Registry

A Registry is the database of all domain names registered under a certain TLD. A registry operator also known as Network Information Center (NIC), which refers to person(s) or entity(ies) responsible in providing registry services. These services include customer database administration, zone file publication, DNS operation, marketing and policy determination. A Registry may outsource some, all, or none of these services. Different registries exist for each TLD.

See registry companies

ICANN's Primary Policies on Registry Services

ICANN has two primary requirements regarding the registry services:

1. First, registries of unsponsored top level domains TLDs can only charge registrars to register new domain names with the initial maximum price established by ICANN. For .com, .info, .biz, .org and .name, price cap for new domain name registration or renewals is $6.00. They are allowed to increase the price annually based on the set percentage; 7% for .com and 10% to other unsponsored TLDs. The price cap for .net is $3.50 and the authorized percentage increase per year is 10% while the initial maximum price for new registrations of third-level domain names .pro is $6.00 and $6.50 for second-level domain names. ICANN has no price restrictions for sponsored TLDs (sTLDs).
2. Second, registry operators are not allowed to own more than 15% of registrars within the TLD.

Registries & Registrars

Vertical Separation

The National Science Foundation signed a Cooperative Agreement with Network Solutions (NSI) as Registry Operator and Registrar for the .com, .net and .org TLDs form 1993-1999. The registry agreement was renewed by ICANN on November 1999. Under the new agreement, NSI agreed to create a multiple registrar system also known as the Shared Registration System (SRS), which allows independent registrar to access the system. Independent registrars will also pay NSI $6.00 for every registered or renewed domain names.

In addition, ICANN encouraged registry and registrar business separation to promote competition by stipulating in the agreement that NSI will only be allowed to renew its registry agreement with ICANN for 4 to 8 years if it will sell its registrar business. In 2000, Verisign purchased NSI and re-negotiated its registry agreement for the .com, .net and .org TLDs with ICANN. ICANN did not require ownership separation but implemented structural separation.ICANN explained, "there is little if any additional competitive value under today's market circumstances in forbidding the registry operator from also being a registrar, so long as it is done is such a way so as not to discriminate against other competitive registrars."

In 2000, ICANN introduced new generic top level domain names, which include .biz, .info, .name and .pro. On February 26, 2001, ICANN proposed a new registry agreement stipulating the legal separation between registry and registrar under section 3.5 Fair Treatment of ICANN-Accredited Registrars, wherein Registry Operators are not allowed to act as registrars with respect to the Registry TLD.

In 2005, ICANN implemented the registry-registrar separation of ownership in the registry agreement for .jobs and .travel sponsored TLDs. Under Section 7.1 clause b and c in the registry agreement states the following provisions: (b) Registry Operator Shall Not Act as Own Registrar. Registry Operator shall not act as a registrar with respect to the TLD. This shall not preclude Registry Operator from registering names within the TLD to itself through a request made to an ICANN-accredited registrar. (c) Restrictions on Acquisition of Ownership or Controlling Interest in Registrar. Registry Operator shall not acquire, directly or indirectly, control of, or a greater than fifteen percent ownership interest in, any ICANN-accredited registrar.

At present, these provisions are included in the registry agreements for all sponsored and unsponsored TLDs.

ICANN's Position on Vertical Separation for New gTLDs

Vertical separation is one of the most important method used by ICANN in maintaining its commitment to promote competition, which is one of the founding principles of the organization. On March 12, 2002, the ICANN Board passed a resolution stating the organization strong position for the implementation of "strict separation" of registries and registrars for new gTLDs. The ICANN Board also stated that co-ownership will be prohibited. However, the ICANN Board also indicated, "if a policy becomes available from the GNSO, and approved by the Board prior to the launch of the new gTLD program, that policy will be considered by the Board for adoption as part of the New gTLD Program."

During a Special Meeting on Novemer 5, 2010, the ICANN Board changed its position regarding the vertical separation of registries and registrars. The Board removed the restriction on cross ownership on the Registry Agreements and replaced it with "requirements and restrictions on any inappropriate or abusive conduct arising out of registry-registrar cross ownership..." These abusive conducts are not limited to misuse of data and violations of a registry code of conduct. In addition, ICANN also stated that it will include additional enforcement mechanisms such as self-auditing requirements, contractual termination and punitive damages. Moreover, it also emphasized that "it will have the ability to refer issues to relevant competition authorities."

ICANN's Reasons for Policy Change on Vertical Separation

The ICANN Board enumerated ten reasons to support its policy change on vertical separation:

1. None of the proposals submitted by the GNSO reflects a consensus opinion; as a result, the Board supported a model based on its own factual investigation, expert analysis, and concerns expressed by stakeholders and community.
2. ICANN's position and mission must be focused on creating more competition as opposed to having rules that restrict competition and innovation.
3. Rules permitting cross-ownership foster greater diversity in business models and enhance opportunities offered by new TLDs.
4. Rules prohibiting cross-ownership require more enforcement and can easily be circumvented.
5. Preventing cross-ownership would create more exposure to ICANN of lawsuits, including anti-trust lawsuits, which are costly to defend even if ICANN believes (as it does) that it has no proper exposure to such litigation.
6. Rules permitting cross-ownership enhance efficiency and almost certainly will result in benefits to consumers in the form of lower prices and enhanced services.
7. The Rules of Conduct, which is to be part of the base agreement for all new gTLDs include adequate protections designed to address behavior the Board wants to discourage, including abuses of data and market power...
8. Case by case re-negotiation of existing contracts to reflect the new cross ownership rules will permit ICANN to address the risk of abuse of market power contractually.
9. In the event ICANN has competition concerns, ICANN will have the ability to to refer those concerns to relevant antitrust authorities.
10. ICANN can amend contracts to address harms that may arise as a direct or indirect result of the new cross-ownership rules.

EC Concerns Over the Full Removal of Vertical Separation

On June 17, 2011, the Information Society and Media Directorate General of the European Commission (EC) submitted a non-paper regarding ICANN's proposed full removal of the vertical separation to the ICANN Board. Copies were furnished to NTIA Assistant Secretary Larry Strickling and to Assistant Attorney General Christine Varney of the Department of Justice Antitrust Division. EC cited some issues and recommendations which include:

• Vertical separation provides a balance playing field for competition between registrars. The absence of expert advice to remove it and stakeholders consensus is premature and might result to negative market output for consumers.
• Vertical Integration might harm competition. The European Commission cited the CRA International Report on 2008, which emphasized the risk of vertical integration wherein registries may discriminate independent registrars by lowering prices and providing better registry services to their affiliate registrars.
• ICANN does not have sufficient data to support the full removal of vertical separation.
• A consensus on the issue within the GNSO and internet stakeholders is lacking.
• The procedural approach of ICANN to refer an application to relevant antitrust authorities for "expert analysis and ante determination" overlooks the fact that competition authorities have limited powers in implementing rules, which is based on a case to case market analysis. ICANN did not clearly identify specific laws that will serve as basis of its jurisdiction to determine if there are concerns on competition. Referral to competition authorities depends on ICANN's discretion.
• The EC encouraged ICANN to reconsider its' decision to implement the full removal of vertical separation of registries and registrars and to accomplish the following suggestions:

1. seek independent economic and legal expert studies regarding the present situation of the domain name market and evaluate the impact of the existing restrictions on vertical integration. The impact of partially or totally removing the restriction on innovation and to consumers.
2. provide new market data on the current degree of competition and cross-ownership within the registry and registrar level.
3. provide data and documents supporting ICANN's decision to fully remove vertical separation.
4. provide comments regarding the procedural concerns raised by EC.

Top-Level Domain

Generic Names Supporting Organization. Develops and recommends to the Board substantive policies relating to generic top-level domains and other responsibilities set forth in the Bylaws (ICANN Bylaws).