Changes

[[Cramton Associates]] is one of three visible providers of Private Auction services for gTLD applicants, the other two being [[Right of the Dot]] and [[Sedo]]. [[Cramton Associates]]' model is preferred by the largest [[TLD]] applicant, [[Donuts]].<ref>[http://domainincite.com/10828-heres-how-donuts-wants-to-resolve-its-158-new-gtld-contention-fights Here's How Donuts Wants To Resolve its 158 Contention Fights, DomainIncite.com]Published 23 Oct 2012, Retrieved 8 Jan 2013</ref> [[Raymond King]], applicant for 10 TLDs with [[Top Level Design]] expressed his favor for Private Auctions in general, and Cramton Associates specifically in an [http://www.circleid.com/posts/20130102_private_vs_icann_auction_of_last_resort/ opinion piece on CircleID].

[[Cramton Associates]] is one of three visible providers of Private Auction services for gTLD applicants, the other two being [[Right of the Dot]] and [[Sedo]]. [[Cramton Associates]]' model is preferred by the largest [[TLD]] applicant, [[Donuts]].<ref>[http://domainincite.com/10828-heres-how-donuts-wants-to-resolve-its-158-new-gtld-contention-fights Here's How Donuts Wants To Resolve its 158 Contention Fights, DomainIncite.com]Published 23 Oct 2012, Retrieved 8 Jan 2013</ref> [[Raymond King]], applicant for 10 TLDs with [[Top Level Design]] expressed his favor for Private Auctions in general, and Cramton Associates specifically in an [http://www.circleid.com/posts/20130102_private_vs_icann_auction_of_last_resort/ opinion piece on CircleID].

During [[ICANN 45]] in Toronto, auction expert Dr. [[Peter Cramton]] outlined an "ascending clock" model, where a price is increased by the auctioneer at each stage; bidders and sellers can then either drop out or bid on the increased amount.<ref name="domainincite">[http://domainincite.com/10828-heres-how-donuts-wants-to-resolve-its-158-new-gtld-contention-fights Here's how Donuts wants to resolve its 158 new gTLD contention fights]. Domain Incite. Published 2012 October 23. Retrieved 2012 November 13.</ref>  ICANN has identified the same style of auction for its own Auction of Last Resort.<ref>[http://www.cramton.umd.edu/aa/cramton-applicant-auction-in-brief.pdf Applicant Auction in Brief, Cramton.umd.edu]Published 21 Nov 2012, retrieved Jan 7 2013</ref> At his presentation following the ICANN Draw in December, 2012, Dr. Cramton also also addressed a sequential first-price sealed bid, noting that the ascending clock model is still preferred given that it involves: better price discovery, better deposit management, reduced tendency to overbid, and is more consistent with the ICANN Auction of Last Resort.<ref name="Cramton Draw Proposal">[http://www.cramton.umd.edu/aa/cramton-applicant-auction-conference-slides.pdf Cramton Applicant Auction Conference Slides, Cramton.umd.edu]Retrieved Jan 7 2013]</ref> He continues to defend his decision to exclusively offer one style of auction, as opposed to [[Right of the Dot]]'s three options, by writing on [[CircleID]], "Choosing an auction design is not a matter of taste, or of favoring one bidder over another. There is a whole field in economics concerned with determining what the best auction is for a particular situation. Thousands of scientific papers have been written on the subject and much has been learned from decades of study." He goes on to note that using an independent system and auction provider, uniform across auctions, takes away the need to negotiate the auction style between the parties and creates a more predictable playing field.<ref name="CircleID Faq">[http://www.circleid.com/posts/20130107_rationale_for_tld_applicant_auctions_to_resolve_string_contentions/ Rationale for TLD Applicant Auctions to Resolve Strings, CircleId.com]Published 8 Jan 2013, Retrieved 8 Jan 2013</ref>

During [[ICANN 45]] in Toronto, Dr. Peter Cramton outlined an "ascending clock" model, where a price is increased by the auctioneer at each stage; bidders and sellers can then either drop out or bid on the increased amount.<ref name="domainincite">[http://domainincite.com/10828-heres-how-donuts-wants-to-resolve-its-158-new-gtld-contention-fights Here's how Donuts wants to resolve its 158 new gTLD contention fights]. Domain Incite. Published 2012 October 23. Retrieved 2012 November 13.</ref>  ICANN has identified the same style of auction for its own Auction of Last Resort.<ref>[http://www.cramton.umd.edu/aa/cramton-applicant-auction-in-brief.pdf Applicant Auction in Brief, Cramton.umd.edu]Published 21 Nov 2012, retrieved Jan 7 2013</ref> At his presentation following the ICANN Draw in December, 2012, Dr. Cramton also also addressed a sequential first-price sealed bid, noting that the ascending clock model is still preferred given that it involves: better price discovery, better deposit management, reduced tendency to overbid, and is more consistent with the ICANN Auction of Last Resort.<ref name="Cramton Draw Proposal">[http://www.cramton.umd.edu/aa/cramton-applicant-auction-conference-slides.pdf Cramton Applicant Auction Conference Slides, Cramton.umd.edu]Retrieved Jan 7 2013]</ref> He continues to defend his decision to exclusively offer one style of auction, as opposed to [[Right of the Dot]]'s three options, by writing on [[CircleID]], "Choosing an auction design is not a matter of taste, or of favoring one bidder over another. There is a whole field in economics concerned with determining what the best auction is for a particular situation. Thousands of scientific papers have been written on the subject and much has been learned from decades of study." He goes on to note that using an independent system and auction provider, uniform across auctions, takes away the need to negotiate the auction style between the parties and creates a more predictable playing field.<ref name="CircleID Faq">[http://www.circleid.com/posts/20130107_rationale_for_tld_applicant_auctions_to_resolve_string_contentions/ Rationale for TLD Applicant Auctions to Resolve Strings, CircleId.com]Published 8 Jan 2013, Retrieved 8 Jan 2013</ref>

Cramton's original model proposed to run auctions during the first quarter of 2013, before ICANN announced the results of their Initial Evaluation. Such a model would allow losing bidders to receive 70% back from their ICANN application fee, but would pose difficulties if winning applicants later discovered their applications were rejected as other applicants would have withdrawn already, and the new gTLD would be left without an owner. The former model also lumped all TLDs that an individual applicant had applied for in one package. Criticisms stating that such a model would benefit larger companies led to a change, so that auctions will now proceed on a TLD-by-TLD basis, with all auctions being simultaneously resolved at the same time.<ref name="domainincite"></ref>

Cramton's original model proposed to run auctions during the first quarter of 2013, before ICANN announced the results of their Initial Evaluation. Such a model would allow losing bidders to receive 70% back from their ICANN application fee, but would pose difficulties if winning applicants later discovered their applications were rejected as other applicants would have withdrawn already, and the new gTLD would be left without an owner. The former model also lumped all TLDs that an individual applicant had applied for in one package. Criticisms stating that such a model would benefit larger companies led to a change, so that auctions will now proceed on a TLD-by-TLD basis, with all auctions being simultaneously resolved at the same time.<ref name="domainincite"></ref>