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→Cybersecurity Providers
Every type of Internet user has worries over DNS Abuse and the responses to it. For instance, there is an ongoing multistakeholder debate over where to draw the line between technical abuse and content abuse. Moreover, there are technical limits on what each type of stakeholder can do to stop abuse.
Every type of Internet user has worries over DNS Abuse and the responses to it. For instance, there is an ongoing multistakeholder debate over where to draw the line between technical abuse and content abuse. Moreover, there are technical limits on what each type of stakeholder can do to stop abuse.
===Social Scientists===
===Academics===
[https://apo.org.au/sites/default/files/resource-files/2018-04/apo-nid142116.pdf Criminologists] feel the capacity to regulate DNS abuse is very limited because:
:*[[COMAR]]
:*[https://apo.org.au/sites/default/files/resource-files/2018-04/apo-nid142116.pdf Criminologists] feel the capacity to regulate DNS abuse is very limited because:
# no single global entity is responsible for the regulation of all its aspects;
# no single global entity is responsible for the regulation of all its aspects;
# the [[Multistakeholder Model]] of governance and the distributed administration model allows disagreements and discrepancies;
# the [[Multistakeholder Model]] of governance and the distributed administration model allows disagreements and discrepancies;
# regulation will continue to be reserved for the most egregious infringements.
# regulation will continue to be reserved for the most egregious infringements.
Regulation will remain limited until a uniform set of policies to prevent abuse before it happens is enacted.<ref>[https://apo.org.au/sites/default/files/resource-files/2018-04/apo-nid142116.pdf Criminal misuse of the Domain Name System, Australian Institute of Criminology, 2018, pg 13]</ref>
Regulation will remain limited until a uniform set of policies to prevent abuse before it happens is enacted.<ref>[https://apo.org.au/sites/default/files/resource-files/2018-04/apo-nid142116.pdf Criminal misuse of the Domain Name System, Australian Institute of Criminology, 2018, pg 13]</ref>
:*[https://www.internetgovernance.org/category/cybersecurity/ The Internet Governance Project at GA Tech] focuses on privacy concerns and [[Internet Fragmentation]] in relation to IGO and governmental attempts to manage and mitigate [[cybercrime]] as well as content and technical abuse
===Intergovernmental Organizations===
===Intergovernmental Organizations===
* [[NIST#Cybersecurity Framework|Cybersecurity Framework]]
* [[NIST#Cybersecurity Framework|Cybersecurity Framework]]
=====Responding to State-Sponsored Cyberattacks=====
=====Responding to [[Threat Actor|State-Sponsored Cyberattacks]]=====
======Sanctions/Condemnations======
======Sanctions/Condemnations======
* [[SolarWinds#Hacking Attack|SolarWinds Hacking Attack]]: In an executive order issued April 15, 2021, President Biden levied economic sanctions against Russian financial institutions, technology companies, and individuals that participated in this series of hacks that infiltrated nine federal agencies and over 100 private companies.<ref>[https://www.vox.com/recode/22385555/biden-solarwinds-hack-russia-sanctions Biden's SolarWinds Executive Order, Vox]</ref>
* [[SolarWinds#Hacking Attack|SolarWinds Hacking Attack]]: In an executive order issued on April 15, 2021, President Biden levied economic sanctions against Russian financial institutions, technology companies, and individuals that participated in this series of hacks that infiltrated nine federal agencies and over 100 private companies.<ref>[https://www.vox.com/recode/22385555/biden-solarwinds-hack-russia-sanctions Biden's SolarWinds Executive Order, Vox]</ref>
* [[Microsoft#Email Systems Hacking Attack|Microsoft Email Systems Hacking Attack]]: On July 19, 2021, the Biden administration formally condemned but did not inflict sanctions against the Chinese government for working with hackers to breaching Microsoft email systems.<ref>[https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/19/us/politics/microsoft-hacking-china-biden.html?action=click&module=Spotlight&pgtype=Homepage US Govt Accuses China of Hacking Microsoft, NY Times]</ref>
* [[Microsoft#Email Systems Hacking Attack|Microsoft Email Systems Hacking Attack]]: On July 19, 2021, the Biden administration formally condemned but did not inflict sanctions against the Chinese government for working with hackers to breach Microsoft email systems.<ref>[https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/19/us/politics/microsoft-hacking-china-biden.html?action=click&module=Spotlight&pgtype=Homepage US Govt Accuses China of Hacking Microsoft, NY Times]</ref>
===Technical Community===
===Technical Community===
Parts of [[ICANN Organization]], [[ICANN Board|Board]], and [[ICANN Community|Community]] that are dedicated to resolving DNS Abuse issues:
Parts of [[ICANN Organization]], [[ICANN Board|Board]], and [[ICANN Community|Community]] that are dedicated to resolving DNS Abuse issues:
:*[[GDD|GDD Accounts and Services]] and [[OCTO]] have come to an agreement with [[RySG]] to change the Base gTLD Registry Agreement to enable ICANN org to use existing data provided by registries for research purposes such as [[DAAR]].<ref>[https://www.icann.org/en/blogs/details/icann-makes-progress-toward-a-more-comprehensive-dns-security-threat-analysis-28-10-2021-en ICANN Makes Progress on DNS Security Threat Analysis, ICANN Blogs]</ref>
:*[[GDD|GDD Accounts and Services]] and [[OCTO]] have come to an agreement with [[RySG]] to change the Base gTLD Registry Agreement to enable ICANN org to use existing data provided by registries for research purposes such as [[DAAR]].<ref>[https://www.icann.org/en/blogs/details/icann-makes-progress-toward-a-more-comprehensive-dns-security-threat-analysis-28-10-2021-en ICANN Makes Progress on DNS Security Threat Analysis, ICANN Blogs]</ref>
=====ICANN Organization=====
:*[[Goran Marby]] formed the DNS Security Facilitation - Technical Study Group ([[DSFI-TSG]]) to investigate and determine what ICANN should and should not do based on the technical landscape about security threats and attack vectors, including the DNS, and its final report recommendations are now under review for implementation by the ICANN Org.
:*[[OCTO]] monitors gTLD zone files and runs
:*[[OCTO]] monitors gTLD zone files and runs
:*[[Contractual Compliance]] reprimands registrars or registries that do not maintain abuse contacts (or a webform) to receive abuse complaints or promptly investigate allegations of DNS Abuse in good faith and conducts audits.
:*[[Contractual Compliance]] is not beholden to the DNS Abuse Framework; instead, the office can reprimand registrars or registries that do not maintain abuse contacts (or a webform) to receive abuse complaints or promptly investigate allegations of DNS Abuse in good faith.
:*[[Domain Abuse Activity Reporting|DAAR]]
:*[[Domain Abuse Activity Reporting|DAAR]]
:*[[Domain Name Security Threat Information Collection and Reporting Project]] (DNSTICR)<ref>[https://www.icann.org/en/announcements/details/adding-linguistic-diversity-to-the-domain-name-security-threat-information-collection-and-reporting-project-14-6-2021-en Adding Linguistic Diversity to the DNSTICR project, ICANN Announcements]</ref> <br/>
:*[[Domain Name Security Threat Information Collection and Reporting Project]] (DNSTICR)<ref>[https://www.icann.org/en/announcements/details/adding-linguistic-diversity-to-the-domain-name-security-threat-information-collection-and-reporting-project-14-6-2021-en Adding Linguistic Diversity to the DNSTICR project, ICANN Announcements]</ref> <br/>
:*[[ICANN Organization]] has developed an internal [[DNS Security Threat Mitigation Program]],<ref>[https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/presentation-dns-security-threat-mitigation-program-update-22jul21-en.pdf DNS Security Threat Mitigation Program Update, ICANN Presentation, July 2021]</ref> which seeks to realize ICANN organization-wide coordination & collaboration on DNS abuse responses and, thus, acts as a hub for DAAR and DNSTICR, Compliance Audits and Abuse Complaints, Working with Contracted Parties, and Leading Educational Outreach.
:*[[ICANN Organization]] has developed an internal [[DNS Security Threat Mitigation Program]],<ref>[https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/presentation-dns-security-threat-mitigation-program-update-22jul21-en.pdf DNS Security Threat Mitigation Program Update, ICANN Presentation, July 2021]</ref> which seeks to realize ICANN organization-wide coordination & collaboration on DNS abuse responses and, thus, acts as a hub for DAAR and DNSTICR, Compliance Audits and Abuse Complaints, Working with Contracted Parties, and Leading Educational Outreach.
=====ICANN Community=====
======GNSO======
The GNSO Council formed a "Small Team on DNS Abuse," to which the [[DNS Abuse Institute|DNSAI]] sent a [https://dnsabuseinstitute.org/dnsai-response-gnso-small-team-dns-abuse/ letter] offering advice on how to respond to DNS Abuse in a way that is clearly within ICANN's remit.<ref>[https://gnso.icann.org/en/council/correspondence/2022 Responses to GNSO DNS Abuse Small Team Request for Input, GNSO Council Correspondence April 2022]</ref> [[Graeme Bunton]] explained that there is
<blockquote>near universal agreement...that malicious registrations used for the distribution of malware, phishing, or the operation of botnets are appropriately and reasonably addressed by registrars and registries...which means there is an opportunity to focus on this issue at the outset and make meaningful progress on abuse. ICANN’s [[https://icannwiki.org/Policy_Development_Process_to_Review_the_Transfer_Policy|current work]] on [[Inter-Registrar Transfer Policy]] provides a model for an approach. I would propose three separate, sequential efforts, either narrowly scoped efforts or [[PDP]]s, for mitigating malicious registrations:
* Malicious Registrations used for the distribution of Malware;
* Malicious Registrations used for Phishing;
* Malicious Registrations used for the operation of Botnet command and control systems.
By restricting the work to malicious registrations...avoids actors outside of ICANN’s contractual regime, like hosting companies and content distribution networks and targets bad actors, and the impacts on legitimate registrants are correspondingly minimized.</blockquote>
Bunton also hopes that taking the "micro-PDP" approach will result in short, simple, easy to implement requirements.
:*The [[CPH]] has developed a [https://www.rysg.info/wp-content/uploads/archive/Final-CPH-Notifier-Framework-6-October-2021.pdf Trusted Notifier Framework]
:*The [[CPH]] has developed a [https://www.rysg.info/wp-content/uploads/archive/Final-CPH-Notifier-Framework-6-October-2021.pdf Trusted Notifier Framework]
:**The [[RrSG]] offers guidance on [https://rrsg.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Appeal-Mechanisms-following-DNS-Abuse-Mitigation-22-October-2021-.pdf Appeal Mechanisms for DNS Abuse Mitigation], [https://rrsg.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/RrSG-Approaches-to-BEC-Scams-22-Oct-2021.pdf managing BEC Scams], [https://rrsg.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Guide-to-Registrar-Abuse-Reporting-v1.8.pdf Registrar Abuse Reporting], and [https://rrsg.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/CPH-Minimum-Required-Information-for-a-Whois-Data-Requests.docx.pdf Minimum requirements for WHOIS data requests].
:**The [[RrSG]] offers guidance on [https://rrsg.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Appeal-Mechanisms-following-DNS-Abuse-Mitigation-22-October-2021-.pdf Appeal Mechanisms for DNS Abuse Mitigation], [https://rrsg.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/RrSG-Approaches-to-BEC-Scams-22-Oct-2021.pdf managing BEC Scams], [https://rrsg.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Guide-to-Registrar-Abuse-Reporting-v1.8.pdf Registrar Abuse Reporting], and [https://rrsg.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/CPH-Minimum-Required-Information-for-a-Whois-Data-Requests.docx.pdf Minimum requirements for WHOIS data requests].
:**encourage these same entities to develop and deploy new tools to identify domain names that could potentially infringe on their rights; and
:**encourage these same entities to develop and deploy new tools to identify domain names that could potentially infringe on their rights; and
:**encourage these same entities to offer services allowing [[IP|Intellectual Property]] rights holders to preventively block infringing domain name registrations.<ref>[https://domainnamewire.com/2022/03/30/business-constituency-weighs-in-on-dns-abuse/ BC weighs in on DNS Abuse, Domain Name Wire]</ref>
:**encourage these same entities to offer services allowing [[IP|Intellectual Property]] rights holders to preventively block infringing domain name registrations.<ref>[https://domainnamewire.com/2022/03/30/business-constituency-weighs-in-on-dns-abuse/ BC weighs in on DNS Abuse, Domain Name Wire]</ref>
:*The [[ISPCP]]
:*The [[IPC]] is concerned with the year-on-year growth of online fraud recently due in large part to the Covid pandemic and with trust in the Internet
======GAC======
:*The [[GAC]] wants to help law enforcement and regulatory bodies gain access to the contact information of victims as well as bad actors
:*The [[GAC]] wants to help law enforcement and regulatory bodies gain access to the contact information of victims as well as bad actors
:**The [[PSWG] (within GAC) developed the Framework on DGAs Associated with Malware and Botnets in collaboration with the [[RySG]]<ref>[https://www.rysg.info/wp-content/uploads/assets/Framework-on-Domain-Generating-Algorithms-DGAs-Associated-with-Malware-and-Botnets.pdf DGAs, Malware, and Botnets Framework, RySG]</ref>
:**The [[PSWG] (within GAC) developed the Framework on DGAs Associated with Malware and Botnets in collaboration with the [[RySG]]<ref>[https://www.rysg.info/wp-content/uploads/assets/Framework-on-Domain-Generating-Algorithms-DGAs-Associated-with-Malware-and-Botnets.pdf DGAs, Malware, and Botnets Framework, RySG]</ref>
======ccNSO======
:*The [[ccNSO]] has begun exploring its role in mitigating DNS Abuse, as it has limited remit but many attacks happen via [[ccTLD]]s
:*The [[ccNSO]] has begun exploring its role in mitigating DNS Abuse, as it has limited remit but many attacks happen via [[ccTLD]]s
:*The [[IPC]] is concerned with the year-on-year growth of online fraud recently due in large part to the Covid pandemic and with trust in the Internet
======SSAC======
:*The [[SSAC]] has published several documents on DNS Abuse measurement and mitigation
======ALAC======
:*At [[ICANN 74]], the [[ALAC]] held a session discussing end users' perspective and the role of [[RALO]]s in responding to DNS Abuse
====IGF====
====IGF====
====DNS Abuse Institute====
====DNS Abuse Institute====
This newcomer is entirely focused on creating an interoperable framework to reduce DNS abuse. The [[DNS Abuse Institute|DNSAI]] acknowledges there are two options for reducing security threats: proactive and reactive methods. The institute is currently putting more of its energy into developing ''reactive tools'' because they can be used by anti-abuse or compliance personnel without requiring integration in registration platforms and thus, broad buy-in should be easier to secure.<ref>[https://dnsabuseinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/DNS-Abuse-Institute-Roadmap.pdf DNSAI Roadmap pg. 9]</ref>
* [[NetBeacon]]
===Private Sector===
===Private Sector===
====Cybersecurity Providers====
====Cybersecurity Providers====
The [[:Category:Cybersecurity Providers|cybersecurity]] industry is booming and is trying various [[cybersecurity|approaches]] to protect networks and supply chains from data breaches and [[ransomware]] attacks. For instance, [[Prevailion]]'s strategy is to hack the hackers, while [[McAfee]] remains the revenue leader by continuing to churn out cybersecurity software.<ref>[https://www.thesoftwarereport.com/the-top-25-cybersecurity-companies-of-2020/ Top 25 Cybersecurity Companies of 2020, The Software Report]</ref>
The [[:Category:Cybersecurity Providers|cybersecurity]] industry is booming and is trying various [[cybersecurity|approaches]] to protect networks and supply chains from data breaches and [[ransomware]] attacks. For instance, [[Prevailion]]'s strategy is to hack the hackers, while [[McAfee]] remains the revenue leader by continuing to churn out cybersecurity software.<ref>[https://www.thesoftwarereport.com/the-top-25-cybersecurity-companies-of-2020/ Top 25 Cybersecurity Companies of 2020, The Software Report]</ref>
====[[Registries]] and [[Registar]]s====
* [[CleanDNS]]
* [[PhishLabs]]
* [[KnowBe4]]
* [[Cofense]]
* [[Cyber Risk Aware]]
* [[KnowBe4]] (MediaPRO)
* [[SANS Institute]]
* [[Inspired eLearning]]
====[[Registries]] and [[Registrar]]s====
* In March 2022, [[TWNIC]] and [[DotAsia]] signed an MOU of bilateral collaboration of information exchange and mutual recognition as [[Trusted Notifier]]s. When either TWNIC or DotAsia receives a notification via the Fast Track mechanism that they created, it will be able to immediately take appropriate actions under the domain name registration agreement to reduce the [[cybercrime]] impact.<ref>[https://www.digitimes.com/news/a20220329PR200.html?chid=9 TWNIC and DotAsia establish fast track mechanism to fight DNS abuse, Digitimes]</ref>
* In March 2022, [[TWNIC]] and [[DotAsia]] signed an MOU of bilateral collaboration of information exchange and mutual recognition as [[Trusted Notifier]]s. When either TWNIC or DotAsia receives a notification via the Fast Track mechanism that they created, it will be able to immediately take appropriate actions under the domain name registration agreement to reduce the [[cybercrime]] impact.<ref>[https://www.digitimes.com/news/a20220329PR200.html?chid=9 TWNIC and DotAsia establish fast track mechanism to fight DNS abuse, Digitimes]</ref>
* Sebastian Felix Schwemer's 2020 analysis of 30 European ccTLD terms of services (ToS) showed several responses to use/content-related domain name abuse, including no related reservations, reactions to severe cases, and proactive screening.<ref>[https://policyreview.info/articles/analysis/regulation-abusive-activity-content-study-registries-terms-service Schwemer, The regulation of abusive activity and content: a study of registries’ terms of service]</ref> Some ToSes do ''not'' contractually reserve to take down a domain name due to use or content, while others ''do'' reserve the right to take down a domain name but only in severe situations. Others have established "takedown regimes" akin to that of site operators, hosting providers, and registrants (per Article 14 of the [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32000L0031 E-Commerce Directive]. [[EURid]], [[.be]], and [[SIDN]] have begun to screen abusive use by crawling content, using fuzzy hashes, or HTML structural similarity analysis; they are also working on early warning systems. Schwemer found that only 1/3 of ccTLD ToSes contained content/use provisions and that the discretion for registrars to take down domain names via a morality clause was higher than it was for ccTLD registries. This analysis also revealed the emergence of ccTLD registries' use of data validation in a new way. Registries have noticed a correlation between domain names engaging in unlawful activities and the provision of poor registration data. Because ToSes can reserve the right to terminate registrations based on wrong or inaccurate information, some ccTLD registries are using this term as a workaround.<ref>[https://policyreview.info/articles/analysis/regulation-abusive-activity-content-study-registries-terms-service Schwemer, The regulation of abusive activity and content: a study of registries’ terms of service]</ref>
* Sebastian Felix Schwemer's 2020 analysis of 30 European ccTLD terms of services (ToS) showed several responses to use/content-related domain name abuse, including no related reservations, reactions to severe cases, and proactive screening.<ref>[https://policyreview.info/articles/analysis/regulation-abusive-activity-content-study-registries-terms-service Schwemer, The regulation of abusive activity and content: a study of registries’ terms of service]</ref> Some ToSes do ''not'' contractually reserve to take down a domain name due to use or content, while others ''do'' reserve the right to take down a domain name but only in severe situations. Others have established "takedown regimes" akin to that of site operators, hosting providers, and registrants (per Article 14 of the [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32000L0031 E-Commerce Directive]. [[EURid]], [[.be]], and [[SIDN]] have begun to screen abusive use by crawling content, using fuzzy hashes, or HTML structural similarity analysis; they are also working on early warning systems. Schwemer found that only 1/3 of ccTLD ToSes contained content/use provisions and that the discretion for registrars to take down domain names via a morality clause was higher than it was for ccTLD registries. This analysis also revealed the emergence of ccTLD registries' use of data validation in a new way. Registries have noticed a correlation between domain names engaging in unlawful activities and the provision of poor registration data. Because ToSes can reserve the right to terminate registrations based on wrong or inaccurate information, some ccTLD registries are using this term as a workaround.<ref>[https://policyreview.info/articles/analysis/regulation-abusive-activity-content-study-registries-terms-service Schwemer, The regulation of abusive activity and content: a study of registries’ terms of service]</ref>
# Reserve the domains or
# Reserve the domains or
# create the domains in order to suspend or [[DNS sinkholing|sinkhole]] the domains for victim identification
# create the domains in order to suspend or [[DNS sinkholing|sinkhole]] the domains for victim identification
====Reputation Industry====
====Reputation Industry====
Commercial service providers, researchers, and non-profit organizations operate the most prominent [[RBL]]s that detect or receive notifications of security threats. Some key players include:
Commercial service providers, researchers, and non-profit organizations operate the most prominent [[RBL]]s that detect or receive notifications of security threats. Some key players include:
* [http://www.surbl.org/ SURBL], and
* [http://www.surbl.org/ SURBL], and
* [https://www.threatstop.com/ ThreatStop].
* [https://www.threatstop.com/ ThreatStop].
====End Users====
====End Users====
End users, even those who work in the DNS industry, need help managing DNS Abuse mainly because of the timeless effectiveness of [[Social Engineering Attacks]]. For instance, at the end of 2020, [[GoDaddy]] notoriously tested its workers to see if they would share sensitive information after clicking on dubious links from a spoofed email.<ref> [http://domainincite.com/26143-godaddy-pranks-employees-with-insensitive-phishing-test GoDaddy Pranks Employees, DomainIncite]</ref>
End users, even those who work in the DNS industry, need help managing DNS Abuse mainly because of the timeless effectiveness of [[Social Engineering Attacks]]. For instance, at the end of 2020, [[GoDaddy]] notoriously tested its workers to see if they would share sensitive information after clicking on dubious links from a spoofed email.<ref> [http://domainincite.com/26143-godaddy-pranks-employees-with-insensitive-phishing-test GoDaddy Pranks Employees, DomainIncite]</ref>