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Line 36: − Cramton's original model proposed to run auctions during the first quarter of 2013, before ICANN announced the results of their Initial Evaluation. Such a model would allow losing bidders to receive 70% back from their ICANN application fee, but would pose difficulties if winning applicants later discovered their applications were rejected as the other applicants will have withdraw already, and the new gTLD would be left without an owner. The former model also lumped all TLDs that an individual applicant had applied for in one package. Criticisms stating that such a model would benefit larger companies led to a change, so that auctions will now proceed on a TLD-by-TLD basis, with all auctions being simultaneously resolved at the same time.<ref name="domainincite"></ref>+ − − The new proposal is to hold one set of auctions before Initial Evaluations are posted, with a commitment made before the end of February 2013 and the auction happening in March. The second auction would come after Initial Evaluations are posted with commitment made before the end of August, 2013 and auctions taking place in September. Mock auctions are held before the actual auctions.<ref name="Cramton Draw Proposal"></ref> Cramton Associates has subsequently planned for a third auction to be held around June 2013 for those contention sets that complete their Initial Evaluation early.<ref>[http://www.cramton.umd.edu/aa/cramton-draw-and-applicant-auction.pdf Draw and Applicant Auction, Cramton.umd.edu]Published 4 Dec 2012 Retrieved Jan 7 2013</ref><ref name="CircleID Faq"></ref> This plan is currently in flux given that ICANN announced in mid-January that the results of the [[String Similarity Panel]] would not be done until March 8th, a significant delay, and would thus the first Cramton auction may not be available until the end of March.<ref>[http://www.circleid.com/posts/20130112_more_on_private_auctions_for_new_gtlds/ More on Private Auctions For New gTLDs, CircleID.com]Retrieved 16 Jan 2013, Published 12 Jan 2013</ref> − −
→ICANN New gTLD Auctions
During [[ICANN 45]] in Toronto, [[Peter Cramton]] outlined an "ascending clock" model, where a price is increased by the auctioneer at each stage; bidders and sellers can then either drop out or bid on the increased amount.<ref name="domainincite">[http://domainincite.com/10828-heres-how-donuts-wants-to-resolve-its-158-new-gtld-contention-fights Here's how Donuts wants to resolve its 158 new gTLD contention fights]. Domain Incite. Published 2012 October 23. Retrieved 2012 November 13.</ref> This model is also preferred by [[Right of the Dot]], though it has also proposed "sealed bid" and "live auction" models. In a sealed bid model, applicants securely send money via a courier and packages are stored in a safe place until they are opened at the auction session.<ref name="worldipreview"></ref>
During [[ICANN 45]] in Toronto, [[Peter Cramton]] outlined an "ascending clock" model, where a price is increased by the auctioneer at each stage; bidders and sellers can then either drop out or bid on the increased amount.<ref name="domainincite">[http://domainincite.com/10828-heres-how-donuts-wants-to-resolve-its-158-new-gtld-contention-fights Here's how Donuts wants to resolve its 158 new gTLD contention fights]. Domain Incite. Published 2012 October 23. Retrieved 2012 November 13.</ref> This model is also preferred by [[Right of the Dot]], though it has also proposed "sealed bid" and "live auction" models. In a sealed bid model, applicants securely send money via a courier and packages are stored in a safe place until they are opened at the auction session.<ref name="worldipreview"></ref>
Cramton and Associates have secured their fees at 1% for the first round and 4% for subsequent rounds. The first round is now slated to take place in Early June.
Cramton and Associates have secured their fees at 1% for the first round, 2% for the second round, and 4% for the third round. There is a floor of $1 million USD and a ceiling of $5 million on the third round. The escalation of prices helps account for the higher cost of expenses due to offering multiple application rounds.<ref>[http://www.circleid.com/posts/20130107_rationale_for_tld_applicant_auctions_to_resolve_string_contentions/ Rationale for TLD Applicant Auctions to Resolve String Contention, CircleID.com]</ref>
[[Peter Cramton|Dr. Cramton]] has conducted research on auction theory and practice since 1983, and has facilitated a variety of high stakes auctions, including a large variety of government auctions for resource rights and distribution rights, with Cramton Associates.<ref>[http://www.cramton.umd.edu/ca/ About, Cramton.umd.edu/ca]</ref> Highlights from his high-profile and unique auction experience includes holding the world's first auction on greenhouse gas emissions in the UK in 2002, designing electricity and gas markets in Colombia, and leading the FAA process to auction airport runway slots for New York City airports.<ref name="Cramton Home">[http://www.cramton.umd.edu/ca/ Home, Cramton.umd.edu/ca]Retrieved 7 Jan 2013]</ref>
[[Peter Cramton|Dr. Cramton]] has conducted research on auction theory and practice since 1983, and has facilitated a variety of high stakes auctions, including a large variety of government auctions for resource rights and distribution rights, with Cramton Associates.<ref>[http://www.cramton.umd.edu/ca/ About, Cramton.umd.edu/ca]</ref> Highlights from his high-profile and unique auction experience includes holding the world's first auction on greenhouse gas emissions in the UK in 2002, designing electricity and gas markets in Colombia, and leading the FAA process to auction airport runway slots for New York City airports.<ref name="Cramton Home">[http://www.cramton.umd.edu/ca/ Home, Cramton.umd.edu/ca]Retrieved 7 Jan 2013]</ref>