Changes

|  || 6. The study also recommends setting up a standardized (and potentially centralized) system for abuse reporting, identifying the minimum information necessary to process such reports. The receipt of abuse reports is to be acknowledged. The reaction time to such reports shall be clearly defined and the abuse reporter should be provided with information on the actions taken. The DNS service providers shall provide for an appeal proceeding against their decisions to a third neutral party || 11. registries and registrars should use predictive algorithms to prevent abusive registrations ||  || 20. Internet Service Providers operating DNS resolvers should configure DNSSEC validation to protect end users from cache poisoning attacks || 27. all intermediaries and stakeholders should share knowledge and do capacity building in the fight against DNS abuse

|  || 6. The study also recommends setting up a standardized (and potentially centralized) system for abuse reporting, identifying the minimum information necessary to process such reports. The receipt of abuse reports is to be acknowledged. The reaction time to such reports shall be clearly defined and the abuse reporter should be provided with information on the actions taken. The DNS service providers shall provide for an appeal proceeding against their decisions to a third neutral party || 11. registries and registrars should use predictive algorithms to prevent abusive registrations ||  || 20. Internet Service Providers operating DNS resolvers should configure DNSSEC validation to protect end users from cache poisoning attacks || 27. all intermediaries and stakeholders should share knowledge and do capacity building in the fight against DNS abuse

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|  || 7. We encourage the exchange of information on threats between parties involved (e.g., CERTs, security organizations) using collaborative platforms such as Malware Information Sharing Platform (MISP) to report and mitigate abuse in a more effective and timely way. || 12. Registries' and registrars' abuse rates should always be monitored by independent researchers with institutions and regulatory bodies; their abuse rates should not exceed predetermined thresholds; if they exceed the thresholds and do not improve, [[accreditation]] could be revoked ||  || 21. National CERT teams should subscribe to data sources that identify open DNS resolvers; should intensify notification efforts to reduce the number of open DNS resolvers, the root cause of distributed reflective (DR)[[DoS Attack]]s ||  

|  || 7. We encourage the exchange of information on threats between parties involved (e.g., CERTs, security organizations) using collaborative platforms such as Malware Information Sharing Platform (MISP) to report and mitigate abuse in a more effective and timely way. || 12. Registries' and registrars' abuse rates should always be monitored by independent researchers with institutions and regulatory bodies; their abuse rates should not exceed predetermined thresholds; if they exceed the thresholds and do not improve, [[Registrar Accreditation Agreement|accreditation]] could be revoked ||  || 21. National CERT teams should subscribe to data sources that identify open DNS resolvers; should intensify notification efforts to reduce the number of open DNS resolvers, the root cause of distributed reflective (DR)[[DoS Attack]]s ||  

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|  ||  || 13. registries and registrars with lower abuse rates could be financially rewarded, through a reduction in domain registration fees ||  || 22. The [[Cybersecurity]] community should continuously measure the adoption of SPF and DMARC protocols, especially for high-risk domain names; raise awareness of domain spoofing among domain owners and email service providers; and correct and toughen SPF and DMARC rules to mitigate email spoofing/Business Email Compromise scams ||  

|  ||  || 13. registries and registrars with lower abuse rates could be financially rewarded, through a reduction in domain registration fees ||  || 22. The [[Cybersecurity]] community should continuously measure the adoption of SPF and DMARC protocols, especially for high-risk domain names; raise awareness of domain spoofing among domain owners and email service providers; and correct and toughen SPF and DMARC rules to mitigate email spoofing/Business Email Compromise scams ||