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DNS Abuse Responses: Difference between revisions

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=====Responding to State-Sponsored Cyberattacks=====
=====Responding to State-Sponsored Cyberattacks=====
* [[SolarWinds Hacking Attack]]  
* [[SolarWinds#Hacking Attack|SolarWinds Hacking Attack]]  
* [[Microsoft Email Systems Hacking Attack]] On July 19, 2021, the Biden administration formally condemned but did not inflict sanctions against the Chinese government for working with hackers to breaching Microsoft email systems.<ref>[https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/19/us/politics/microsoft-hacking-china-biden.html?action=click&module=Spotlight&pgtype=Homepage US Govt Accuses China of Hacking Microsoft, NY Times]</ref>  
* [[Microsoft#Email Systems Hacking Attack|Microsoft Email Systems Hacking Attack]]] On July 19, 2021, the Biden administration formally condemned but did not inflict sanctions against the Chinese government for working with hackers to breaching Microsoft email systems.<ref>[https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/19/us/politics/microsoft-hacking-china-biden.html?action=click&module=Spotlight&pgtype=Homepage US Govt Accuses China of Hacking Microsoft, NY Times]</ref>
 
===Technical Community===
===Technical Community===



Revision as of 13:54, 19 July 2021

DNS Abuse Responses are the various tools, methods, collaboration, and philosophies spawning from DNS Abuse itself.

Objectives edit

What are the goals of DNS abuse responses?

Overview edit

There are four time-related categories of responses to DNS Abuse:

  1. reactionary detection and removal of sources of abuse (necessarily after the fact),
  2. cotemporal efforts to mitigate the amount and likelihood of abuse or its impact,
  3. future-focused work on stopping abuse before it can happen, and
  4. ongoing allowance of abuse for ideological or jurisdictional reasons.

Response Options edit

Reactionary Removal edit

Cotemporal Mitigation edit

Future Prevention edit

Intentional Inaction edit

Points of View edit

Every type of Internet user has worries over DNS Abuse and the responses to it. For instance, there is an ongoing multistakeholder debate over where to draw the line between technical abuse and content abuse.

Social Scientists edit

Governments/Intergovernmental Organizations edit

IGO responses generally see DNS Abuse as a facet of Cybercrime. Government responses tend to focus on what can be adjudicated; include content abuse, such as child pornography; and outline how and when electronic evidence can be collected.

Objectives edit

Pro-Mitigation edit


Pro-Privacy edit
  • Pro-privacy legislation, such as the GDPR, limits access to natural persons' data.

Government Responses edit

Domestic Legislation edit

Case Type edit

Civil edit
Criminal edit
Responding to State-Sponsored Cyberattacks edit

Technical Community edit

Internet Governance Organizations edit

ICANN edit

So far, ICANN has been steadfast in its focus on technical DNS abuse and avoidance of policymaking around content abuse. As recently as ICANN 71, the organization was criticized by [[____]] and [[ ___]] for not doing enough to steward contracted parties and non-contracted parties toward involvement in reducing abuse. However, ICANN and SSAC, in particular, can point to SAC115.

IGF edit

DNS Abuse Institute edit

Currently, this newcomer is entirely focused on creating an interoperable framework.

Private Sector edit

Registars edit

Registries edit

BC edit

The business community wants

IP edit

Intellectual property lawyers

ISPCP edit

Internet Service and Connectivity providers

Reputation Industry edit

End Users edit

End users, even those who work in the DNS industry, need help managing DNS Abuse mainly because of the timeless effectiveness of Social Engineering Attacks. For instance, at the end of 2020, GoDaddy notoriously tested its workers to see if they would share sensitive information after clicking on dubious links from a spoofed email.[2]

References edit

References edit