at hand itself.<ref name="greenwhite"></ref> The White Paper spurned the creation of the [[International Forum on the White Paper]], which involved the creation and meeting of four globally regional forums, and brought together some 1,000 Internet stakeholders. The IFWP did not create any specific proposal in response to NTIA's White Paper, but it did create a valuable body of thought and laid the foundations for future Internet governance and multi-stakeholder conferences and organizations.<ref>[http://www.ntia.doc.gov/legacy/ntiahome/domainname/proposals/bosgrp/submission-letter.html Letter from Boston Working Group to Ira Magaziner]. National Telecommunications & Information Administration. Published 1998 September 28.</ref>
In January 1998, an agency of the [[DOC|Department of Commerce]] ([[NTIA]]) issued what has become known as the "[[Green Paper]]." The document was a proposal which made clear that the agency intended to empower a non-profit entity to take control of the Internet and its [[DNS]] system.<ref>[http://www.icann.org/en/general/white-paper-05jun98.htm ICANN White Paper]. ICANN.</ref> The proposal drew criticism from some American lawmakers and other concerned individuals who saw the American-fostered Internet about to be handed over to the IAHC, a Swiss entity.<ref name="greenwhite">[http://www.icann.org/en/comments-mail/icann-current/msg00800.html The Green Paper vs. The White Paper]. ICANN. Published 1999 October 18.</ref> The revised "[[White Paper]]" addressed some of those concerns but still posited the need for an Internet organization which could respect and foster stability, competition, bottom-up coordination, and international representation, while also establishing appropriate protocol and administrative mechanisms.<ref>[http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/rcs/principles.html How do the NTIA White Paper and the ICANN By-Laws Impact Membership?]. Harvard Law. Published 1999 January 19.</ref> The "[[White Paper]]" did not clarify all of the divisive issues but instead called for the proposed entity to utilize its self-governance to decide on the issues at hand itself.
==History: ICANN 2.0==
==History: ICANN 2.0==