Cross Community Working Group on Enhancing ICANN Accountability: Difference between revisions

JP (talk | contribs)
JP (talk | contribs)
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The implications of the shift, Jones Day opined, were magnified by the inexperience of the ICANN board, org, and community in managing a membership non-profit model. Without such experience, substantial and comprehensive testing was recommended to ensure that the Community Mechanism would work as intended. The analysis also recommended that the rules of procedure for the Community Mechanism should be fully defined, and that such work should be a Work Stream 1 task to ensure that the community had an opportunity to review and comment on the proposed rules of procedure. Again, because it did not appear that all SOs and ACs would exercise voting rights in the Community Mechanism as proposed, the establishment of explicit rules prior to adoption presented an opportunity to risk-proof the Community Mechanism from capture and avoid the disenfranchisement of non-participating SOs and ACs.<ref name="jonesday" />
The implications of the shift, Jones Day opined, were magnified by the inexperience of the ICANN board, org, and community in managing a membership non-profit model. Without such experience, substantial and comprehensive testing was recommended to ensure that the Community Mechanism would work as intended. The analysis also recommended that the rules of procedure for the Community Mechanism should be fully defined, and that such work should be a Work Stream 1 task to ensure that the community had an opportunity to review and comment on the proposed rules of procedure. Again, because it did not appear that all SOs and ACs would exercise voting rights in the Community Mechanism as proposed, the establishment of explicit rules prior to adoption presented an opportunity to risk-proof the Community Mechanism from capture and avoid the disenfranchisement of non-participating SOs and ACs.<ref name="jonesday" />


The board's response caused some concern among the members of the IANA Functions Stewardship Transition Coordination Group, who saw that substantial differences of opinion on a fundamental element of the accountability proposals could delay or even halt progress on the development of a transition proposal.<ref>[https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/transcript-icg-08oct15-en.pdf ICG Meeting Archive - Transcript, ICG Call #24], October 8, 2015</ref>
The board's response, and subsequent discussions, caused some concern among the members of the IANA Functions Stewardship Transition Coordination Group, who feared that substantial differences of opinion on a fundamental element of the accountability proposals could delay or even halt progress on the development of a transition proposal.<ref>[https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/transcript-icg-08oct15-en.pdf ICG Meeting Archive - Transcript, ICG Call #24], October 8, 2015</ref>


==References==
==References==
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