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The discussion of creating new [[gTLD|Generic Top-Level Domains]] has been around since the inception of ICANN; there was no set number fixed, and the fact that the [[.com]] extension has long been the most widely used and recognizable top-level domain was encouraged by ICANN's slow policy development process. It was underwritten in the 2001 amendments to their [[MoU]] with the U.S.' [[DOC|Department of Commerce]] that ICANN was to "collaborate on the design, development and testing of a plan for creating a process that will consider the possible expansion of the number of gTLDs".<ref>[http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/icann-memorandum.htm NTIA.doc.gov]</ref>
The discussion of creating new [[gTLD|Generic Top-Level Domains]] has been around since the inception of ICANN; there was no set number fixed, and the fact that the [[.com]] extension has long been the most widely used and recognizable top-level domain was encouraged by ICANN's slow policy development process. It was underwritten in the 2001 amendments to their [[MoU]] with the U.S.' [[DOC|Department of Commerce]] that ICANN was to "collaborate on the design, development and testing of a plan for creating a process that will consider the possible expansion of the number of gTLDs".<ref>[http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/icann-memorandum.htm NTIA.doc.gov]</ref>


At the October, 2003 meeting in Carthage the Board passed its most significant address to date on the issue. In it they recognized their obligation to develop new gTLDs in an effective, transparent, and stable manner, the overdue nature of a formal process for gTLD expansion, and the problems they faced when introducing the last round of extensions in 2000. Thus, they resolved to begin to dedicate significant resources to the issue and to establish a public forum in order to receive community input.<ref>[http://www.icann.org/en/announcements/advisory-31oct03.htm ICANN Carthage]</ref>
At the October, 2003 meeting in Carthage, [[ICANN Board|the Board]] passed its most significant resolution to date on the issue. In it they recognized their obligation to develop new gTLDs in an effective, transparent, and stable manner, the overdue nature of a formal process for gTLD expansion, and the problems they faced when introducing the last round of extensions in 2000. Thus, they resolved to begin to dedicate significant resources to the issue and to establish a public forum in order to receive community input.<ref>[http://www.icann.org/en/announcements/advisory-31oct03.htm ICANN Carthage]</ref>


=References=
=References=

Revision as of 23:13, 15 June 2011

Type: Private, Non-Profit
Industry: Internet Protocol Management
Founded: 1998
Headquarters: 4676 Admiralty Way # 330,
Marina del Rey, CA, USA
Employees: 140 employees
Revenue: 63.6 million (2010)
Website: ICANN.org
Key People
Rod Beckstrom, CEO and President

Peter Dengate Thrush, Chair of the Board
Steve Crocker, Vice Chair of the Board

ICANN is an acronym for the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, a global multi-stakeholder organization that was created and empowered through actions by the U.S. government and its Department of Commerce.[1] It coordinates the Internet DNS, IP addresses and AS numbers; which involves a continued management of these evolving systems and the protocols that underly them.

While ICANN has its roots in the U.S. government, it is now, and continues to strive to be, an international, community driven organization. Their management of an interoperable Internet covers 180 million domain names, the allocation of more than 4 billion network addresses, and the support of approximately a trillion DNS look-ups everyday across 240 countries.[2]

ICANN collaborates with companies, individuals, and governments to ensure the continued success of the Internet. It holds meetings three times a year, switching the international location for each meeting; one of these serves as the annual general meeting when the new ICANN board members take their seats.[3]

The Beginning[edit | edit source]

On July 1st, 1997, U.S. President Bill Clinton directed the Secretary of Commerce to privatize the management of the DNS, which had heretofore been managed by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the National Science Foundation (NSF) and other U.S. research agencies.[4] The goal was to open the Internet to greater international participation, and to bolster it as a new medium of commercial competition and exchange.[5]

On July 2nd, the Department of Commerce requested public input regarding DNS administration and structure, policy input regarding new registrars and the creation of new TLDs, and concerns regarding trademarks. More than 1,500 pages of comments were received.[6]

In January, 1998, an agency of the Department of Commerce (NTIA) issued what has become known as the "Green Paper." The document was a proposal which made clear that the agency intended to empower a non-profit entity to take control of the Internet and its DNS system.[7] The proposal drew criticism from some American lawmakers and other concerned individuals who saw the American-fostered Internet about to be handed over to a Swiss entity.[8] The revised "White Paper" addressed some of those concerns but still posited the need for an Internet organization which could respect and foster stability, competition, bottom-up coordination, and international representation, while also establishing appropriate protocol and administrative mechanisms.[9] The "White Paper" did not clarify all of the divisive issues but instead called for the proposed entity to utilize its self-governance to decide on the issues at hand itself.[10]

The Memorandum of Understanding[edit | edit source]

On November 25th, 1998, The U.S. Department of Commerce and ICANN entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU),[11] which officially recognized ICANN as the entity that would:

a. Establish policy for and direct the allocation of IP number blocks;

b. Oversee the operation of the authoritative root server system;

c. Oversee the policy for determining the circumstances under which new TLDs would be added to the root system;

d. Coordinate the assignment of other Internet technical parameters as needed to maintain universal connectivity on the Internet; and

e. Oversee other activities necessary to coordinate the specified DNS management functions, as agreed by the Department of Commerce and ICANN.

Once again, these responsibilities would be undertaken and guided by the principles of stability, competition, private bottom-up coordination, and representation.[12] The agreement established ICANN as an entity that would encourage transparency in its dealings and would create ample room for appeals for any binding decisions it would make. The Department of Commerce later noted that it was comfortable ceding its control to ICANN, as it seemed like the best step towards true privatization while still binding the authority of the institution to the American policies found within the MoU.[13] The original agreement was set with an expiration of September 30th, 2000.[14] The MoU has been amended several times.

Initial Issues[edit | edit source]

ICANN was immediately faced with two pressing, opposing issues: the task of reigning in CyberSquatting by creating policies necessary to protect recognized trademarks, and conversely the need to expand the number of entities accredited to function as registrars. Following the release of the White Paper, WIPO began its own research into how to protect trademarks and intellectual property within the changing DNS. A congressional hearing some 7 months after the empowerment of ICANN recognized the steps that the new entity had already taken to protect intellectual property, recognized the headway WIPO had made in creating further proposals, and called on intellectual property owners to become involved in ICANN. [15]

WIPO's report, submitted to ICANN at their 1999 meeting in Berlin, supported the Whois system, but also recommended that, should the Whois system fail to provide adequate contact information for the trademark holder to contact the domain name holder, the registrar should be obliged to rectify the situation by canceling the domain name holder's rights to the name. ICANN immediately took steps to develop the nascent Whois system.

The report also made recommendations regarding the process of accrediting new registrars, called for the creation of a concrete dispute resolution process for intellectual property issues within the DNS, and also recommended that the creation of any new gTLDs should proceed slowly and with caution. These recommendations precipitated ICANN's Accreditation Guidelines, the creation of the UDRP, and the continued debate over how and when to increase the number of gTLDs.[16]

Registrar Accreditation[edit | edit source]

A month before the MoU officially recognized ICANN, the Department of Commerce and NSI amended their cooperative agreement. The agreement had previously maintained the NSI as the only registrar for the .com, .org, and .net domains.[17] The three amendments to the agreement removed the exclusive rights of NSI; amendment 11 called for the creation of a Shared Registry System, whereby an unlimited number of competitive registrars would have access to one system managed by NSI.[18] Amendment 12 gave more time to NSI to complete important milestones in the liberalization of registry services; the final phase, which called for equal access to the SRS by all accredited registrars, was now given a deadline of about one year, October 25th, 1999.[19] Amendment 13 attached a $9 fee for each second level domain name registered, payable as $18 for new registrations and $9 per year on the anniversary of the original registration.[20]

On February 8th, 1999, ICANN posted its Draft Guidelines for Registrar Accreditation for public commentary.[21] The guidelines were formed through consultation with the DOC and NSI, and further tailored after the session of public commentary.[22] Some issues raised during the period of public commentary include: concerns regarding the inherent bureaucracy, inadequate protections for intellectual property, and the reasoning behind accrediting registrars before the DNSO was constituted.[23] The ICANN board accepted the revised Statement of Registrar Accreditation Policy at their March, 1999 meeting in Singapore.[24]

The initial policy called for registrars to provide secure access to the registry, be operationally capable of handling significant registration volume, maintain electronic transaction records, handle and provide prompt service to SLD requests, provide security, handle seamless transfers of customers who desire to switch registrars, employ an adequately sized staff, and have measures in place to protect the interests of their customers should the registrar fail. The registrar would also have to demonstrate that it had a sufficient liability insurance policy and store of liquid assets. A concern over creating and maintaining a valid registry service is evidenced in the requirement that information regarding each registrant of a SLD would have to be submitted by the registrar to NSI for inclusion in its registry. Providing a searchable Whois service was also required. Application fees for those applying to be included in the Phase 1 testbed cost $2,500, the general application fee was $1,000. Annual accreditation fees, amounting to $5,000, would also be assessed.[25]

The Registration Accreditation Agreement was unanimously amended by the ICANN board in May, 2009.[26]

The Testbed Period[edit | edit source]

Numerous technical problems plagued the testbed period of the SRS.[27] The aforementioned Amendment 12 established the testbed period as Phase 1 of the deployment of the SRS, and set a start date of April 26th, 1999, and an end date of June 25th, 1999.[28] Register.com finally became the first of the 5 competitive testbed registrars to successfully implement its interface with the SRS, which happened 6 weeks into the 2 month testbed period. The technical difficulties also extended to the deployment of the required Whois system.[29] Throughout the testbed period general applications for the later phases were being accepted.[30] The Department of Commerce and the NSI extended the testbed period about 4 times,[31] the final extension finally expired on November 5th, 1999.[32]

UDRP[edit | edit source]

On September 29th, 1999, ICANN posted the Uniform Domain Name Resolution Policy for public comments. The process aimed to address problems arising from CyberSquatting and protect intellectual property rights. This process was not solely a concern or product of ICANN,given WIPO's earlier, and continued, effort on the UDRP. The policy asserts that it will transfer, delete, or asses other changes to any domain name held by a domainer which:

1. Is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights; and

2. The domainer no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name; and

3. The domain name in question has been registered and is being used in bad faith.[33]

The same day, ICANN also issued the Rules for the UDRP, which set forth the procedure for filing and responding to complaints. This was also open for a period of public commentary.[34] Some of the public comments can be found here.

ICANN adopted the UDRP at its November, 1999, meeting in Los Angeles.[35]

Organization & Structure[edit | edit source]

It is central to ICANN's mission that the organization itself is structured in a way that welcomes a variety of voices and seeks to represent the extremely diverse constituencies with continued interest in the Internet's development, from registries, to corporations, to individual Internet users. Naturally, throughout ICANN's structural development there have been critics who have taken issue with closed-door sessions, the role of the U.S. Department of Commerce, and other structural and procedural rules.[36] ICANN has recently been described as being in a contentious oversight situation; with some countries calling for all U.S. influence to be removed from the organization by subordinating it to the U.N.'s jurisdiction, or suggesting similar solutions.[37]

Board of Directors[edit | edit source]

ICANN is governed by a Board of Directors made up of 15 voting members,[38] and the President and CEO; who is also a voting member. The board is further aided by 5 non-voting liaisons.[39]

Selection of Voting Members[edit | edit source]

ICANN's bylaws stipulate the makeup of the board, stating:

The board then selects a Chairman and vice-Chairman from among its voting ranks, although the President and CEO is excluded from consideration from either of these posts. Directors selected for the board must be: individuals of intelligence and integrity, aware of ICANN and the effects of its existence and decisions, representative of cultural and geographic diversity, familiar with Internet protocols and the roles of its important entities, volunteers (excluding the CEO), and capable of working in written and spoken English.[41] They also must disclose any external affiliations they have that could be perceived as affecting a conflict of interest as they are charged with representing ICANN's best interests and not those of the group which nominated them or their professional affiliations.

International Representation[edit | edit source]

At any one time each global region must have at least one director on the board, with no more than 5 allowed for any one region. The international regions are: Europe; Asia/Australia/Pacific; Latin America/Caribbean islands; Africa; and North America. This rule is in place to ensure holistic international representation.[42]

Current Board of Directors[edit | edit source]

The 15 current directors, and the current CEO, are listed below, along with the organization which nominated them and the length of their term:[43]

Non-Voting Liaisons[edit | edit source]

An additional 5 seats are held for non-voting liaisons. These liaisons are given access to the same materials and are a part of the board's debates; they represent various specialty and advisory organizations and provide valuable input and reactions to ICANN deliberations. The seats are determined as follows:[44]

Current Non-Voting Liaisons[edit | edit source]

Review Processes[edit | edit source]

ICANN has mechanisms in place for any individual or entity to solicit a reappraisal of any board decision that affects them. The Board Governance Committee is in charge of reviewing all reconsideration requests, which are submitted electronically and must be responded to within 30 days. The boards actions are also reviewed by an Independent Review Panel, which has the power to call attention to discrepancies between the bylaws and actions taken by the board, and recommend that the board readdress certain issues. Furthermore, ICANN's structure and operations, including every supporting organization and committee, is also subject to occasional reviews.[45]

Meetings[edit | edit source]

ICANN holds week-long meetings 3 times per year; one of these meetings serves as the organization's annual meeting, where new board directors take their appointed seats. These meetings are held in a different location each time, with each global region hosting a meeting before the regional cycle is started anew.[46] The next meeting will be the 41st meeting in Singapore. The 41st meeting was scheduled to be held in Amman, Jordan, before it was moved due to security concerns.[47] Singapore was then selected to host that meeting.[48]

Meetings officially begin on a Monday, though some supporting organizations meet prior to this, and run through Friday.

A fellowship program is in place to bring in individuals who have a desire or need to attend but do not have the financial backing to attend on their own.[49]

Developments & Changes[edit | edit source]

ICANN's bottom-up focus and its periodic structural reviews lead to revision of its bylaws and the introduction of new entities and policies. One such rush of changes happened in and around the year 2000, when the prospective changes and the discussions surrounding them spurned people to talk of "ICANN 2.0".[50]

The Introduction of the ALAC[edit | edit source]

One of the discussions and propositions which was involved in the debate surrounding "ICANN 2.0" was the introduction of a body which could represent individual Internet users.[51] This became known as the At-Large Committee, or ALAC, and while it was finally introduced through amendments to the bylaws in 2002, it had been a hot topic for debate for years. [52]

Other Committees[edit | edit source]

Many of the other new developments at ICANN were accomplished through the introduction of review teams; such as the Committee on ICANN Evolution and Reform. Other Committees intent on expanding and specializing the role of ICANN were also created, such as the Security Committee, which eventually became the Security and Stability Advisory Committee. Both of these committees were given official recognition in 2002.[53] The push for reform was also significantly aided by Stuart Lynn's "President's report: The Case for Reform",[54] which they credited for starting the dialogue on reform and leading to the creation of the more formal committee.[55]

ICANN adopted a new set of by-laws, which were first laid out by the aforementioned Evolution and Reform Committee, before being revised in response to Public Forums. Those by-laws can be read here. The by-laws not only more clearly defined ICANN's mission and core values, but it also put in place and improved apparatuses for review and greater transparency. The Reconsideration Committee, Independent Review Panel, and the Ombudsman all were strengthened as a part of this move towards a more transparent organization that is able to defend its actions and decisions.[56]

Further Developments[edit | edit source]

New gTLDs[edit | edit source]

The discussion of creating new Generic Top-Level Domains has been around since the inception of ICANN; there was no set number fixed, and the fact that the .com extension has long been the most widely used and recognizable top-level domain was encouraged by ICANN's slow policy development process. It was underwritten in the 2001 amendments to their MoU with the U.S.' Department of Commerce that ICANN was to "collaborate on the design, development and testing of a plan for creating a process that will consider the possible expansion of the number of gTLDs".[64]

At the October, 2003 meeting in Carthage, the Board passed its most significant resolution to date on the issue. In it they recognized their obligation to develop new gTLDs in an effective, transparent, and stable manner, the overdue nature of a formal process for gTLD expansion, and the problems they faced when introducing the last round of extensions in 2000. Thus, they resolved to begin to dedicate significant resources to the issue and to establish a public forum in order to receive community input.[65]

References[edit | edit source]

  1. ↑ ICANN DOC MoU
  2. ↑ ICANN Strategic Plan 2010
  3. ↑ ICANN About Meetings
  4. ↑ NTIA Green Paper
  5. ↑ ICANN DOC MoU
  6. ↑ NTIA
  7. ↑ ICANN White Paper
  8. ↑ ICANN Green Paper v. White Paper correspondence
  9. ↑ Harvard Law Document
  10. ↑ ICANN Greev v. White Paper correspondence
  11. ↑ ICANN MoU
  12. ↑ ICANN DOC MoU
  13. ↑ Congressional Hearing
  14. ↑ ICANN DOC MoU
  15. ↑ Congressional Hearing, July 1999
  16. ↑ Congressional Hearing, July 1999
  17. ↑ accreditation history
  18. ↑ NTIA Amendment 11
  19. ↑ NTIA Amendment 12
  20. ↑ NTIA Amendment 13
  21. ↑ ICANN Accreditation History
  22. ↑ Mail Archive
  23. ↑ Harvard Law Singapore Document
  24. ↑ ICANN Accreditation History
  25. ↑ Statement of Registrar Accreditation Policy
  26. ↑ ICANN Accrediation History
  27. ↑ Andrew McLaughlin Memorandum
  28. ↑ Amendment 12
  29. ↑ Andrew McLaughlin Memorandum
  30. ↑ ICANN Accreditation History
  31. ↑ [http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/icann/pressingissues2000/briefingbook/milestones.html
  32. ↑ Fact Sheet on Tentative Agreements among ICANN, the U.S. Department of Commerce, and Network Solutions, Inc.
  33. ↑ ICANN UDRP Policy
  34. ↑ Rules for the UDRP]
  35. ↑ Harvard Law UDRP Overview
  36. ↑ Stanford.edu
  37. ↑ The Washington Post
  38. ↑ Board Review
  39. ↑ ICANN Bylaws
  40. ↑ ICANN Bylaws
  41. ↑ ICANN Bylaws
  42. ↑ ICANN Bylaws
  43. ↑ ICANN.org
  44. ↑ ICANN Bylaws
  45. ↑ ICANN Bylaws
  46. ↑ ICANN About Meetings
  47. ↑ DNN.com
  48. ↑ Goldstein Report.com
  49. ↑ Fellowship Program
  50. ↑ "ICANN 2.0 Meet the New Boss"
  51. ↑ Caslon.com
  52. ↑ ICANN ALAC
  53. ↑ ICANN.org
  54. ↑ ICANN.org
  55. ↑ ICANN Bucharest]
  56. ↑ ICANN.org
  57. ↑ ICANN.org
  58. ↑ ICANN Shanghai
  59. ↑ ICANN.org
  60. ↑ ICANN Bucharest
  61. ↑ ICANN 4th Annual Meeting
  62. ↑ ICANN Rio
  63. ↑ ICANN Rome
  64. ↑ NTIA.doc.gov
  65. ↑ ICANN Carthage

At-Large Advisory Committee. Considers and provides advice on the activities of ICANN related to the interests of individual Internet users (ICANN Bylaws). Not to be confused with the Non-Commercial Stakeholder Group.

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