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| {{CompanyInfo| | | {{CompanyInfo| |
− | | logo = Innovative auctions logo.png | + | | logo = Applicant_auction.png |
− | | bronzesponsor = ICANNWiki [[Sponsorship|Bronze Sponsor]]
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| | type = | | | type = |
| | industry = | | | industry = |
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| | ownership = | | | ownership = |
| | headquarters = | | | headquarters = |
− | | country = USA | + | | country = Hong Kong |
| | businesses = | | | businesses = |
| | products = | | | products = |
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| | linkedin = | | | linkedin = |
| | twitter = | | | twitter = |
− | | keypeople = [[Ulrich Gall]], Director<br> | + | | keypeople = [[Ulrich Gall]] - Founder<br> |
− | [[Lindsay Holden]], Director<br> | + | [[Lindsay Holden]] - Business Development<br> |
− | [[Sheel Mohnot]], Project Director<br> | + | [[Sheel Mohnot]] - Business Development<br> |
− | [[Peter Cramton]], Auction Consultant<br> | + | [[Ben Hanna]] - Operations<br> |
| + | [[Peter Cramton]]<br> |
| }} | | }} |
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− | '''Innovative Auctions''' (IAL) specializes in providing advice on auction and market design for multiple industries in many different countries. IAL is the only group that has resolved gTLD contention sets via private auction. The firm is offering [[gTLD Auctions|gTLD auction]] services to applicants in contention in [[ICANN]]'s [[New gTLD Program]].Their auction was designed by [[Peter Cramton]], a leading expert on auction design and strategy. | + | '''Innovative Auctions''' (IAL) is a Hong Kong based company that specializes in providing advice on auction and market design for multiple industries in many different countries. The firm is offering [[gTLD Auctions|gTLD auction]] services to applicants in contention in [[ICANN]]'s [[New gTLD Program]]. Their auction was designed by [[Peter Cramton]], a leading expert on auction design and strategy. |
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| + | IAL's private auction for gTLD contention sets is called '''Applicant Auction'''.<ref>[http://www.innovativeauctions.com/#applicant-auction Applicant Auction] Retrieved 08 Nov 2013</ref> |
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| ==ICANN New gTLD Auctions== | | ==ICANN New gTLD Auctions== |
− | Numerous companies have offered their own models [[gTLD Auctions|gTLD auction models]] for resolving contention among multiple applicants for the same TLD. ICANN, whose auctions are by definition a last resort, has encouraged parties to resolve contention themselves. Innovative Auctions has designed a private auction, competing with [[Sedo]] and [[Right of the Dot]]. All three groups offer slight variations on implementation and services but share commonalities in their proposed models. In all cases, the winner will pay the amount of the second-highest bid, and money will be split either equally or proportionally between the losers.<ref name="worldipreview">[http://www.worldipreview.com/newsstory.asp?ID=46 New gTLD applicants ponder private auctions], WorldIPreview.com. Published 14 November 2012. Retrieved 6 December 2012.</ref> All applicants for each contention set must agree to participate in order for a private auction to proceed; otherwise, the contention set will be managed via ICANN's auction system, in which all proceeds go to ICANN as "excess funds" that will be allocated at a later date.<ref>[http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2012/11/icann_s_gtld_auction_proceeds_should_be_used_to_bring_mesh_technologies.html ICANN, Make a Difference], Slate.com. Published 27 November 2012. Retrieved 6 December 2012.</ref> | + | Numerous companies have offered their own models [[gTLD Auctions|gTLD auction models]] for resolving contention among multiple applicants for the same TLD. ICANN, whose auctions are by definition a last resort, has encouraged parties to resolve contention themselves. Innovative Auctions has designed a private auction, competing with [[Sedo]] and [[Right of the Dot]]. All three groups offer slight variations on implementation and services but share commonalities in their proposed models. In all cases, the winner will pay the amount of the second-highest bid, and money will be split either equally or proportionally between the losers.<ref name="worldipreview">[http://www.worldipreview.com/newsstory.asp?ID=46 New gTLD applicants ponder private auctions], WorldIPreview.com. Published 14 November 2012. Retrieved 6 December 2012.</ref> All applicants for each contention set must agree to participate in order for a private auction to proceed; otherwise, the contention set will be managed via ICANN's auction system, in which all proceeds go to ICANN as "excess funds" that will be allocated at a later date.<ref>[http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2012/11/icann_s_gtld_auction_proceeds_should_be_used_to_bring_mesh_technologies.html ICANN, Make a Difference], Slate.com. Published 27 November 2012. Retrieved 6 December 2012.</ref> |
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| During [[ICANN 45]] in Toronto, [[Peter Cramton]] outlined an "ascending clock" model, where a price is increased by the auctioneer at each stage; bidders and sellers can then either drop out or bid on the increased amount.<ref name="domainincite">[http://domainincite.com/10828-heres-how-donuts-wants-to-resolve-its-158-new-gtld-contention-fights Here's how Donuts wants to resolve its 158 new gTLD contention fights]. Domain Incite. Published 2012 October 23. Retrieved 2012 November 13.</ref> This model is also preferred by [[Right of the Dot]], though it has also proposed "sealed bid" and "live auction" models. In a sealed bid model, applicants securely send money via a courier and packages are stored in a safe place until they are opened at the auction session.<ref name="worldipreview"></ref> | | During [[ICANN 45]] in Toronto, [[Peter Cramton]] outlined an "ascending clock" model, where a price is increased by the auctioneer at each stage; bidders and sellers can then either drop out or bid on the increased amount.<ref name="domainincite">[http://domainincite.com/10828-heres-how-donuts-wants-to-resolve-its-158-new-gtld-contention-fights Here's how Donuts wants to resolve its 158 new gTLD contention fights]. Domain Incite. Published 2012 October 23. Retrieved 2012 November 13.</ref> This model is also preferred by [[Right of the Dot]], though it has also proposed "sealed bid" and "live auction" models. In a sealed bid model, applicants securely send money via a courier and packages are stored in a safe place until they are opened at the auction session.<ref name="worldipreview"></ref> |
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− | Innovative Auctions Limited (the group using the Auction model proposed by Peter Cramton) have secured their fees at 1% for the first round and 4% for subsequent rounds. The first round took place in June and 6 contention sets were settled for a total of $9.01M .<ref name="applicantauction">[http://www.applicantauction.com/blog/2013/6/19/first-applicant-auction-settled-next-auction-august-13th FIRST APPLICANT AUCTION SETTLED, NEXT AUCTION AUGUST 13TH]. Applicant Auction. Published 2013 June 19. Retrieved 2013 July 10.</ref> To date, the Applicant Auction has resolved contention for 14 gTLDs for a total sales price of $18.6 million. | + | Innovative Auctions has secured its fees at 1% for the first round and 4% for subsequent rounds. The first round took place in June and 6 contention sets were settled for a total of $9.01M .<ref name="applicantauction">[http://www.applicantauction.com/blog/2013/6/19/first-applicant-auction-settled-next-auction-august-13th FIRST APPLICANT AUCTION SETTLED, NEXT AUCTION AUGUST 13TH]. Applicant Auction. Published 2013 June 19. Retrieved 2013 July 10.</ref> To date, the Applicant Auction has resolved contention for over 70 gTLDs.<ref>[http://www.applicantauction.com/ ApplicantAuction.com] Retrieved 01 Dec 2014</ref> In the first two auctions (comprising 14 strings), the total sales price was $18.6 million; results from subsequent auctions have not been disclosed.<ref>[http://www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/the-great-internet-land-grab The Great Internet Land Grab] ''The New Yorker'', www.newyorker.com, Retrieved 01 Dec 2014</ref> |
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| [[Peter Cramton|Dr. Cramton]] has conducted research on auction theory and practice since 1983, and has facilitated a variety of high stakes auctions, including a large variety of government auctions for resource rights and distribution rights, with Cramton Associates.<ref>[http://www.cramton.umd.edu/ca/ About, Cramton.umd.edu/ca]</ref> Highlights from his high-profile and unique auction experience includes holding the world's first auction on greenhouse gas emissions in the UK in 2002, designing electricity and gas markets in Colombia, and leading the FAA process to auction airport runway slots for New York City airports.<ref name="Cramton Home">[http://www.cramton.umd.edu/ca/ Home, Cramton.umd.edu/ca]Retrieved 7 Jan 2013]</ref> | | [[Peter Cramton|Dr. Cramton]] has conducted research on auction theory and practice since 1983, and has facilitated a variety of high stakes auctions, including a large variety of government auctions for resource rights and distribution rights, with Cramton Associates.<ref>[http://www.cramton.umd.edu/ca/ About, Cramton.umd.edu/ca]</ref> Highlights from his high-profile and unique auction experience includes holding the world's first auction on greenhouse gas emissions in the UK in 2002, designing electricity and gas markets in Colombia, and leading the FAA process to auction airport runway slots for New York City airports.<ref name="Cramton Home">[http://www.cramton.umd.edu/ca/ Home, Cramton.umd.edu/ca]Retrieved 7 Jan 2013]</ref> |
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| ==References== | | ==References== |
| {{reflist}} | | {{reflist}} |
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| + | [[Category:Past Sponsors]] |