Changes

Cramton's original model proposed to run auctions during the first quarter of 2013, before ICANN announced the results of their Initial Evaluation. Such a model would allow losing bidders to receive 70% back from their ICANN application fee, but would pose difficulties if winning applicants later discovered their applications were rejected as other applicants would have withdrawn already, and the new gTLD would be left without an owner. The former model also lumped all TLDs that an individual applicant had applied for in one package. Criticisms stating that such a model would benefit larger companies led to a change, so that auctions will now proceed on a TLD-by-TLD basis, with all auctions being simultaneously resolved at the same time.<ref name="domainincite"></ref> Cramton has indicated that the final auction price will be made public, along with the winning bidder.<ref>email communication from [[Peter Cramton|Dr. Cramton]] 25 March 2013</ref>

Cramton's original model proposed to run auctions during the first quarter of 2013, before ICANN announced the results of their Initial Evaluation. Such a model would allow losing bidders to receive 70% back from their ICANN application fee, but would pose difficulties if winning applicants later discovered their applications were rejected as other applicants would have withdrawn already, and the new gTLD would be left without an owner. The former model also lumped all TLDs that an individual applicant had applied for in one package. Criticisms stating that such a model would benefit larger companies led to a change, so that auctions will now proceed on a TLD-by-TLD basis, with all auctions being simultaneously resolved at the same time.<ref name="domainincite"></ref> Cramton has indicated that the final auction price will be made public, along with the winning bidder.<ref>email communication from [[Peter Cramton|Dr. Cramton]] 25 March 2013</ref>

The first Applicant Auction was held in June 2013, and resolved 6 domains, selling for a combined $9.01 million[http://www.applicantauction.com/blog/2013/6/6/first-applicant-auction-a-success-6-domains-valued-at-over-9-million First Applicant Auction a success! 6 domains valued at over $9 million]. The second auction will be held on August 13th[http://www.applicantauction.com/blog/2013/6/19/first-applicant-auction-settled-next-auction-august-13th Next Applicant Auction August 13th].

The first Applicant Auction was held in June 2013, and resolved 6 domains, selling for a combined $9.01 million <ref name="Applicant Auction">[[http://www.applicantauction.com/blog/2013/6/6/first-applicant-auction-a-success-6-domains-valued-at-over-9-million]. The second auction will be held on August 13th <ref name="Applicant Auction blog">[[http://www.applicantauction.com/blog/2013/6/19/first-applicant-auction-settled-next-auction-august-13th Next Applicant Auction August 13th].

[[Peter Cramton|Dr. Cramton]] has conducted research on auction theory and practice since 1983, and has facilitated a variety of high stakes auctions, including a large variety of government auctions for resource rights and distribution rights, with [[Cramton Associates]].<ref>[http://www.cramton.umd.edu/ca/ About, Cramton.umd.edu/ca]</ref> Highlights from his high-profile and unique auction experience includes holding the world's first auction on greenhouse gas emissions in the UK in 2002, designing electricity and gas markets in Colombia, and leading the FAA process to auction airport runway slots for New York City airports.<ref name="Cramton Home">[http://www.cramton.umd.edu/ca/ Home, Cramton.umd.edu/ca]Retrieved 7 Jan 2013]</ref>

[[Peter Cramton|Dr. Cramton]] has conducted research on auction theory and practice since 1983, and has facilitated a variety of high stakes auctions, including a large variety of government auctions for resource rights and distribution rights, with [[Cramton Associates]].<ref>[http://www.cramton.umd.edu/ca/ About, Cramton.umd.edu/ca]</ref> Highlights from his high-profile and unique auction experience includes holding the world's first auction on greenhouse gas emissions in the UK in 2002, designing electricity and gas markets in Colombia, and leading the FAA process to auction airport runway slots for New York City airports.<ref name="Cramton Home">[http://www.cramton.umd.edu/ca/ Home, Cramton.umd.edu/ca]Retrieved 7 Jan 2013]</ref>