Changes

===ICANN 54===

===ICANN 54===

At [[ICANN 54]] in Dublin, the CCWG-Accountability group met with a variety of stakeholder groups, as well as holding a public engagement session and open work sessions.<ref>[https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=56134263 CCWG-Accountability WS 1 Workspace - ICANN 54 Dublin meetings], last modified October 21, 2015</ref> The first meeting, held in the lead-up to the main programming of the conference, focused on the feedback received from the public comment period on the group's second draft proposal.<ref name="54f2f">[https://meetings.icann.org/en/dublin54/schedule/fri-ccwg-accountability ICANN 54 Archive - CCWG-Accountability Face to Face Meeting], October 16, 2015</ref> The model for the empowered community was once again a key conversation point, both in terms of decision-making (voting rights vs. consensus building) and legal and operational powers (inclusion in bylaws, legal definition of EC, and governance considerations).<ref name="54f2ftranscript">[https://meetings.icann.org/en/dublin54/schedule/fri-ccwg-accountability/transcript-ccwg-accountability-16oct15-en ICANN 54 Archive - Transcript, CCWG-Accountability Face to Face Meeting] October 16, 2015</ref> In the lead up to the meeting in Dublin, Work Party 1 had shifted its attention toward a "single designator" model, marking a third such shift in as many draft cycles. The designator model was examined in detail during the October 16 meeting, and compared with the single member model of the second draft.<ref>[https://docs.google.com/document/d/1Bu6ze45ONESJyO_f3RCpEafQsb1VAPgCFHtmWsNIIoM Google Docs - CCWG-Accountability Models Comparison Tool], October 16, 2015</ref> As the initial discussion proceeded, [[Wolfgang Kleinwaechter]] offered some historical perspective:

At [[ICANN 54]] in Dublin, the CCWG-Accountability group met with a variety of stakeholder groups, as well as held a public engagement session and open work sessions.<ref>[https://community.icann.org/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=56134263 CCWG-Accountability WS 1 Workspace - ICANN 54 Dublin meetings], last modified October 21, 2015</ref> The first meeting, held in the lead-up to the main programming of the conference, focused on the feedback received from the public comment period on the group's second draft proposal.<ref name="54f2f">[https://meetings.icann.org/en/dublin54/schedule/fri-ccwg-accountability ICANN 54 Archive - CCWG-Accountability Face to Face Meeting], October 16, 2015</ref> The model for the empowered community was once again a key conversation point, both in terms of decision-making (voting rights vs. consensus building) and legal and operational powers (inclusion in bylaws, legal definition of EC, and governance considerations).<ref name="54f2ftranscript">[https://meetings.icann.org/en/dublin54/schedule/fri-ccwg-accountability/transcript-ccwg-accountability-16oct15-en ICANN 54 Archive - Transcript, CCWG-Accountability Face to Face Meeting] October 16, 2015</ref> In the lead up to the meeting in Dublin, Work Party 1 had shifted its attention toward a "single designator" model, marking a third such shift in as many draft cycles. The designator model was examined in detail during the October 16 meeting, and compared with the single-member model of the second draft.<ref>[https://docs.google.com/document/d/1Bu6ze45ONESJyO_f3RCpEafQsb1VAPgCFHtmWsNIIoM Google Docs - CCWG-Accountability Models Comparison Tool], October 16, 2015</ref> As the initial discussion proceeded, [[Wolfgang Kleinwaechter]] offered some historical perspective:

<blockquote>I want to continue what Cherine has raised [whether or not the single designator model meant that the removal of individual board members would be removed by community consensus]. But I think that's a key question, you know, whether the five designators, you know, act in -- on a consensus basis or just, you know, in an agreement basis. So this is really a key point for me. Because if you go back to the reform in 2002 when the new mechanism was introduced, the basic argument behind this was we have to have a redistribution of power. No single group can capture the Board. That's why we have five different designators and a stakeholder process in the NomCom. So that means, you know, every year, the Board is reshuffled and you have a new group. I know that some board members, you know, are already there for a long time, but, you know, they had -- go through a process of checking, and then they were reelected.<br />

<blockquote>I want to continue what Cherine has raised [whether or not the single designator model meant that the removal of individual board members would be removed by community consensus]. But I think that's a key question, you know, whether the five designators, you know, act in -- on a consensus basis or just, you know, in an agreement basis. So this is really a key point for me. Because if you go back to the reform in 2002 when the new mechanism was introduced, the basic argument behind this was we have to have a redistribution of power. No single group can capture the Board. That's why we have five different designators and a stakeholder process in the NomCom. So that means, you know, every year, the Board is reshuffled and you have a new group. I know that some board members, you know, are already there for a long time, but, you know, they had -- go through a process of checking, and then they were reelected.<br />

So that means the decentralization of power is a key factor for ICANN. And whatever we do, we cannot remove this or reduce this. And so far, you know, to answer these questions, whether this can be -- needs consensus of all groups or whether this is just, you know, one group raises the issue and gets rubber stamped by the others is an important point.<br />

So that means the decentralization of power is a key factor for ICANN. And whatever we do, we cannot remove this or reduce this. And so far, you know, to answer these questions, whether this can be -- needs consensus of all groups or whether this is just, you know, one group raises the issue and gets rubber stamped by the others is an important point.<br />

And let me add another experience when I have the microphone. For me, it's deja vu in [[World Summit on the Information Society|Tunis 2005]] when we discussed in the WSIS four models for ICANN oversight. It was ICANN oversight with the new corporation model in the final negotiations. And, you know, there was, you know -- it was midnight and after midnight that then people realized, okay, we will not agree on a model. What we can agree is on a process. And it should not be a new one; that we should base the process on what we have, on the existing mechanism. We have to enhance this. We have to make better. And the outcome was rather creative language.<br />

And let me add another experience when I have the microphone. For me, it's deja vu in [[World Summit on the Information Society|Tunis 2005]] when we discussed in the WSIS four models for ICANN oversight. It was ICANN oversight with the new corporation model in the final negotiations. And, you know, there was, you know -- it was midnight and after midnight that then people realized, okay, we will not agree on a model. What we can agree is on a process. And it should not be a new one; that we should base the process on what we have, on the existing mechanism. We have to enhance this. We have to make it better. And the outcome was rather creative language.<br />

And this is what I hope we will achieve here in Dublin, that we create, really, something new.<ref name="54f2ftranscript" /></blockquote>

And this is what I hope we will achieve here in Dublin, that we create, really, something new.<ref name="54f2ftranscript" /></blockquote>

There were concerns expressed about making another change in model for the new proposal, but the co-chairs and others argued that the continued evolution of a model that ensured enforceability of "big stick" community powers (board removal and the removal of individual directors) while also finding ways to escalate and enforce other issues within the bundle of community powers was the goal.<ref name="54f2ftranscript" />  

There were concerns expressed about making another change in model for the new proposal, but the co-chairs and others argued that the continued evolution of a model that ensured enforceability of "big stick" community powers (board removal and the removal of individual directors) while also finding ways to escalate and enforce other issues within the bundle of community powers was the goal.<ref name="54f2ftranscript" />  

<blockquote>With respect to the bylaws status, the board supports the consideration of the designator model as the closest to our current governance model. So basically from our perspective, the board will continue to actively participate in refining how best to implement the community powers and following up on the work that was done on Saturday morning. And the board is willing to participate in investigating how a sole designator model could be implemented.<ref name="54work1" /></blockquote>

<blockquote>With respect to the bylaws status, the board supports the consideration of the designator model as the closest to our current governance model. So basically from our perspective, the board will continue to actively participate in refining how best to implement the community powers and following up on the work that was done on Saturday morning. And the board is willing to participate in investigating how a sole designator model could be implemented.<ref name="54work1" /></blockquote>

===Third Draft===

==Work Stream 2==

===Transparency===

==References==

==References==