DNS Security Facilitation - Technical Study Group: Difference between revisions

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==History==
==History==
The group met 29 times between June 2020 and September 2021 to answer the aforementioned questions and draft recommendations for the [[ICANN CEO]].<ref>[https://community.icann.org/display/DSFI/Work+Plan+and+Timeline?preview=/136120022/160727866/DSFI%20Milestones%20Timeline.pdf DSFTSG Key Meetings Timeline]</ref> The group submitted its draft report to the ICANN CEO in October 2021, just prior to ICANN 72.<ref>[https://www.icann.org/en/blogs/details/dns-security-facilitation-technical-study-group-delivers-final-report-13-10-2021-en ICANN.org Blog - DSFI-TSG Delivers its Final Report], October 13, 2021</ref> At [[ICANN 72]], the group presented its findings in a session during Prep Week.<ref>[https://72.schedule.icann.org/meetings/4FLR7CFvzr2JrnL3p ICANN 72 Archive - Introducing the DSFI-TSG], October 14, 2021</ref>
The group met 29 times between June 2020 and September 2021 to answer the aforementioned questions and draft recommendations for the [[ICANN CEO]].<ref>[https://community.icann.org/display/DSFI/Work+Plan+and+Timeline?preview=/136120022/160727866/DSFI%20Milestones%20Timeline.pdf DSFTSG Key Meetings Timeline]</ref> The group submitted its draft report to the ICANN CEO in October 2021, just prior to ICANN 72.<ref>[https://www.icann.org/en/blogs/details/dns-security-facilitation-technical-study-group-delivers-final-report-13-10-2021-en ICANN.org Blog - DSFI-TSG Delivers its Final Report], October 13, 2021</ref> At [[ICANN 72]], the group presented its findings in a session during Prep Week.<ref>[https://72.schedule.icann.org/meetings/4FLR7CFvzr2JrnL3p ICANN 72 Archive - Introducing the DSFI-TSG], October 14, 2021</ref><br/>
In April 2022, the Office of the Chief Technology Officer ([[OCTO]]) announced its plan to process the DSFI-TSG proposals. Although the DSFI-TSG recommendations were beyond the scope of the [[AC|Action Request Register]], which is for [[ICANN Board]] advice, the OCTO is using the ARR framework for the DSFI_TSG recommendations. The four phases of this process are: understand, evaluate, consult the [[ICANN Community]], and implementation.<ref>[https://www.icann.org/en/blogs/details/icann-is-developing-a-process-for-evaluating-dsfi-tsg-recommendations-20-04-2022-en DSFI-TSG Recommendation Implementation Process]</ref>


==Work Product==
==Work Product==
The Final Report indicated that [[ICANN Organization]] can improve the security of the [[DNS]] directly, through funded research and education, and indirectly through partnerships, community collaboration, and [[Contractual Compliance|contractual controls]] and offered 12 recommendations:<ref>[https://community.icann.org/display/DSFI/DSFI+TSG+Final+Report?preview=/176623416/176623417/DSFI-TSG-Final-Report.pdf DSFI-TSG Final Report, ICANN Community]</ref>
The Final Report indicated that [[ICANN Organization]] can improve the security of the [[DNS]] directly, through funded research and education, and indirectly through partnerships, community collaboration, and [[Contractual Compliance|contractual controls]] and offered 12 recommendations:<ref>[https://community.icann.org/display/DSFI/DSFI+TSG+Final+Report?preview=/176623416/176623417/DSFI-TSG-Final-Report.pdf DSFI-TSG Final Report, ICANN Community]</ref>
# Develop a Tabletop Exercise Program
# Develop a [https://www.redlegg.com/solutions/advisory-services/tabletop-exercise-pretty-much-everything-you-need-to-know Tabletop Exercise] Program to exercise incident-response procedures and identify operational gaps for services provided by registries and registrars and facilitate closing them
# Continue Existing Work on [[DNS Abuse]]  
# Continue developing the definitions of [[DNS Abuse]] and support the security and research communities in identifying and mitigating DNS abuse via SME research funding
# Investigate DNS Security Enhancements  
# Investigate DNS Security Enhancements  
# Investigate Best Practices for Authentication
# Investigate Best Practices for Authentication
# Empower [[CPH|Contracted Parties]] to adopt security enhancements to the domain registration systems and authoritative name services  
# Empower [[CPH|Contracted Parties]] to adopt security enhancements to the domain registration systems and authoritative name services  
# Bug Bounty Program Feasibility Funding  
# Offer [https://www.bugcrowd.com/bug-bounty-list/ Bug Bounty Program] Feasibility Funding  
# Educate DNS stakeholders to make available the appropriate standards-based authentication mechanisms for all interactions  
# Educate DNS stakeholders to make available the appropriate standards-based authentication mechanisms for all interactions  
# Improve documentation and understanding of Registry Lock features and promote their use; explain the differences between Registry and Registrar Lock to registrants; facilitate the standardization of minimum requirements for Registry and Registrar Lock services
# Improve documentation and understanding of [[Domain Locking|Registry Lock]] features and promote their use; explain the differences between Registry and Registrar Lock to registrants; facilitate the standardization of minimum requirements for Registry and Registrar Lock services
# Raise Awareness of Best Practices for [[ICANN Terms#Infrastructure|Infrastructure]] Security
# Raise Awareness of Best Practices for [[ICANN Terms#Infrastructure|Infrastructure]] Security by participating in initiatives such as [[MANRS]] and [[KINDNS]] and promoting the adoption of [[DMARC]], [[SPF]], [[TLSA]], [[DANE]], and [[DNSSEC]]
# DNS [[RBL|Blocking]] and Filtering
# Help the [[ICANN Community]], contracted parties, and others understand the risks and benefits of DNS [[RBL|Blocking]] and filtering for [[SSR|security and stability reasons]], best practices, tooling for DNS interdependencies to avoid large-scale collateral damage, using the Public Suffix List ([[PSL]]), sharing lists to avoid overblocking, and general reputation hygiene
# Incident Responses
# Develop and deploy a formalized incident-response process across the DNS industry that allows for interaction with others in the ecosystem
# Raise Covert Channel Awareness
# Raise [https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/9248526 Covert Channel] Awareness


Of these recommendations, the TSG said the two top priorities for ICANN were conducting a study and offering a report on best practices for authentication against the different roles and risks in the DNS and encouraging the development and deployment of a formalized incident-response process across the DNS industry that allows for interaction with others in the ecosystem.
Of these recommendations, the TSG said the two top priorities for ICANN were conducting a study and offering a report on best practices for authentication against the different roles and risks in the DNS and encouraging the development and deployment of a formalized incident-response process across the DNS industry that allows for interaction with others in the ecosystem.