Changes

|  ||  || 14. registries should maintain access to [[RBL]]s, identify their registrars with the highest and lowest concentrations and rates of DNS abuse, propose incentive structures to encourage their registrars to prevent and mitigate malicious registrations ||  || 23. Network operators should deploy IP Source Address Validation for all traffic at the edge of a network to protect closed DNS resolvers from different external attacks against DNS infrastructure, including possible zero-day vulnerabilities within the DNS server software

|  ||  || 14. registries should maintain access to [[RBL]]s, identify their registrars with the highest and lowest concentrations and rates of DNS abuse, propose incentive structures to encourage their registrars to prevent and mitigate malicious registrations ||  || 23. Network operators should deploy IP Source Address Validation for all traffic at the edge of a network to protect closed DNS resolvers from different external attacks against DNS infrastructure, including possible zero-day vulnerabilities within the DNS server software

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