Changes

====Paper 3: Finances====

====Paper 3: Finances====

The third paper sees the EC calling ICANN's marked growth in staff and revenue into question. They point out that over the past 5 years the expenses and revenue of ICANN have increased significantly, and they also noted that revenue is expected to at least double as ICANN begins accepting applications, and the fees involved, for new [[gTLD]]s. They claim that despite increases in revenue, staffing, and spending, that ICANN's mandate, jurisdiction, and responsibilities have largely remained unchanged. They see these problems as inherently tied to other governance issues, and call for an independent audit mechanism to be put in place. They cite their oversight of the non-profit European [[registry]], [[EURid]], as a potential example, and they encouraged ICANN to consider using surpluses to fund appropriate IT related organizations and Internet governance projects.<ref>[http://blog.internetgovernance.org/pdf/ECPaper3-4.pdf EC Paper 3]</ref>

The third paper sees the EC calling ICANN's marked growth in staff and revenue into question. They point out that over the past 5 years the expenses and revenue of ICANN have increased significantly, and they also noted that revenue is expected to at least double as ICANN begins accepting applications, and the fees involved, for new [[gTLD]]s. They claim that despite increases in revenue, staffing, and spending, that ICANN's mandate, jurisdiction, and responsibilities have largely remained unchanged. They see these problems as inherently tied to other governance issues, and call for an independent audit mechanism to be put in place. They cite their oversight of the non-profit European [[registry]], [[EURid]], as a potential example, and they encouraged ICANN to consider using surpluses to fund appropriate IT related organizations and Internet governance projects.<ref>[http://blog.internetgovernance.org/pdf/ECPaper3-4.pdf EC Paper 3]</ref> They also question ICANN's general staffing practices.

The third paper can be read [http://blog.internetgovernance.org/pdf/ECPaper3-4.pdf here].

The third paper can be read [http://blog.internetgovernance.org/pdf/ECPaper3-4.pdf here].

Commentators have noted that their arguments are superficial at best, and demonstrate an ignorance of ongoing debates in ICANN circles related to financing, and also point to the EC's own exorbitant budget surpluses.<ref>[http://blog.internetgovernance.org/blog/_archives/2011/9/9/4895767.html InternetGovernance.org/blog]</ref>

[[Milton Mueller]] believes that their arguments are superficial at best, and demonstrate an ignorance of ongoing debates in ICANN circles related to financing, and also point to the EC's own exorbitant budget surpluses.<ref>[http://blog.internetgovernance.org/blog/_archives/2011/9/9/4895767.html InternetGovernance.org/blog]</ref> It has also been noted that many ICANN community members have called into question the financing and staffing of the organization, and thus the EC is totally on-point to also voice its own concern.<ref>[http://nigel.je/ Nigel Roberts' blog, Nigel.je]</ref> An important example of ICANN community members calling staffing issues into question took place at [[ICANN 40]] in San Francisco. [[Maria Farrell]], a former ICANN staff member, and [[Lesley Cowley]], a long time participant and the CEO of [[Nominet]], probed ICANN CEO [[Rod Beckstrom]] on his questionable staffing practices and lamented the turn-over of long-term, experienced staff members under his leadership.<ref>[http://mariafarrell.com/?cat=7 MariaFarrell.com Blog post]</ref>

 

====Paper 4: Corporate Governance====

====Paper 4: Corporate Governance====

The fourth paper takes on ICANN's lack of transparency in its dealing and rulings, it also offers solutions to problems of ethical neutrality with relation to board members. It is first noted that the work of ICANN's own [[Accountability and Transparency Review Team]] does not offer sufficient answers to the variety of problems at hand. They are particularly concerned about the neutrality of board members given that they can simultaneously work for contracted entities that stand to gain or lose revenue with regards to a given ICANN decision. They subsequently note that board members are free to move directly from their position as a voluntary member of ICANN's board into a paid position with a contracted ICANN entity, such as the high-profile example with former chairman [[Peter Dengate Thrush]]. Thus, they call on the organization to better spell out what constitutes a conflict of interest for board and staff members, to create new mandates to support this definition, to create independent control mechanisms, and to formulate a punishment for breaches of the new rules. They agree with the Accountability and Transparency Review Team that board members should be compensated to reward professionalism and help eliminate any incentives for conflicting one's own interest with that of the organization. The EC concludes by making a number of implementation suggestions related to their recommendations, including advice to the USG to amend the [[IANA]] contract to more forcefully and specifically address conflicts of interest.<ref>[http://blog.internetgovernance.org/pdf/ECPaper3-4.pdf EC Paper 4]</ref>

The fourth paper takes on ICANN's lack of transparency in its dealing and rulings, it also offers solutions to problems of ethical neutrality with relation to board members. It is first noted that the work of ICANN's own [[Accountability and Transparency Review Team]] does not offer sufficient answers to the variety of problems at hand. They are particularly concerned about the neutrality of board members given that they can simultaneously work for contracted entities that stand to gain or lose revenue with regards to a given ICANN decision. They subsequently note that board members are free to move directly from their position as a voluntary member of ICANN's board into a paid position with a contracted ICANN entity, such as the high-profile example with former chairman [[Peter Dengate Thrush]]. Thus, they call on the organization to better spell out what constitutes a conflict of interest for board and staff members, to create new mandates to support this definition, to create independent control mechanisms, and to formulate a punishment for breaches of the new rules. They agree with the Accountability and Transparency Review Team that board members should be compensated to reward professionalism and help eliminate any incentives for conflicting one's own interest with that of the organization. The EC concludes by making a number of implementation suggestions related to their recommendations, including advice to the USG to amend the [[IANA]] contract to more forcefully and specifically address conflicts of interest.<ref>[http://blog.internetgovernance.org/pdf/ECPaper3-4.pdf EC Paper 4]</ref>