2002 Evolution and Reform Process

The 2002 Evolution and Reform Process was a board-led reform process that resulted in the adoption of substantial reform in the bylaws, structure, and operation of ICANN.

Background

ICANN was incorporated in 1998, and entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with the Department of Commerce in November of that year to begin a joint project to manage the domain name system in a way that promoted the principles of stability, competition, private, bottom-up coordination, and representation of all views among the global and diverse community of Internet users and functions.

Initial Structure and Growth

In March 1999, ICANN amended its bylaws to establish a new supporting organization, the Domain Names Supporting Organization (DNSO). As amended, the bylaws contemplated the following structure of ICANN and its SOs and ACs:

• Three Supporting Organizations: Address Supporting Organization (ASO); Domain Name Supporting Organization (DNSO); and Protocol Supporting Organization (PSO).
• Four Advisory Committees: Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC); Root Server System Advisory Committee (RSSAC); an Advisory Committee on Membership (until such time as the board established rules for At-Large director seats on the board); and an Advisory Committee on Independent Review (until such time as the board adopted procedures for independent review).

In the March 1999 amended bylaws, only the DNSO had defined procedures established for its operation. The ASO and the PSO sections of the bylaws were reserved. ICANN and the PSO signed a Memorandum of Understanding in July 1999, amended bylaws of August 26, 1999, included procedural and operational guidelines for the PSO. In October 1999, the three existing regional internet registries - RIPE NCC, APNIC, and ARIN - entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with ICANN as well, resulting in the creation of the ASO. The addition of the ASO to the bylaws occurred at the end of October.

Perceived Need for Reform

In November 2001, the ICANN Board created a Committee on Restructuring to investigate possible reforms to ICANN's structure and operations. The resolution forming the committee also instructed the ICANN President (at the time, M. Stuart Lynn) "to take such steps as he deems appropriate to bring to the Board for its review and approval recommendations for how best to reaffirm and clarify the nature and scope of ICANN's limited mission." The board cited "ongoing considerable discussion in the ICANN community, including a number of the DNSO constituencies, about the desirability of possible changes in the structure of ICANN, including consideration of possible new Supporting Organizations and changes in the composition of the ICANN Board;" as well as the fact that "ongoing evaluation of the ALSC Final Report also implicates issues of ICANN structure and Board composition" as factors in taking these actions.

In February 2002, Lynn published his report and proposal for comprehensive reforms of the ICANN structure, board, and operations. Prior to publication, the reform report and proposal was presented to the ICANN Board during its retreat in Washington D.C. The report makes the case for "deep, meaningful, structural reform, based on a clearheaded understanding of the successes and failures of the last three years." Lynn's proposals included:

• Reformation of the ICANN Board.
• Reform of ICANN's Policy Development Structure and Process:
  • Three Policy Councils - Address & Numbering, Generic TLDs, and Geographic TLDs;
  • Two Advisory Committees - Technical and Governmental;
  • Two additional Standing Committees - Security Committee, and Root Server System Operations Committee; and
  • Participation in Councils by self-organized forums, including possibly an At-Large organization for internet users.
• Transparency and Accountability reforms: creation of the Ombudsman's office, and a "Manager of Public Participation" role.
• Funding reforms - dramatically increase funding from governmental and non-governmental sources, including contributions for core functions and fees for services.

In response to Lynn's report, the board made a number of resolutions at its meeting at ICANN 12 in Accra, Ghana:

• the Committee on Restructuring was renamed the Committee on Evolution and Reform;
• the committee was tasked to provide a report to the board outlining a "framework for the structure and functioning of a reformed ICANN, and a timetable for implementing that framework" in time for the ICANN 13 meeting in Bucharest;
• the committee was to ensure that they addressed and recommended resolutions for a broad range of issues, including both structural and operational considerations for the proposed reformed structure, transition of existing structural components, and ensuring adherence to ICANN's core mission and objectives;
• the board strongly encouraged public comment on reform proposals as well as all activities and recommendations of the committee; and
• the committee was instructed to work with Lynn and ICANN staff to develop its recommendations for reform.

These actions kicked off what would come to be known as the Evolution and Reform Process. The board expressed a desire to engage in deliberations on a set of proposals for reform at ICANN 13 in Bucharest, and that any materials to be presented at that meeting should be published for public comment no later than May 31, 2002.

Committee Work and Reports

The Evolution and Reform Committee (ERC) began work in the spring of 2002. The ERC presented an interim report on progress to the Board in April 2002, stating that it was making strides in gathering public opinion across a variety of fora, including personal communications to committee members. The report provided an "idiosyncratic" overview of the public input received around many of the features and talking points of Stuart Lynn's proposals for reform. The Committee chair, Alejandro Pisanty, emphasized that none of the community input and discussions could be characterized as conclusive.

Working Papers

In May 2002, the ERC released a series of working papers on ICANN's mission & values, its policy development process, and its structure & the nominating committee concept. The papers were intended to capture the current state of ICANN and its written and unwritten rules, and to spark community contributions and discussion on each of the issue areas being addressed by the ERC.

ICANN Mission

At the time of the ERC's work, neither ICANN's mission nor the organization's values were described in the bylaws. The ERC created a draft mission statement and core values based on a wide variety of documents and agreements, most importantly the White Paper, the 1998 Memorandum of Understanding with the Department of Commerce, the IANA Contract, and the Memorandum of Understanding between ICANN and the IETF. The draft mission statement identifies ICANN's mission as "coordinat[ing] the stable operation of the Internet's unique identifier systems," including the allocation and assignment of domain names, IP addresses, autonomous process addresses, and protocol port and parameter numbers, as well as the operation and evolution of the DNS's root name server system. The working paper also identifies an array of "core values," although some of the listed values are more akin to operational mandates.

The Mission & Core Values working paper received 9 comments. The comments varied widely in terms of support for the draft mission statement and values. Some commenters noted that the representation of all members of the multistakeholder community was not mentioned; rather the core values identified "inclusivity" of diverse viewpoints.

Policy Development Process

The results of ICANN's policy development process to date in 2002 was, in the view of the ERC, "at best uneven, with the predominant outcomes slow or exceedingly general or both." In its discussion of the standards of decision-making, the ERC further described some of the issues facing ICANN's policy model to date:

The results to date are mixed. ICANN has been very effective in some areas, notably the introduction of competition at the registrar level, establishment of new TLDs, and the creation of an efficient, non-binding dispute resolution process. But in other areas ICANN has been less effective. In particular, ICANN has not always demonstrated the ability to come to decisions on issues of interest to some or all of its constituents, with the result that the consequence is often no action – by default rather than through a conscious choice of the Internet community.

The paper went on to identify the challenge of reaching consensus as a primary roadblock to efficient and effective decision-making. Noting that the word "consensus" did not appear in the ICANN bylaws until the March 1999 amendments that created the DNSO, the ERC nonetheless accepted that consensus policy was an important concept, both in the spirit of ICANN's multistakeholder model and in terms of ICANN's Registry Agreements.

Balancing the equities, the ERC proposed an approach toward consensus that creates checks and balances against the exercise of either a de facto veto on the part of individual constituencies (by refusing to join a "consensus" proposal), and top-down imposition of policy by the board:

Thus, a reasonable solution would be to have ICANN seek consensus whenever possible in developing policies, through processes and procedures that insure that all views of those affected are heard and that are open and transparent, and then to allow the ICANN Board to decide the issue based on its educated perception of the best interests of the whole community. To ensure that the ICANN Board did not lightly disregard any policy recommendation from a constituent entity, ICANN's bylaws could require only a simple majority to accept a properly documented consensus recommendation from such an entity, and a supermajority (two-thirds?) to take action that was significantly inconsistent with such a recommendation.

This would preserve the incentive of all parties to work toward consensus solutions, but allow the Board (assuming a Board selection process that produces a broadly representative Board) to exercise its good judgment. If a supermajority provision was included in the bylaws, and if an independent review process or some similar mechanism existed, there would be a review to ensure that standard was met.

The ERC also outlined a uniform procedure for policy-making that is quite familiar to the modern-day policy development process:

• PDPs should be initiated by supporting organizations or at the request of the board, delegating the PDP to a specific SO or cross-community working group;
• A specific timeframe for the PDP working group or task force to gather input from the community and other relevant sources;
• A draft report, stating the basis for any recommendations, the steps taken to gather community input, the proposed policy or recommendations, along with a timeline regarding those recommendations, and an opportunity for dissenting opinions to present their rationales;
• A public comment period on the draft report; and
• A final report presented to the board for action.

Deprecated. Domain Name Supporting Organization. Predecessor of the Generic Names Supporting Organization, which advised the Board with respect to policy issues relating to the Domain Name System (ICANN Bylaws).

Address Supporting Organization. Advises the Board with respect to policy issues relating to the operation, assignment, and management of Internet addresses (ICANN Bylaws).

Deprecated. Protocol Supporting Organization.

Governmental Advisory Committee. Considers and provides advice on the activities of ICANN as they relate to concerns of governments, particularly matters where there may be an interaction between ICANN's policies and various laws and international agreements or where they may affect public policy issues (ICANN Bylaws).

Root Server System Advisory Committee. Advises the ICANN community and Board on matters relating to the operation, administration, security, and integrity of the Internet's Root Server System (ICANN Bylaws).

Internet Engineering Task Force

Policy Development Process