Difference between revisions of "Zero Trust"
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:* the policy enforcement point (PEP) enables, terminates, and monitors connections between users and enterprise resources; and | :* the policy enforcement point (PEP) enables, terminates, and monitors connections between users and enterprise resources; and | ||
:* the policy administrator sends commands to the PEP based on policy engine decisions to allow or deny users’ connections to a requested resource.<ref>[https://www.ekransystem.com/en/blog/zero-trust-security-model Zero Trust Security Model, Ekran]</ref> | :* the policy administrator sends commands to the PEP based on policy engine decisions to allow or deny users’ connections to a requested resource.<ref>[https://www.ekransystem.com/en/blog/zero-trust-security-model Zero Trust Security Model, Ekran]</ref> | ||
| + | |||
| + | ==Advantages & Complications== | ||
| + | Zero trust is possible, but implemented incorrectly, it can disenfranchise users.<ref>[https://www.techrepublic.com/article/zero-trust-the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly/ Zero trust: The good, the bad and the ugly, Tech Republic]</ref><ref>[https://www.ekransystem.com/en/blog/zero-trust-security-model Zero Trust Security Model, Ekran]</ref> | ||
| + | |||
| + | {| class="wikitable" | ||
| + | ! Pros !! Cons | ||
| + | |- | ||
| + | | Increased resource access visibility || Configuration challenges | ||
| + | |- | ||
| + | | Decreased attack surface || Insider threats | ||
| + | |- | ||
| + | | Improved monitoring || Dependence on the policy decision point | ||
| + | |} | ||
==References== | ==References== | ||
[[Category:Cybersecurity]] | [[Category:Cybersecurity]] | ||
Revision as of 15:19, 10 August 2021
Zero Trust (ZT) is a set of cybersecurity paradigms that focuses on users, assets, and resources instead of static perimeters. Zero trust is a response to trends such as including remote users, bringing one's own device, and cloud-based assets not within an enterprise-owned network boundary. The network location is no longer the prime component of a resource's security.[1]
Principles
- Never trust, always verify.
- No assumptions about assets or user accounts based solely on their physical or network location or asset ownership.
- Protect resources (assets, services, workflows, and network accounts), not network segments.
- Trust is a vulnerability.
History
Zero Trust was created by John Kindervag, while he was vice president and principal analyst at Forrester Research.[2]
Zero Trust Architecture
Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA) uses zero trust principles to guide industrial and enterprise infrastructure and workflow. Authentication and authorization are discrete functions performed before a session to an enterprise resource is established.[3]
Components
The following components do not make a system trusted; they work together to eliminate trust:[4]
- Protect Surfaces generally includes the most important data, assets, applications, and services (DAAS) in an organization;
- Attack Surfaces;
- A microperimeter goes anywhere the protect surface goes;
- A segmentation gateway, aka a next-generation firewall, allows traffic or legitimate applications to access the protect surface;
- The Kipling Method defines a zero trust policy based on who, what, when, where, why, and how; and
- A Zero Trust policy determines who can cross the microperimeter, stops access to protect surfaces by unauthorized users, and prevents sensitive data exfiltration. More specifically,
- the policy engine grants, revokes, or denies user access to requested enterprise resources;
- the policy enforcement point (PEP) enables, terminates, and monitors connections between users and enterprise resources; and
- the policy administrator sends commands to the PEP based on policy engine decisions to allow or deny users’ connections to a requested resource.[5]
Advantages & Complications
Zero trust is possible, but implemented incorrectly, it can disenfranchise users.[6][7]
| Pros | Cons |
|---|---|
| Increased resource access visibility | Configuration challenges |
| Decreased attack surface | Insider threats |
| Improved monitoring | Dependence on the policy decision point |