Registry

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A Registry is the database of all domain names registered under a certain TLD. A Registry Operator, also known as Network Information Center (NIC), refers to person(s) or entity(ies) responsible for providing registry services. These services include customer database administration, zone file publication, DNS and DNSSEC operation, marketing and policy determination. A Registry may outsource some, all, or none of these services. Different registries exist for different TLDs.

See our list of registry companies

Registries & Registrars

Vertical Separation

The National Science Foundation signed a Cooperative Agreement with Network Solutions (NSI) as Registry Operator and Registrar for the .com, .net and .org TLDs from 1993-1999. The registry agreement was renewed by ICANN in November, 1999. Under the new agreement, NSI agreed to create a multiple registrar system also known as the Shared Registration System (SRS), which allows independent registrars to access the system. Independent registrars were to pay NSI $6.00 for every registered or renewed domain names.

In addition, ICANN encouraged registry and registrar business separation to promote competition by stipulating in the agreement that NSI will only be allowed to renew its registry agreement with ICANN for 4 years if it sells its registrar business. In 2000, Verisign purchased NSI and re-negotiated its registry agreement for the .com, .net and .org TLDs with ICANN. ICANN did not require ownership separation but implemented structural separation. ICANN explained, "there is little if any additional competitive value under today's market circumstances in forbidding the registry operator from also being a registrar, so long as it is done is such a way so as not to discriminate against other competitive registrars."

In 2000, ICANN introduced new generic top level domain names, which included .biz, .info, .name and .pro. On February 26, 2001, ICANN proposed a new registry agreement stipulating the legal separation between registry and registrar under section 3.5 Fair Treatment of ICANN-Accredited Registrars, wherein Registry Operators are not allowed to act as registrars with respect to the Registry TLD.

In 2005, ICANN implemented the registry-registrar separation of ownership in the registry agreement for the .jobs and .travel sponsored TLDs. Under Section 7.1 clause b and c in the registry agreement state the following provisions:

• (b) Registry Operator Shall Not Act as Own Registrar. Registry Operator shall not act as a registrar with respect to the TLD. This shall not preclude Registry Operator from registering names within the TLD to itself through a request made to an ICANN-accredited registrar.
• (c) Restrictions on Acquisition of Ownership or Controlling Interest in Registrar. Registry Operator shall not acquire, directly or indirectly, control of, or a greater than fifteen percent ownership interest in, any ICANN-accredited registrar.

At present, these provisions are included in the registry agreements for all sponsored and unsponsored TLDs.

ICANN's Changing Position on Vertical Separation for New gTLDs

Some believe that vertical separation is one of the most important methods used by ICANN to maintain its commitment to promote competition, which is one of the founding principles of the organization. On March 12, 2002, the ICANN Board passed a resolution stating the organization's strong position for the implementation of "strict separation" of registries and registrars for new gTLDs. The ICANN Board also stated that co-ownership will be prohibited. However, the ICANN Board also indicated, "if a policy becomes available from the GNSO, and approved by the Board prior to the launch of the new gTLD program, that policy will be considered by the Board for adoption as part of the New gTLD Program."

During a Special Meeting on Novemer 5, 2010, the ICANN Board changed its position regarding the vertical separation of registries and registrars. The Board removed the restriction on cross ownership on the Registry Agreements and replaced it with "requirements and restrictions on any inappropriate or abusive conduct arising out of registry-registrar cross ownership..." These abusive conducts are not limited to misuse of data and violations of a registry code of conduct. In addition, ICANN also stated that it will include additional enforcement mechanisms such as self-auditing requirements, contractual termination and punitive damages. Moreover, it also emphasized that "it will have the ability to refer issues to relevant competition authorities."

ICANN's Reasons for Policy Change on Vertical Separation

The ICANN Board enumerated ten reasons to support its policy change on vertical separation:

1. None of the proposals submitted by the GNSO reflected a consensus opinion; as a result, the Board supported a model based on its own factual investigation, expert analysis, and concerns expressed by stakeholders and community.
2. ICANN's position and mission must be focused on creating more competition as opposed to having rules that restrict competition and innovation.
3. Rules permitting cross-ownership foster greater diversity in business models and enhance opportunities offered by new TLDs.
4. Rules prohibiting cross-ownership require more enforcement and can easily be circumvented.
5. Preventing cross-ownership would create more exposure to ICANN of lawsuits, including anti-trust lawsuits, which are costly to defend even if ICANN believes (as it does) that it has no proper exposure to such litigation.
6. Rules permitting cross-ownership enhance efficiency and almost certainly will result in benefits to consumers in the form of lower prices and enhanced services.
7. The Rules of Conduct, which is to be part of the base agreement for all new gTLDs include adequate protections designed to address behavior the Board wants to discourage, including abuses of data and market power...
8. Case by case re-negotiation of existing contracts to reflect the new cross ownership rules will permit ICANN to address the risk of abuse of market power contractually.
9. In the event ICANN has competition concerns, ICANN will have the ability to to refer those concerns to relevant antitrust authorities.
10. ICANN can amend contracts to address harms that may arise as a direct or indirect result of the new cross-ownership rules.

EC Concerns Over the Full Removal of Vertical Separation

On June 17, 2011, the Information Society and Media Directorate General of the European Commission (EC) submitted a non-paper regarding ICANN's proposed full removal of the vertical separation to the ICANN Board. Copies were furnished to the U.S. NTIA Assistant Secretary Larry Strickling and to Assistant Attorney General Christine Varney of the Department of Justice Antitrust Division. The EC cited some issues and recommendations, which include:

• Vertical separation provides a balanced playing field for competition between registrars. The absence of expert advice to remove vertical separation and stakeholders consensus shows that the move may be premature and might result in negative market output for consumers.
• Vertical Integration might harm competition. The European Commission cited the CRA International Report of 2008, which emphasized the risk of vertical integration wherein registries may discriminate independent registrars by lowering prices and providing better registry services to their affiliate registrars.
• ICANN does not have sufficient data to support the full removal of vertical separation.
• A consensus on the issue within the GNSO and internet stakeholders is lacking.
• The procedural approach of ICANN to refer an application to relevant antitrust authorities for "expert analysis and ante determination" overlooks the fact that competition authorities have limited powers in implementing rules, which is based on a case to case market analysis. ICANN did not clearly identify specific laws that will serve as basis of its jurisdiction to determine if there are concerns regarding competition. Referral to competition authorities depends on ICANN's discretion.

Thus, The EC encouraged ICANN to reconsider decision to implement the full removal of vertical separation of registries and registrars and to follow these suggestions:

1. Conduct independent economic and legal expert studies regarding the present situation of the domain name market and evaluate the impact of the existing restrictions on vertical integration. The impact of partially or totally removing the restriction on innovation and to consumers.
2. Provide new market data on the current degree of competition and cross-ownership at the registry and registrar level.
3. Provide data and documents supporting ICANN's decision to fully remove vertical separation.
4. Provide comments regarding the procedural concerns raised by EC.

Emergency Back-up Registry Operators (EBEROs)

In connection with the implementation of new gTLDs, ICANN designed a new program known as Emergency Back-up Registry Operators (EBEROs) to ensure the safety and security of the domain name system. EBEROs are to be activated in circumstances wherein a new registry operator needs help to maintain critical functions for a period or time or during transition from one registry operator to another. A Request for Proposal (RFP) was issued by ICANN to solicit applications from entities interested to serve as EBEROs on September 14, 2011.

gTLD Registry Continuity Framework

ICANN partnered with expert gTLD & ccTLD registries as well as members of the technical community in developing a gTLD Registry Continuity Framework, which aims to protect existing registrants and to ensure confidence in the DNS. Core ICANN values served as guidelines in developing the framework, which aims to:

• Maintain and develop the operational stability, reliability, security, and global interoperability of the Internet.
• Apply documented policies neutrally, objectively with integrity and fairness in decision making.
• Be responsive and speedy in taking actions to resolve the needs of the Internet community and obtain informed input from affected entities during the decision making process.

ICANN's Timeline for its Continuity Initiatives is available here

Chinese version of this page/本页中文版

注册局

注册局是包含注册在一个特定顶级域下的所有域名的数据库。注册局运营者，也称为网络信息中心（NIC），指的是负责提供注册局服务的人或实体。这些服务包括管理客户数据库、发表区域文件、运作域名系统（DNS）和域名系统安全扩展（DNSSEC）、制定营销方案和政策。注册局可以将这些服务中的全部或部分外包，或不外包这些服务中的任何一种。不同的 顶级域由不同的注册局管理。

查看我们的注册局公司名册。

注册局和注册商

纵向分离

国家科学基金会与网络解决方案公司（Network Solutions）（NSI）签署了一份作为注册局运营者和注册商从1993年-1999年管理顶级域.com、.net 和.org的合作协议。该注册局协议在1999年11月被互联网名称与数字地址分配机构（ICANN）更新。新协议中规定，NSI同意创建一个多元化的注册商系统，也称为共享注册系统（SRS），独立注册商拥有使用该系统的权力。独立注册商需要为每个注册或续费的域名向NSI支付6美元的费用。

此外，ICANN还鼓励注册局和注册商业务分离，在协议中规定如果NSI出售其注册商业务，则其与ICANN的注册局协议只能续约四年，以此鼓励竞争。. 2000年，威瑞信收购了NSI，并且与ICANN重新商定了关于顶级域 .com、.net和 .org的注册局协议。ICANN不要求所有权分离，但是却要求执行结构性分离。ICANN为此解释道： "在当今市场环境下，禁止注册局运营者同时成为一个注册商的附加竞争价值是微乎其微的，只要它没有排斥其他注册商的竞争。"

2000年，ICANN引入了新的通用类顶级域名，包括 .biz、.info、.name 和 .pro。2001年2月26日，ICANN草拟了一份新的注册局协议，规定了注册局和注册商的法定分离关系，详见第3.5节公平对待ICANN委任注册商（Fair Treatment of ICANN-Accredited Registrars），其中规定注册局运营者不得充当注册局顶级域的注册商的角色。

2005年，ICANN根据赞助类顶级域 .jobs和.travel注册局协议执行了注册局和注册商的所有权分离。在注册局协议第7.1节的条款b和c中做出了以下规定：

• (b)注册局运营者不得作为自己的注册商。注册局运营者不得充当自己顶级域注册商的角色。此规定不应妨碍注册局运营者通过向一个由ICANN委任的注册商请求注册其自身顶级域中的域名。
• (c)注册商所有权取得或控股权益的限制条件。注册局运营者不应直接或间接完全控制或取得任何ICANN委任注册商百分之十五以上的所有者权益。

目前，这些条款包含在所有赞助类和非赞助类顶级域的注册局协议中。

ICANN对新通用顶级域纵向分离的立场转换

一些观念认为，ICANN为了维护其促进竞争的基本原则，纵向分离是其采取的最重要的方法之一。2002年3月12日，ICANN董事会通过了一项决议，表明该组织对执行新通用顶级域注册局和注册商“严格分离”的坚决立场。ICANN董事会还声明禁止共同所有权的存在。然而，ICANN董事会还指出："如果是来自通用名称支持组织（GNSO）的已经生效的政策，并且在推出新通用顶级域项目之前已经取得董事会批准，那么该政策将被董事会采纳作为新通用顶级域项目的一部分。”

在2010年11月5日的一次特别会议期间，ICANN董事会对注册局和注册商纵向分离的立场有所改变。董事会取消了注册局协议中对交叉所有权的限制，而改为"针对由于注册局注册商交叉所有权引起的任何不当或滥用行为的要求和限制……"这些滥用行为不限于误用数据以及违反注册局行为准则。此外，ICANN还申明其将采取其他执行机制，比如自我审计要求、合同终止和惩罚性损害赔偿。而且，ICANN还强调“它将拥有向相关竞争管理机构递交争议的权力。

ICANN对纵向分离政策做出变动的原因

ICANN董事会列出了支持其纵向分离政策变动的十大理由:

1. GNSO提交的建议都没有反映一个一致性的观点；因此，董事会支持了一个基于其自身事实调查、专家分析和利益相关方及社区顾虑的模式。
2. ICANN的立场和使命必须集中于促进更多的竞争，而不是设立限制竞争和创新的规则。
3. 允许交叉所有权的规则能够培养更加多元化的商业模式并增加新顶级域带来的机遇。
4. 禁止交叉所有权的规定需要更强的执行力并且可以轻易被规避。
5. 限制交叉所有权会让ICANN面临更多的法律诉讼，包括反垄断的诉讼，即使ICANN认为（事实亦如此）其不应面对此类诉讼，但是这些诉讼的辩护成本很高，。
6. 允许交叉所有权的规定可以提高效率并且几乎必将使消费者受益，比如更低的价格和更好的服务。
7. 行为准则将作为所有新通用顶级域基础协议的一部分，包含了充分的保护性条款，用以解决董事会希望阻止的行为，包括数据和市场权力滥用……
8. 逐一重新商定现有合同以反应交叉所有权新规将允许ICANN以合约形式处理市场权力滥用的风险。
9. 如果ICANN对竞争方面存有顾虑，ICANN将有权将这些顾虑诉诸相关反垄断管理机构。
10. ICANN可以修订合同以解决由于交叉所有权新规直接或间接引起的损害。

欧洲委员会对完全取消纵向分离的担忧

2011年6月17日， 欧洲委员会（EC）的信息社会和媒体总局向ICANN董事会提交了一份关于ICANN提议完全取消纵向分离的非正式文件。副本提交给了美国 国家电信和信息管理局的助理秘书Larry Strickling 以及司法部反垄断局的司法部长助理Christine Varney。EC提出了若干问题和建议，其中包括：

• 纵向分离为注册商之间提供了一个公正的竞技场。在没有专家建议和缺乏股东共识的情况下取消纵向分离可能为时过早，并且还可能给消费者带来负面的市场效应。
• 纵向整合可能会损害竞争。欧洲委员会援引了2008年的查尔斯河国际报告，其中强调了纵向整合将导致的风险，报告认为纵向整合会导致注册局通过向其附属注册商降低价格和提供更优质的注册局服务从而区别对待独立注册商。
• ICANN没有足够的数据支持其完全取消纵向分离的决策。
• 在通用名称支持组织和互联网利益相关者之间缺乏对该问题的共识。
• ICANN将申请递交给相关反垄断当局寻求“专家分析和反垄断判定”的程序式方法忽略了一个事实，那就是竞争管理机构执行规则的权力有限，因为它是基于个案市场分析的基础之上。ICANN没有明确指出将作为其竞争问题判定基础的详细法律条款。是否提交竞争管理机构只取决于ICANN的判断。

因此，EC建议ICANN重新考虑其执行完全取消注册局和注册商纵向分离的决定，并且遵循以下建议：

1. 针对当前域名市场的形式实施独立的经济和法律专家研究，并评估现有限制条件对纵向整合的影响。部分取消或完全取消限制对创新及消费者产生的影响。
2. 提供关于注册局和注册商当前竞争程度和交叉所有权的新市场数据。
3. 提供支持ICANN完全取消纵向分离决定的数据和文件。
4. 针对EC提出的每个关注点给出解释。

后方紧急注册管理执行机构（EBERO）

ICANN为新通用顶级域的实施设计了一个名为后方紧急注册管理执行机构（EBERO）的新项目，以确保域名系统的安全和保障。当一个新的注册局运营者在某个时期或一段时间或在从一个注册局运营者过渡到另一个注册局运营者期间需要帮助以维护重要功能时，EBERO将被激活。ICANN在2011年9月14日发出了一个征求建议书（RFP），寻求有意申请成为EBERO的实体。

通用顶级域注册局连续性构架

ICANN与通用顶级域及国家代码顶级域名的专家注册局以及技术社区的成员合作开发了一个通用顶级域注册局连续性构架，旨在保护现有注册人并且确保公众对域名系统（DNS）的信任。ICANN核心价值观是开发该构架的指导方针，其目的是：

• 维护并开发互联网的运行稳定性、可靠性、安全性和全球互用性。
• 在制定决策时中立、客观地运用已成文的政策，保持完整性和公平。
• 应答并快速采取行动从而解决互联网社区的需求，并且在决策制定过程中从受影响的实体获得知情信息。

ICANN连续性构架的方案时间表详见这里。

Chinese translation of this page provided thanks to TLD Registry Ltd.

Top-Level Domain

Generic Names Supporting Organization. Develops and recommends to the Board substantive policies relating to generic top-level domains and other responsibilities set forth in the Bylaws (ICANN Bylaws).