Zero Trust

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Zero Trust (ZT) is a set of cybersecurity paradigms that focuses on users, assets, and resources instead of static perimeters. Zero trust is a response to trends such as including remote users, bringing one's own device, and cloud-based assets not within an enterprise-owned network boundary. The network location is no longer the prime component of a resource's security.[1]

Principles

  1. Never trust, always verify.[2]
  2. No assumptions about assets or user accounts based solely on their physical or network location or asset ownership.
  3. Protect resources (assets, services, workflows, and network accounts), not network segments.
  4. Trust is a vulnerability.
  5. least privilege[3]

History

Zero Trust was created by John Kindervag, while he was vice president and principal analyst at Forrester Research.[4] The COVID-19 Pandemic expedited the development and deployment of zero trust architectures.[5]

Zero Trust Architecture

Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA) uses zero trust principles to guide industrial and enterprise infrastructure and workflow. Authentication and authorization are discrete functions performed before a session to an enterprise resource is established.[6]

Components

The following components do not make a system trusted; they work together to eliminate trust:[7]

  • Protect Surfaces generally includes the most important data, assets, applications, and services (DAAS) in an organization;
  • Attack Surfaces;
  • A microperimeter goes anywhere the protect surface goes;
  • A segmentation gateway, aka a next-generation firewall, allows traffic or legitimate applications to access the protect surface;
  • The Kipling Method defines a zero trust policy based on who, what, when, where, why, and how; and
  • A Zero Trust policy determines who can cross the microperimeter, stops access to protect surfaces by unauthorized users, and prevents sensitive data exfiltration. More specifically,
  • the policy engine grants, revokes, or denies user access to requested enterprise resources;
  • the policy enforcement point (PEP) enables, terminates, and monitors connections between users and enterprise resources; and
  • the policy administrator sends commands to the PEP based on policy engine decisions to allow or deny users’ connections to a requested resource.[8]

Pillars

The seven pillars in the DOD Zero Trust Architecture include:[9]

User

Securing, limiting, and enforcing person, non-person, and federated entities’ access to DAAS encompasses the use of ICAM capabilities such as multi-factor authentication and continuous multi-factor authentication.

Device

The capacity to identify, authenticate, authorize, inventory, isolate, secure, remediate, and control all devices is essential. Real-time attestation and patching of devices in an enterprise are critical. Possible options include Mobile Device Managers or Comply to Connect programs and assessments for every access request: examinations of compromise state, anomaly detection, software versions, protection status, and encryption enablement.

Network/Environment

logically and physically segment everything in order to isolate and control organizations with granular access and policy restrictions.

Applications/Workload

This category spans the complete application stack from the application layer to the hypervisor.

Data

Zero Trust protects critical DAAS. Thus, organizations must categorize their DAAS in terms of mission criticality.

Visibility & Analytics

Details are needed on performance, behavior, and activity baselines across other Zero Trust pillars to detect anomalous behavior and make dynamic changes to security policy and real-time access decisions.

Automation & Orchestration

Enterprises needed to automate manual security processes to take policy-based actions fast and at scale.

Difference between Layers 3 & 7

Layer 3 Layer 7[10]
The layer where information is evaluated based only on IP address, port or protocol. This layer is much more specific. Information is evaluated based on the application being used.
It is limited by the lack of information that can be seen. IP addresses can be spoofed. Simple port scans uncover all open ports. Thus, attackers can encapsulate stolen data and exfiltrate them across the open port. The protocol is a metadata tag to help the administrator understand the type of traffic that is supposed to be traversing a specific port. The 4th step in the Forrester five-step methodology to a Zero Trust network is to write policy rules for the segmentation gateway based on the expected behavior of the data and the user or applications that interact with that data.
Adversaries know how to bypass Layer 3 controls Due to the granularity of the policy, it can only be done at Layer 7.

Advantages & Complications

Zero trust is possible, but implemented incorrectly, it can disenfranchise users.[11][12]

Pros Cons
Increased resource access visibility Configuration challenges
Decreased attack surface Insider threats
Improved monitoring Dependence on the policy decision point
Technical Debt (Redesigning, recoding, and redeploying internal applications can be costly and potentially disruptive)
Legacy applications, infrastructure, and operating systems have no concept of least privilege, lateral movement, or dynamic, context-based authentication models
Peer-to-peer (P2P)/mesh network technologies (used in Windows 10, for instance) do not work with access and microperimeter controls.
Large deployments of a zero-trust model, such as that needed for Cloud, DevOps, and IoT, are going to be cost-prohibitive.[13]

Addressing Misconceptions

Kindervag is very concerned with correcting vendors and the public's misunderstandings about Zero trust. He argues,[14]

  1. zero trust does not make a system trusted;
  2. it is much more than identity and multi-factor authentication;
  3. there is no such thing as a zero trust product

References